


















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 











Presenting the Prison: The South African 
Prison Autobiography under Apartheid 
Daniel Roux 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in the Department of English 












Presenting the Prison: The South African Prison Autobiography under Apartheid 
This thesis investigates a range of South African autobiographical accounts of imprisonment, 
most of them by political prisoners under apartheid. Its principal focus is on the ways in 
which the prison as physical and ideological space intersects with a conscious literary 
construction of identity. The argument is that in these accounts, the prison features as both 
object and subject: it appears as one of the objects of description, a referent among others in a 
structured succession of events, but in fact it also serves as the very frame that enables and 
structures the consciousness that speaks about - and from within - the prison. In other words, 
the prison is one of the important coercive instruments that governed the forms of 
consciousness, literary and otherwise, that emerged in South Africa under apartheid. A 
broader topic engaged by this discussion is therefore also the role played by materially based 
disciplinary structures in the emergence of autobiographical literary forms. This approach 
rejects the idea that resistance is exclusively a matter of grappling with social injustice, and 
suggests that it resides also in moments of uncertainty, equivocation and tension in the 
construction of the "I" that speaks. A corollary aim of the thesis is to demonstrate how South 
African prisons produced various distinct forms of subjectivity, specifically because different 
prisons treated prisoners differently, often in accordance with apartheid understandings of 
race and gender. The South African prison is approached not as a monolithic, uniform 
structure, but as a formation that was originally inherited from Enlightenment Europe and 
then fractured and transformed under the pressures of colonialism and apartheid. While a 
wide range of autobiographies are referred to in the discussion, the most important memoirs 
include Herman Charles Bosman's Cold Stone Jug (as prototype for the genre), Breyten 
Breytenbach's The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist, Ruth First's 117 Days, Caesarina 
Makhoere's No Child's Play, Nelson Mandela's Long Walk to Freedom, and Emma 
Mashinini's Strikes Have Followed Me All My Life. 
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When Van Riebeeck confined Autshumoto to Robben Island in 1658, he also 
introduced the prison as one of the principal methods of social control and coercion 
under successive colonial and apartheid regimes. After 1948, under apartheid rule, the 
prison and its myriad subsidiary institutions increasingly occupied a central role in 
South African society. Pass laws effectively ensured that most black South Africans 
spent some time in prison: between 1920 and 1986, when pass books were abolished, 
20 million people were arrested for pass law infractions (Worger 63). Detention Laws, 
the Suppression ofCornmunism Act (1950), the Sabotage Act (1962), the Terrorism 
Act (1967), the Internal Security Act (1976) and successive States of Emergency 
between 1960 and 1990 ensured that incarceration or exile were the only available 
options for at least two generations of political activists and freedom fighters. 
Political leaders, artists, writers, intellectuals, and rights campaigners were routinely 
imprisoned, often under the flimsiest pretexts. Between 1960 and 1990, approximately 
80 000 people were detained without trial, in addition to the large numbers of charged 
and sentenced political prisoners (Gready, "Writing as resistance" 1). When the first 
democratic cabinet was announced under Nelson Mande1a's presidency in 1994, nine of 
its thirty members had spent time in prison, and most had lived in exile at some point to 














second half of the twentieth century, the prison served as a master signifier that 
determined the boundary of all the different articulations of activism, of political 
attitudes and even, at a certain level, for the maj ority of South Africans, of ideas of 
citizenship. As Gready points out, 
[c]entral to apartheid's design were the layered spaces of confinement and 
exclusion: lives were lived within an evolving crosshatch of mutually enforcing 
insides and outsides, behind bars and borders. Opponents of apartheid provided 
only the most obvious manifestation of lifetimes of harassment that could be 
framed in these terms. The prison extended from the various prisons of the mind 
and pervasive state interference and control in daily life, to house arrest, 
banning (a measure which variously restricted freedom of movement, 
association, and expression), detention, andjail, through the occupied and 
terrorized townships to the Bantustans, the borders of South Africa, and 
beyond ... (Writing as Resistance 1-2) 
Actual imprisonment aside, ordinary civilian life in South Africa shared some of the 
characteristics of a prison environment. A 1978 Amnesty International report observes: 
Over the years, several commentators have made the point that the restrictions 
imposed by apartheid on the individual's freedom of movement, association 
and expression, have effectively made political prisoners of all South Africa's 
2 
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population. In some senses this is perhaps true, for the introduction of 
discriminatory apartheid legislation has imposed new and artificial limits on 
each individual's activity and behaviour. Even members of the dominant white 
group are restricted in that, for example, they may not enter certain areas 
without official permission or marry the person of their choice if such a person 
is not a member ofthe same racial group. Blacks are subject to restrictions on 
all aspects of life. (Amnesty International 37) 
The cultural imaginary cohered around the prison; those South Africans who never 
encountered it in reality were haunted by it in their dreams. The absolute centrality of 
the prison to recent South African history is figured in the erection of the Constitutional 
Court on the site of the old Fort, where countless people had been detained over the 
years predominantly for pass offences, and by the construction in the buildings of 
parliament in Pretoria of a replica of Mandela's cell on Robben Island. In this way, the 
enduring legacy of the prison is poignantly figured in the actual architecture and 
topography of the parliament and of the highest judiciary authority in post-apartheid 
South Africa. 
Against this background, this thesis investigates a range of South African 
autobiographical accounts of imprisonment, most of them by political prisoners under 
apartheid. My principal interest is in the ways in which different subjectivities are 

















in which the prison as physical and ideological space intersects with a conscious 
literary construction of identity. My argument is that prison narratives became a kind of 
laboratory for the construction of South African selves. The basic coordinates of 
contemporary post-apartheid South African debates about personal and collective 
identity as well as the grounds for a particular ontological awareness of the nature and 
duties of the self were laid down with specific reference to the prison, which became a 
synechdocal representative of society in general: as Mandela observes in Long Walk to 
Freedom, "[ w]e regarded the struggle in prison as a microcosm of the struggle as a 
whole" (464). 
To understand the role of the prison in the construction of self, it is necessary to 
________ ---~---~.-----"-----.-«-r-.-- _._"_." ,,~,"_~_,,_ .. K __ ~.~~",<,._~.~. 
dlsp~ with the idea of what Bruner calls a "natur l genre" of artless autobiography 
(48), where some autonomous, authentic and transcendent voice describes and 
evaluates the reality of life in prison. This view recurs often in popular accounts of 
prison memoirs as "triumphant illustrations of the human spirit" (Moseneke iv), but 
also recurs in some academic appraisals of this important South African genre. 1 
Against such a view, we should insist that identity is always contingent on the 
conditions of its emergence. There are very particular socio-historical structures that 
-~----.-..• ----.---------~--
-----~ 
1 See for example Dietche's "Voyaging Towards Freedom", where she claims that "Mashinini's voice at 
the end of her book rises up above her fatigue, her infrrmity, the losses she has suffered. Her voice carries 
with it the weight of her undaunted spirit ... " (68) This is not to say, of course, that all academic appraisals 
of South African prison writing advance such a romanticised and simplistic understanding of the narrating 
voice: Coetzee, Dimitriu, Driver, Gready, Jacobs, Reckwitz and Schalkwyk, to name only a few examples, 
offer readings that are attentive to the mediated quality of the narration in prison autobiographies. My thesis 





















govern how the individual subject becomes knowable. Importantly, these structures 
--:---=---=--:-------::-:-----:-~---::-:--=------::---=----::-:------~------­
include the structures of the prison itself. At the most fundamental level, even the --- -----assumption of a singular, introspective "I", one of the cornerstones of an 
autobiographical ~c-colliiCiealisesthepris~'s project of isolation and individualisation. 
fu;dditi~~~~f~;~~;s ~~~h-;S-ffie· global appetite for n~ves of personal witnessing2, 
the ideologies and cultural capital that prisoners enter prison with, particular culturally 
and politically inflected understandings of the structure and function of 
autobiographical accounts, dominant social understandings of the trope of prison, and 
the "higher truths" (Gready, "Autobiography" 522) that prisoners consciously address 
themselves to, the prison is itself a "machine for altering minds", to use Foucault's 
famous fonnulation (125). An important point of departure, for this thesis, is that the 
prison produces the voices that speakfrom it: it is not an objective phenomenon that 
-------------------------------
becomes assimilated into and Q!~g.i<lJ~gJ:)~~.:existiM!ocal and global1nroi1iianon 
. .--'.--" .... ._----
flows, but is itself productive of particular subjectivities. To put it simply, the prison is 
------...;:0. 
both object and subject: it appears as one of the objects of description, a referent among 
others in a structured succession of events, but in fact it also serves as the very frame 
that enables and structures the consciousness that speaks about - and from within - the 
prison. I return to some of these arguments below, but would like to make clear the 
central premise of my thesis: the language, rituals and proscriptions of the penal 
institution do not merely number along a range of discursive practices that "destabilise" 
the speaking subject, as the cliched topos of autobiographical theory would propose, 
5 
2 As Gilmore points out, the publication of books identified as "autobiography or memoir" tripled between 













but is itself the discourse that organises, locates and supplies meaning to all other 
discursive practices. Even when the trauma of prison is artfully remembered in answer 
to particular literary, cultural or therapeutic needs, the prison itself ultimately plays a 
central role in the production of memory. 
, 
One of the few academic studies of the South African prison that proceeds from an 
analogous assumption is Fran Buntman's Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to 
Apartheid. Buntman's text stands out from other histories of Robben Island for its 
willingness to engage the key role of political imprisonment in forming - and 
sustaining - strategies for resistance. Moreover, the text is attentive to the ways in 
which the prison's "impact resonated beyond antiapartheid opposition to the politics of 
negotiating a transition and creating and governing a democratic state" (Robben Island 
4).3 While Buntman's interest is primarily historical and sociological, however, this 
thesis focuses not so much on memoirs and testimonies as corroborative historical 
evidence as on the conscious, literary production of subjectivity. My interest is really a 
literary one, concerned with the emergence of a constellation of influential discourses 
of SUbjectivity from the apartheid prison, and on the conditions that governed and 
shaped these representations. 
Another important aim of this thesis is to suggest that post-apartheid subjectivities 
remain inextricably bound to the kinds of selves that emerged in reference to the 
3 See also Fran Buntman and Tong-Yi Huang's "The Role of Political Imprisonment in Developing and 
Enhancing Political Leadership". 
6 
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apartheid prison. In the sense that life in the apartheid prison represented a kind of 
focalised, acute version of civilian life under the apartheid state - a point made by 
almost every prison diarist - this is also to suggest that there is a more general 
continuity between apartheid and post-apartheid constructions of individuality, 
community and notions of care. I return to this observation in more detail in the third 
chapter ("On Robben Island") and in the conclusion, where I discuss some of the links 
between the concept of "self' in prison and the selves addressed by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. 
By insisting on a certain historical connection between the South African landscape 
before and after the first democratic election of 1994, this thesis endeavours to avoid 
the convenient division between "apartheid" and "post-apartheid" literary and social 
forms that seems to have become a standard postulation in South African literary and 
cultural theory. While such a periodisation is obviously inevitable and necessary, its 
naturalisation in academic language seems to encourage readings that rest on a model 
of history as the displacement of one synchronic way of life with another almost 
incongruous synchronic totality: what is lost here in the name of a kind of pseudo-
Foucaultian "historicism" is precisely history itself; the diachronic strands of continuity 
between the past and the present. By making the apartheid period into an enclosed 
object of study, we run the risk of writing an epitaph for our very recent traumatic 













On the one hand, following theorists such as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek, we could 
argue that certain successive historical moments tend to respond to (and try to resolve) 
the same traumatic impasse, what Lacan would call the kernel of the Real4• Thus, for 
instance, Zizek notes that "class struggle is real in the strict Lacanian sense" (For They 
Know Not 100), since it represents a persistent, particular impediment to the smooth 
operation of the social totality. Different historical epochs correspond to different 
attempts to symbolise and resolve the impasse of class struggle, which is figured as an 
unsettling manifestation of the Real at the heart of the social symbolic precisely 
because it frustrates all attempts to contain and defuse its effects: 
This kernel of the Real encircled by failed attempts to symbolize-totalize it is 
radically non-historical: history itself is nothing but a succession of failed 
attempts to grasp, conceive, specify this strange kernel. (Zizek, For They Know 
Not 101) 
4 In Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, the domain of the Real is distinguished by its resistance to 
representation. In his seminar of 1954-1955, Lacan characterises the Real as ''the essential object which 
isn't an object any longer, but this something faced with which all words cease and all categories fail, the 
object of anxiety per excellence" (Ego 164). While it is certainly not the object of this thesis to provide a 
detailed exposition of Lacanian theory, it is worth pointing out that while the Lacanian Real resists 
symbolisation, it is also seen as the cause of the symbolic, an absent centre that language attempts to 
contain. Elsewhere, Lacan refers to a vase to explain this apparently paradoxical status of the Real, noting 
that it is "an object made to represent the emptiness at the centre" (Ethics 121). Slavoj ZiZek provides a 
somewhat less whimsical explanation in his Indivisible Remainder: "the symbolic order (the big Other) is 
organized around a hole in its very heart, around the Traumatic thing which makes it 'non-all'; it is defmed 
by the impossibility of attaining the Thing; however, it is this very reference to the void of the Thing that 
opens up the space for symbolization, since without it the symbolic order would immediately 'collapse' 
into the designated reality - that is to say, the distance that separates 'words' from 'things' would 
disappear. The void of the Thing is therefore both things at the same time: the inaccessible 'hard kernel' 
around which symbolization turns, which eludes it, the cause of the failure, and the very space of 
symbolization, its condition of possibility" (IndiVisible Remainder 145). 
ttc;: tJlt  





















Zizek's rejection of historicism, paradoxically, insists on the importance ofa properly 
materialist concept of history as a way of expressing the relationship between one 
historical moment and another. 
In the South African case, this irresolvable "kernel ofthe Real" that articulates the 
succession of historical epistemes could refer particularly to the problematic of 
subsuming fractured, economically - and previously legally - divided communities 
under the same communal modality, to the traumatic relationship between the 
individual and the collective as centres of meaning and authority, and to the conflict 
between ideas of "modernity" and those discourses that have resisted such a 
classification. While these fissures, collisions and ideological deadlocks were important 
points of reference and crisis for the struggle against apartheid, they are equally 
insistent today as problems of civic governance and nationhood: in this particular sense, 
the current symbolic order is connected to the past in the sense that they both attempt, 
and fail, to address the same fundamental predicaments. 
On the other hand, following Fredric Jameson, one could point out that even where a 
revolutionary shift takes place in the mode of production, the encounter with the past 
necessarily involves and destabilises the present. Jameson comments that once the 
meeting between past and present is seen not as an encounter between individual 
subjects and the inert object of the past, but rather as an encounter between two modes 
of production, then 
9 
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... it is not we who sit in judgment of the past, but rather the past, the radical 
difference of other modes of production (and even the immediate past of our 
own mode of production), whichjudges us, imposing the painful knowledge of 
what we are not, what we are no longer, what we are not yet. ("Marxism and 
Historicism" 175) 
In other words, the sUbjectivities that arise in prison memoirs have urgent questions to 
pose to nascent post-apartheid conceptions of self and other, as, indeed, to the global 
readership ofthese autobiographies. The prison memoir presents a fractured mirror 
where post-apartheid sUbjectivities encounter both their troubled genesis and their 
difference from themselves; where they are invited to recognise themselves as projects 
that are intenninably in the process of becoming. 
To understand something of the origin and development of the voices that speak in 
prison memoirs, this thesis uses a wide range of texts, published between 1948 and 
2003, to examine how the penal institution mediates, obstructs and produces particular 
discursive strategies for self-presentation. This in no way suggests that there is a 
homogeneous "prison voice": in fact, as I will demonstrate throughout this thesis, the 
South African prison under apartheid was uncertain of its principles and aims, 
attempted to reproduce and entrench the racial partitioning of the apartheid state, 

















control that differed hugely from one particular institution to another, shifted its mode 
of operation according to rapidly changing historical circumstances, and existed in 
dispersed and fractured localities that ranged from the complete invisibility and 
terrifying insecurity of detention without trial, to the "ordinary" prison sentence, to 
"house arrest", where a particular carcerallogic bled into the domain of ordinary 
civilian life. 
11 
Moreover, prisoners entered gaol with remarkably diverse histories, beliefs, 
knowledges and self-conceptions. Robben Island, South Africa's premier political 
prison under apartheid, serves as a good example of the kinds of differences that could 
traverse a single penal institution. Firstly, as in other prisons, prisoners were ranked 
according to four categories: A, B, C or D. Prisoners in the A category enjoyed the 
most privileges, while prisoners in the D category enjoyed the least. Political prisoners 
rarely moved up from the D or C classification, since the prison board that evaluated 
prisoner classifications favoured interrogating prisoners about their political beliefs 
rather than looking at their behaviour in prison (Mandela 474). After some early 
experiments with mixing common-law prisoners and political prisoners, common-law 
prisoners started being removed from the island after 1965. The general cells were 
separated from the "leadership section", where individuals regarded by the state as 
leaders of the resistance struggle were ~ept in single cells (Buntman, "Resistance 1963-
1976" 99). In 1967, thirty-five Namibians joined the single-cell section but were not 
allowed to communicate with the other inmates. The treatment of prisoners in the 
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single-cell section differed from the treatment meted out to those in the general section. 
Referring to the somewhat less inhumane period after 1971, Neville Alexander 
comments: 
The prisoners in the single-cells section are treated much more politely (albeit 
grudgingly so) than those in the general section, and these in turn are treated 
much better than those in the 'Terrorist Section', the inmates of which are even 
now treated with the most offensive contempt imaginable. (26) 
12 
Communication between the leadership section and the general section was an arduous 
process. Mandela describes how, for instance, notes between the two sections were 
written in milk and taped inside the rim of the toilet bowl so that inmates from the 
general section who were sentenced to solitary confinement could obtain them (500). 
Robert Sobukwe, the charismatic leader of the Pan Africanist Congress, was kept in a 
completely separate bungalow. He managed to communicate with other prisoners only 
when they passed his cell on their way to work. Mmutlanyane Mogoba describes how 
he would sometimes acknowledge greetings from other prisoners with a salute, or by 
picking up soil and allowing it to run from his hand in deference to the Pan Africanist 
Congress' emphasis on the theft ofland from the African people (30-31). Other 
prisoners were not permitted to look at him as they walked past: Indres Naidoo claims 
that "[t]he warders shouted at us all the time to look straight ahead and not at him" (72). 
Diet and clothes were racially differentiated. Although there were no officially white 
a
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people on Robben Island - Dimitrio Tsafendas, Hendrik Verwoerd's assassin, was 
formally reclassified as black and could consequently be incarcerated on the Island -
differences between black, coloured and Indian diets and clothes were enforced. In 
addition, political tensions between the African National Congress and the Pan 
Africanist Congress created further divisions in the prison, as did internal party splits, 
for instance between the "nationalists" and the "communists" in the African National 
Congress (Buntman, Robben Island 100-102). 
Given such differences, even in one institution, it becomes difficult to generalise about 
penal forms of control and about the kinds of identities that emerge from prison. 
However, I would also like to avoid a form ofpostmodern particularism where every 
experience becomes inassimilable to any larger narrative about the conditions 
governing the emergence and transformation of sUbjectivities. 
One way of approaching this difficulty involves placing the demands of a particular 
narrative in a productive and unresolved tension with larger, more generalising insights 
about prison life under apartheid. To use Robben Island as example again: Mogoba 
points out that Sobukwe was never counted with the other prisoners, but appeared 
instead as a kind of addition: 
He was kept in complete isolation without companionship. Even on the main 
















If there were 988 prisoners injail on a specific day, the board would read: 
987+ 1. He lived a lonely life with his jailers as his only human companionship. 
(30) 
14 
We could read beneath Sobukwe's "special" nomination a more general ideological 
truth about prisons: every particular prisoner is a "Plus One", both part of the general 
prison population and in some way held apart, individualised under the abstract and 
inhuman signifier of "one". To say that the prison contains either a mass of987 
prisoners or merely one prisoner would both be false: the addition mark is a way of 
conj oining all prisoners, although it also serves the function of separating, of marking 
off. Even as the prison instates its mark of surplus/deficit, the mark itself becomes a 
locus of agency and struggle for the prisoner. Every prison memoir recounts, on the one 
hand, the experience of the "one", and every prison memoir insists, on the other hand, 
on the task of addition, on the necessity of community in the face of separation and 
isolation. The addition mark stands for the sense in which the prison imposes a 
particular experience in the name of and in the interests of a single and more general 
ideological totality, but it also stands for the way in which particular experience is 
incessantly returned by the autobiographers themselves to a more general sense of 
political solidarity. A prison memoir necessarily reflects the experience of a single 
individual, but it is also itself the bridge that tries to link that experience to something 















When I claim that the activity of self-representation is governed by the prison, I am of 
course not discounting the world that prisoners bring with them to the prison, nor am I 
dismissing the importance of the context which regulates the production and reception 
of the text. My point is that the penal institution opens the discursive space for self-
narration, and in important ways continues to mediate that narrative. In a properly 
Jamesonian sense, the material reality of the prison forms the "political unconscious" of 
the prison narrative - not because these memoirs are "about" prison, but because the 
prison, in ways that are often invisible, structures the text and conditions the aesthetic 
representation of consciousness. When Molefe Pheto, director of the Music, Drama, Art 
and Literature Institute at the time of his arrest in 1975, is raided by the security police, 
he describes how his books are examined and bagged as " vidence": 
I saw Wole Soyinka thrown head first into the pillow slip; the Imamu Barakas 
that had escaped banning by the Publications Board; Chinua Achebe staring at 
Purple Suit with his strong eyes suffered the fate of Soyinka; Serote, Mtshali, 
Senghor, Cesaire, Okigbo, the two Diops, Mphahlele, E.R. Braithwaite, Ngugi; 
my own poems and the first manuscript of my novel joining that august 
company of Black writers going to jail in a pillow case and six brown South 
African government-supply envelopes. (38) 
Pheto picks up here on the bizarre way in which the prison apparatus tends to reify its 
metaphorical operation. Pheto's world of ideas is literally sent to gaol with him in a 












pillow case. On one level, this scene can be read as a metaphor which indicates that 
individuals do not enter prison as blank slates, but as subjects in a pre-existing literary 
and ideological matrix. By allowing a picture of Chinua Achebe to stare at the security 
police "with his strong eyes", Pheto also underscores the point that ideas represent and 
inhabit bodies: to put it simply, nobody goes to prison alone. Even in solitary 
confinement, the existence of an interior world of literary references, beliefs, personal 
memories and affections sustain a kind of inter subjectivity that the prison labours 
incessantly, and with varying degrees of success, to pull apart. 
However, while the Pheto extract points towards the existence of a fully-formed 
SUbjective interiority that encounters the prison as an intelligible object that can be 
mapped onto an extant world-view - and it is certainly true that Pheto seems sustained 
throughout his ordeal by the ideas that are imprisoned with him - I would suggest that 
there are also factors that complicate such a conception. 
Firstly, the books are "imprisoned" so that they can be deployed as evidence against 
Pheto. In other words, from the outset, the apparatus of imprisonment introduces an 
impossible split between the "empty" subject and the rich fullness of his or her inner 
life, represented in the example by Pheto's books. While Pheto's description denotes 
the conjoint imprisonment of himself and of his literary world, it also denotes a violent 
incursion on his mental life: when his books are bagged, they are also in a sense stolen 
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range of prison writers recount how this form of remembering becomes particularly 
difficult to sustain in prison, where one suffers the privation of aides-memo ire, of 
normal community, and of the kind of dignity and approval that sustain a stable sense 
of self. Reflecting on his experience of solitary confinement, Albie Sachs comments: 
17 
You know what is right and wrong, yet feel powerless to act accordingly. Being 
useless and inactive for so long drains my will so that after a while I begin to 
feel useless and discarded. At first I semi-consciously identify myself with the 
mat in the cell. I felt depersonalised and anonymous. My political ideas, the 
philosophy and aspirations of so many years, seemed remote and cold in this 
situation. They were words, formulations, phrases, not descriptions of a life that 
bore any relation to the one that I was experiencing. (166) 
What Sachs describes here is the aphanisis of the subject, a fading of the intemallife 
and an attendant self-objectification that is in fact characteristic of the experience of 
imprisonment, especially of solitary confinement. In his memoir Bandiet, Hugh Lewin 
remarks in a: very similar way on the colonisation by the prison of his interior life: 
I was bemused by the sudden new world I was in. During that first day and 
night they had not only broken me, they had changed me. They had taken me 
from my world, and made me a part of their world. I felt too scared, too alone, 
too ashamed to fight the change. I was now part of their world and there was 
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nothing I could do to change that. It was easier to do nothing, not to worry, 
easier to accept that all was finished, easier to feel uninvolved and dependent -
numb, cold like the winter outside. (21) 
While this disintegration of self is discontinued once more normal subjective bonds 
become possible, any later organisation of the experience of imprisonment into 
narrative form is forced into an encounter with this traumatic self-splitting and 
subjective destitution. A large part of this thesis is preoccupied with what is at stake in 
such an encounter for various writers, but the more general point is that any later 
remembering occurs on, recovers, translates, or actively attempts to occlude the site of 
this abjection, where the prison's construction of reality b comes all-encompassing. As 
Sachs comments in his conclusion to his Jail Diary: "I write and I write, just as once I 
sat and I sat" (285). The scene of writing echoes the scene of incarceration. 
18 
At the end of his memoir, Pheto returns to his books - more specifically, to his own 
novel, which he manages to finish in New York. He describes the prison autobiography 
as a narrative about "a chapter of my life I want to forget as soon as possible because 
there is still so much ahead of me, so much to achieve, that to be harping back on those 
days would be an unproductive waste oftime" (216). His prison memoir, in other 
words, is written as much in the service of memory as of forgetting: it is a detour, a 
supplement, that allows him to rejoin the trajectory of his life which was interrupted 
when his books were bagged. 
uvu.u.u):::,I












However, his attempts to put the past behind him are frustrated by an incessant ringing 
in his ears, apparently poised somewhere between memory and nerve damage: 
19 
Somewhere within my inner right ear, some nerve had been damaged, brutally 
bruised, as the Johannesburg ear specialist, Mr Joe Seeger, told me after he had 
examined the ear. Joe Seeger examined me without charging any fee. He 
advised me to return so that he could keep a check on the bleep-bleep sounds 
the ear had somehow recorded during the time I had spent at the Hillbrow 
Police Station, where some machines behind my cell kept on bleeping day and 
night, and decided to store for all eternity. When ver I am in a place that is very 
quiet, such as Portia's apartment, the ear begins to ring with the bleep sounds. 
Very early in the morning, very late at night, such as now as I am writing. The 
bleeps remind me of the first brutal assault, of the blow that landed on the ear. 
(Pheto 216-217) 
If one follows Pheto's logic closely in this decription, his declaration that he has "at 
long last. ., finished the narrative of a nightmare" (216) is immediately undercut by his 
description of a sound, both disembodied and profoundly embodied, that interrupts the 













I would argue that any attempt to assimilate the experience of prison back into a pre-
existing body of ideas, or to use it in the service of some historically determined goal -
advocacy, nation-building, self-exculpation - will necessarily encounter the eternal 
return of the prison itself, an inescapable and totally idiosyncratic noise that brings with 
it the full unbearable weight ofunmediated memory. South African selves are centred 
around precisely such an iteration, an intrusion of noise into the ordinary and the 
ordered. The prison, ultimately, represents this incursion that incessantly bears us back 
into the past. Pheto' s books are returned - and his uncompleted book is completed - but 
they are no longer the same books, precisely because ofthe noise that now supplements 
the act of reading or writing. 
In addition, even before the raid on his house, Pheto's books are selected to ensure they 
are not on the government's banned list: 
Over the years, I had checked and made sure that all the books on the shelves and 
elsewhere in the house w re not on the banned list, difficult as it was to be 
absolutely certain about that in South Africa, because there was not a week in which 
a book or a journal or some such publication did not come under the hammer of the 
Publications Board. (Pheto 38) 
In the sense that his books represent an aspect of Pheto' s world of ideas, they are 
always already constrained in expectation of imprisonment. The prison generates a 













shifting logic of inclusion and exclusion that simultaneously dictates the boundary 
between acceptable and unacceptable knowledge, and ensures that the boundary 
remains indistinct and anxiety-provoking. In other words, as much as the prison 
rewrites and marks out memory, it also leaves its stamp on the inner lives of people 
living under apartheid through a tyranny of anticipation. 
21 
While the language of self in the autobiographies that I examine in this thesis inevitably 
becomes entangled with the discourse of the penal institution, it is interesting to note 
that certain memoirists encounter prison with much more fidelity to a fully internalised, 
relatively stable and pre-existing world of ideas than others. Thus Albie Sachs in his 
Jail Diary (1990) and Breyten Breytenbach in True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist 
(1984) appear much more uncertain about their foundational beliefs while in prison 
than, for instance, Molefe Pheto in And Night Fell (1985) or Caesarina Makhoere in No 
Child's Play: In Prison under Apartheid (1988); in Strikes Have Followed Me All My 
Life (1989) Emma Mashinini wages an anxious struggle to avoid being drawn into the 
prison's modes of self-disclosure while Moses Dlamini's account of imprisonment in 
Hell Hole, Robben Island (1984) is an indictment of prison in the name of an entirely 
coherent, stable self that simply refuses the prison's attempts to interpellate him; and so 
on. 
The reasons for these differences are, in many ways, particular to the author. 













between the narrating subject and the subjectivising functions of the prison. These are 
explored in close detail in subsequent chapters, but a brief overview follows below. 
Firstly, and most importantly, the South African prison simply did not address all 
subjects in the same way. The Benthamite notion of a "modem" prison as a space that 
provides forced solitary self-reflection in the interest of reform appertained specifically 
to white prisoners, while black prisoners often encountered a carceral model based on 
the desire for punishment and a simple desire to remove them from society. The 
salutation "Dis die Eiland - this is the Island. Hier julle gaan vrek [sic] - here you will 
die" (Naidoo 65) that many prisoners were greeted with upon arrival at Robben Island 
really summarises the apartheid regime's attitude towards black political activists. This 
racially differentiated attitude to prisoners is of course as old as the history of racial 
segregation in South Africa, but became a systematically imposed aspect of South 
African prison life only towards the end of the 19th century (Bemault 9). Prisons for 
blacks resembled something between feudal dungeons and mine compounds, and 
reflected a more general colonial understanding of African bodies as bodies to be 
broken and subjugated. As Achille Mbembe notes: 
The whip and the cane also served to force upon the African a concocted 
identity, an identity that allowed her/him to move in the spaces where she/he 
was always being ordered around, and where she/he had unconditionally to 
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show submissiveness - in forced labor, public works, local carvee labor, 
military conscription. (113) 
23 
In practice, this meant that black political prisoners were less likely to be isolated from 
one another in a continued way, more likely to be tortured physically, experienced 
much harsher conditions than white prisoners in terms of diet, uniform, health care and 
general living conditions, and were much less likely to be addressed as "reformable" 
subjects with a fully formed interiority by the police, the guards or the Security Police 
interrogators. The systematic flogging of black prisoners was a practice inherited from 
the colonial period, when whipping was defended as a suitable punishment for people 
who were regarded as incapable of the abstract reason required to see deprivation of 
liberty as a punishment (Pete and Devenish 8). Chapter 5, "Solitary Confinement", 
discusses the particular ways in which the notion of the prison as a reformatory 
institution was imported into South Africa in the early 19th century, and subsequently 
became transformed in the new context - in particular, by the colony's racial politics 
and economic requirements. In practice, this transformation effectively split the prison 
into two. One prison was for white subjects, and was really a militarised, isolated 
version of the Benthamite penitentiary, which maintained the European model's 
rhetoric of rehabilitation and its focus on skills training (Smit 31). The other was for 
black prisoners, and looked more like other prisons elsewhere in Africa during the 
colonial period: prisoners were used as labourers, corporal punishment was regularly 
and viciously employed, and there was little or no interest in rehabilitation (Bernault 1-
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26). While such prisons might have incorporated panoptical elements in the 
architecture, or sometimes strategically used an imported language of reform and 
reintegration, the spatial arrangement and discourse were in fact radically uncoupled 
from any rehabilitative function. As Florence Bernault points out, the 19th century 
Benthamite prison was an organic response to the extension of rights and economic 
developments in Europe, while its imported colonial version worked simply to 
consolidate colonial power: 
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Instead of seeking to rehabilitate criminals and promote social stability through 
popular consent over legal punishment, Europeans used the prison ... to secure 
control over a subaltern, racially defined social category that comprised the 
majority of the population. The juxtaposition of archaic and modem elements in 
the colonial prison did not derive, as in the West, from a long penal history. It 
grew out of colonizers' systematic reliance on confinement as a device that 
could allow, behind the fa9ade of rational, disciplined architectures, the use of 
pre-penitentiary punitive practices. (26) 
The formalisation of racial segregation under apartheid did little to change this 
situation. The 1959 Prisons Act consolidated racial and ethnic divisions in South 
African prisons (Smit 31), and by the mid 1960s prisons had become one of the 
principal modes through which the state controlled political unrest (Smit 32). While 
there were obvious exceptions - most notably in the single cells on Robben Island, 













especially in the period after 1971 - black prisoners occupied the position of the other, 
while white prisoners were more likely to be treated as errant but reformable members 
of the same community as the police and the warders. At least in the 1960s, the 
unbearable privation of ordinary human company and the absence of books or writing 
materials were bizarrely juxtaposed, for some white prisoners, with home-cooked meals 
and intimate (and often Kafkaesque) conversations with warders, in addition to a cell 
cleaning service: white prisoners were not allowed to clean their own cells. Albie 
Sachs's solitary detention cell in Wynberg, for instance, seemed to become a grotesque 
extension of the station commander's home. For these reasons, black prisoners often 
found it easier to maintain a distance from the discursive apparatus of the prison: they 
were regarded as other, and could in turn regard the prison and its functionaries as 
other. White prisoners, on the other hand, were more frequently enjoined to participate 
in a ritual of mutual recognition: maintaining a distance from the prison's forms of 
interpellation became a relentless, anxiety-provoking aspect of self-representation and 
self-understanding. 
Nonetheless, even the most agonistic relationship towards the prison, the most severe 
rejection of its functionaries' claim to humanity, still responds to the conditions ofthe 
prison itself. In other words, especially where the prison is antagonistically experienced 
as entirely other, the prison sustains and galvanises a particular rhetoric of self that is 
recognisably more community-centred than individual-centred, and more sustaining of 
a stable ideology that is imported from outside its walls. It does so by rejecting a 
mi
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prisoner's claims to individuality, both discursively and in the material organisation of 
space, and by neglecting to fulfil its "reformative" function, which relies on 
individualising the prisoner and entering into a conversation with him or her. What this 
thesis rejects is really the idea that the experience and the description of prison relies 
exclusively, or predominantly, on the politico-ideological lens through which it is 
perceived. This kind of reading very easily slips into a simplistic understanding of some 
forms of South African autobiography as inherently more "communal" than others -
often based on pseudo-anthropological references to cultural capital, political 
background and a poorly defined idea of "culture" or "cultural background". Against 
this, we should insist that the ideological understandings that prisoners appear to bring 
to the prison are invariably sustained by the prison's forms of interpellation, even if this 
is against the background of an explicitly and fiercely antagonistic relationship to the 
prison. Identity is born first of all out of the material conditions that necessitate its 
narration, and the constellation of political positions that we have inherited from 
apartheid-era South Africa are produced, refined and situated through reference to its 
materially-based ideological apparatuses. In some ways, the prison can be regarded as a 
machine that regulates the flux of ideology: the culture that emerges from prison is 
always connected to the material demands, privations and exigencies of the prison 
space. These observations are explored in more close detail throughout the thesis, but 














Another factor that determines the relationship between the autobiographical voice and 
the prison relates more closely to the imagined audience of the memoir, and can be 
encompassed under the idea ofjidelity to the truth. Here the imagined affiliation 
between reader and writer, which includes also the historical and social context of the 
communicative act, brings its own set of demands and expectations to bear on the way 
the self is rendered - although even here, I would suggest that the penal institution itself 
ultimately still determines the horizon of subjectivity and brings into play the forms of 
resistance available to the narrating self. 
Different figurations of truth coexist across the range of South African prison diaries, 
often even in the same text. For a writer like Albie Sachs, to speak the truth implies a 
scrupulous commitment to memory, a painstaking devotion to rendering every detail of 
his life in prison, even those that cast him in a less than heroic light. In other words, his 
memoir is properly speaking confessional in the traditional sense that one might apply 
to Rousseau's Confessions. His autobiography relies on describing the vicissitudes of 
the narrating self in such detail that he emerges from the text as absolutely 
individualised: what his text strives for is a form of self-presence. At the end of his 
memoir, he indicates his reason for writing about his time in gaol: 
I must record my story as accurately and honestly as I can. Then should they 
take me in again I will know that there is something of me outside which will 
continue to exist whatever they do to me. (Sachs 285) 
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For Sachs, the autobiography is something of himself, an external repository for his 
subjectivity which is tasked with surviving the prison. To recast this in Alain Badiou's 
tenns, we could say that Sachs's self-presence is "supernumerary" to the situation of 
the prison: the prison relies, for its operation, on the systematic erosion of Sachs's 
ability to sustain a realistic narrative of self, to record his experiences in the interest of 
survival, to strive towards a coherent and meaningful sense of self-presence. From the 
point of view of the prison, such a "full" subjectivity would obviate its interrogative 
function as well as, more generally, its "refonnative" ideal: in the Benthamite prison, 
the inmate is removed from his or her old symbolic universe precisely so that he or she 
can be reborn in a new symbolic constellation. 
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The moment Sachs arrives in prison, he draws a map of the gaol on the wall, together 
with his initials. One could assert that this constitutes a zero-point autobiography: the 
location of a subject in space under the sign of a proper name.5 The final autobiography 
is simply an extended iteration ofthese first desperate marks. At a certain point, he 
realises that it is possible to write on a piece of cardboard with a tube of tomato-
flavoured cheese that he was allowed to keep. With great labour, he uses the cheese to 
try to record the details of his life in gaol: 















It is nearly five 0' cIock. At a quarter past five it will be time to try to write with 
the cheese. I must think of a few key words: Caterpillar, ifthey do discover my 
writing they will never know what I am referring to. Song - that will help me to 
remember my singing, and Always. What else is there? I must not forget the 
policemen, what they were like. I can write Cops. It is getting darker now and 
cooler. I stand up, reach for my long pants and jersey and put them on. Back 
between the blankets I try to remember what I had been thinking about. It had 
something to do with my next activity. Now what was that? It was not 
draughts ... oh yes, now I remember, it will be writing with cheese. I was 
thinking of words. What were those words again? It does not matter, they will 
come back to me later. Perhaps I will not be able to write at all. (Sachs 75) 
This description illustrates the material and psychological exertion that attends on even 
the most elementary attempts to structure and record memory in prison, especially in 
solitary confinement. When Sachs is finally allowed a pen and paper because of a court 
judgement, he is at first reduced to child-like, idiosyncratic scribbling. "[T]here is an 
unseen rein holding my hand in check," he comments, "stopping it from crossing the 
page in the bold, sweeping movements that would more accurately represent the 
conscious excitement of my mind" (160). 
The point is that the prison relentlessly interposes itself between consciousness and 


















diligent attempts to hold onto the events of his life in conditions so adversarial to the 
technologies of memory are in fact momentously courageous. What he manages to 
sustain, resulting in the final published autobiography, is a loyalty towards truth: not in 
the sense of a determinate, transcendent and universal truth-category, but in a rather 
different way to the truth as the uncountable exception that the prison must exclude in 
order to exist. To state it differently, Sachs insists on counting, and in the process 
evoking, a presence that exists only as an impossibility or an absence in the logic of the 
prison: the prison's organisation of knowledge relies on the exclusion of a coherent 
inner life and a carefully recorded personal history. 
The popular poststructuralist dismissal of the "metaphysics of presence" that 
supposedly underpin confessional autobiographies, epitomised by Paul De Man's call 
to "deface" this most questionable of literary genres (De Man 67-81), ignores the 
existence of contexts where the production of self-presence can work to displace an 
inflexible and restrictive system of knowledge, rather than to "normalise" a 
"transparent self' in the name of a purportedly Cartesian subjectivity.6 
In contrast to Sachs, a writer like Caesarina Makhoere does not seem overtly concerned 
with the specificity of personal recollection. Her voice is more properly a 
representative voice. In her Postscript to In Prison Under Apartheid, she states: 
6 In fact, the Cartesian model of subjectivity, which underpins the logic of solitary confmement, becomes in 
a certain sense the very site of the most dire threat to this same logic. In other words, Sachs's fidelity to the 
faithful rendition of self is simultaneously premised on the philosophy that produced his particular form of 
imprisonment and a manifestation its own aporic intemallimit - a point that is really consonant with De 
Man's project. 












We learned some lessons in their prisons. They thought they could attack us: they 
failed. We first learned that we could win against them. Even with nothing; even 
with only our hands and our comradeship and our determination, we could defeat 
them. We have faced their viciousness before and won. (120-121) 
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Here the selfwho narrates speaks not only as an "I", but also as a "we" (and, of course, 
to an "us"). Makhoere consciously ignores the dimension of the specificity traditionally 
associated with the memoir form in order to act as witness to a collective event. What 
she instates in the space of the prison is really a narrative of a generation, rather than a 
confessional record of private insecurities, setbacks, triumphs and so on. In Leigh 
Gilmore's words, she utilises the opportunity presented by the autobiography to present 
herself as a subject who stands for others ("Limit Cases" 129). Makhoere's major aim 
is not to be recognised in her narrative - it is for her readers to recognise their own 
experience in her narrative, either literally or potentially, often through the modality of 
the shared principles of the post-1976 Black Consciousness movement. What 
characterises her memoir isfidelity to the signifier of "the struggle", her insistence on 
the existence of such a category, with its own demarcated history and value system. 
One of the characteristics of the apartheid state and its media was that it simply 
discounted the existence of a mass uprising against its laws. Where evidence of the 
















irruptions of irrationality in a generally well-ordered and benign state. Political 
prisoners were never overtly counted as a separate category in public discourse: the 
official narrative tried to represent them as a category of criminal who engaged in anti-
social activity for personal gain or as a consequence of keeping "bad company". The 
Amnesty International report on political imprisonment in South Africa, released in 
1978, notes: 
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Political prisoners have no special status, and from time to time, Government 
ministers and senior police officials have even denied the existence of this 
identifiable group of political prisoners, claiming rather that those convicted 
under security laws such as the Terrorism Act and Sabotage Act are merely 
criminal offenders. In April 1977, for example, Deputy Commissioner of 
Prisons, Major General Jannie Roux, was reported to have told a group of South 
African and foreignjoumalists, 'There are no political prisoners on Robben 
Island. They have all been convicted of criminal offences.' (78-79) 
Obvious public signs of a popular insurrection were ascribed to "black on black 
violence", random acts of terrorism, and so on. Evidence of a systematic state response 
to revolutionary activity - brutal acts of torture and the existence of death squads -
were explained through reference to "rogue elements" in an otherwise law-abiding and 












When Makhoere opens her memoir with the Freedom Charter, and organises even the 
most minute and apparently umelated events under the sign of the struggle, she 
effectively introduces a frame of understanding that cannot be accommodated by the 
state. To use Badiou's terms: until the disparate series of events that constitute the 
struggle are named as "the struggle", they remain simply the innumerable multiple of a 
sequence of events that belong to a certain historical frame. Makhoere's autobiography 
relates precisely such a multiple sequence, but she erects "the struggle" as pivotal self-
relating concept, thereby simultaneously producing the struggle as a historical event 
and making "the struggle" a central term of the struggle itself. The naming of the 
struggle is properly speaking an event: 
The event is thus clearly the multiple which both presents its entire site, and, by 
means of the pure signifier of itself immanent to its own multiple, manages to 
present the presentation itself, that is, the one of the infinite multiple that it is. 
(Badiou 180) 
By presenting itself as "evental site" which contains its own inaugural act of naming, 
Makhoere's struggle autobiography insists on a form of understanding that is unnamed 
and unnamable in the site of apartheid. In his article "Chronotypes of the Self', 
Schalkwyk claims that Makhoere's discourse is underpinned by "an unshakeable 
conception of moral order" ("Chronotypes" 33). This conception not only allows 















paradigm that literally cannot exist in the same space as the ideology of apartheid: its 
erasure is one of the ontological conditions for the existence of apartheid ideology. 
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For the reader of Makhoere's autobiography, this implies that the event that she 
describes appears as such, to use Slavoj Zizek's phrasing, "only to those who recognize 
themselves in its call" (Parallax View 167). For a reader who does not see the 
replacement of normal prison windows with punctured steel plates as an example of the 
brutality of apartheid in general, or the hunger strike that results from this action as a 
part of the broader struggle against apartheid (Makhoere 40-42), such an episode 
remains simply an anecdote about the harshness of prison life and prisoners' attempts to 
secure better living conditions. In such a reading, Makhoere's references to the lack of 
democracy in South Africa (41) simply seem supernumerary, a kind of ideological 
noise that interrupts the mimetic narrative. 
Makhoere's fidelity to the truth, in other words, relates not specifically to the faithful 
recording of experience (as in the case of Sachs), but to the faithful recuperation of 
experience to a revolutionary event. The unifying signifier of struggle and the 
insistence on recognition and identification produces a more stable narrative 
SUbjectivity in Makhoere than in Sachs, who is concerned precisely with recording in 
intimate detail the flux of consciousness and the erosion of self in prison. 
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Finally, there is a genre of prison autobiography - increasingly popular after the 1980s 
- that has no interest in the kind of fidelity to truth described above. These would 
include, for instance, Jan Coetzee's Plain Tales From Robben Island (2000), a 
collection of interviews with former political prisoners on Robben Island. This text 
serves to add to the new democratic dispensation's archive ofhistorica11ife narratives, 
and strives to provide an inclusive and factually accurate picture of past events. 
Simultaneously, it relies heavily on a teleological understanding of the past as a site of 
tribulation and strife that opens to a democratic, multi-cultural present: in other words, 
it adds to a dominant post-apartheid understanding of struggle history without 
introducing substantially new or disquieting frames for understanding subjectivity or 
nationhood. Speaking of the transformation of Robben Island into a heritage site, Heidi 
Grunebaum-Ralph notes that the divorce of the island from its historical function 
allows it to begin functioning as a site where the past can be rendered intelligible and 
distinguished from the present: 
As an unlived space in the present, the island and its historical representations can 
be domesticated; its spaces and its narratives are packaged all the more as a 
foreclosed past. (200) 
Similarly, some more recent prison autobiographies are located under the "unlived" or 
empty signifiers of the struggle, democracy and so on, and serve ultimately to render 
the past as something distinct from the present but also wholly intelligible in the 
35 
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present. Such memoirs might exercise commitment to a very broadly understood 
factual truth, but not to truth as a locus of undecidability and radical transformation. 
36 
To draw these kinds of distinctions is of course not to suggest that all prison 
autobiographies can be firmly categorised in terms of their loyalties and obligations. 
Nelson Mandela's Long Walk to Freedom, for instance, is born out of multiple contexts 
and addresses itselfto a range of objectives. To use Philippe Lejeune's phrase, the 
exact delimitations of the pronouns in its "autobiographical pact" remain uncertain: if 
an autobiography draws up an implicit pact with the reader that the narrating "I" is 
identical to the author on the cover, and that the narrative refers to a real person's 
existence and personality (14), the exact nature and context ofthe "I" that produces 
Long Walk to Freedom is never entirely decided. Mandela speaks simultaneously as an 
individual compelled to record the facts of his life and the history of his personality in a 
situation that denies the legitimacy of a black person's experience, as a subject-
instrument in the service of freedom, and as a venerable leader who needs to 
consolidate a new state and translate his personal experiences into a kind of parable to 
render recent South African history intelligible. In the text, the signifier that binds 
together these different texts is Mandela's "missing manuscript": the original version of 
the autobiography, written under the most difficult circumstances on Robben Island and 















A Long Walk to Freedom displaces or acts as a substitute for the original, which, 
unlike the later work, was forged in the actual conditions of incarceration. The 
later memoir thus represses or suppresses the former. It is a product of a 
different time, changed circumstances, even altered authors. ("Mandela's 
'Missing' Manuscript" 207) 
Whether the original manuscript is in fact significantly different from the canonised 
autobiography is immaterial: the fact that its existence is noted in the final text 
effectively produces a mark of displacement that compels us to read Long Walk to 
Freedom as a substitute text. Ifwe are the intended readers of this text, we might not 
have been the intended readers of the original. IfMandela's commitment in the text is 
to the consolidation of a peaceful state, the original was probably committed to the 
overthrow of the state. If the one text explains the present in terms of the past, the other 
is located in a past where our present is an imagined Utopian future. If the one defers to 
the Western publishing industry's obsession with the "lives and loves" of exceptional 
individuals (even if only in its packaging and marketing), the original was unmediated 
by such economic co cerns. The fact that Long Walk to Freedom is essentially a 
repetition, and marks itself as such, is a symptom of a provisional and variable fidelity. 
If, as this thesis contends, the prison narrative is always in some sense related to the 
prison's modes of interpellation, the obvious question arises: how do we understand 













it produce and contain resistance as well? This remains one of the key questions of this 
thesis. Indeed, one of its aims is precisely to theorise, in a highly contextualised way, 
the relationship between a text and its base. 
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In particular, I would like to steer clear of the tendency to read every prison voice as 
authentically transgressive. Broadly speaking, this critical propensity reflects a larger 
academic obsession with marginality and subversion which has become an almost 
meaningless end in itself: every second text, it seems, is bursting with radically 
dissident voices, poses profound questions to the status quo, and so on. In fact, this 
preoccupation with subversion has become so normative in the current global 
production of knowledge in the humanities that one should ask whether it might not in 
fact be sustaining rather than challenging dominant relations of power. Prison literature, 
and particularly political prison literature, provides a narrating voice that is so patently 
in revolt, so effortlessly subsumable to the current hegemonic critical attitude, that it 
becomes particularly easy to ignore not only the ways in which these texts' 
emancipatory projects in fact remain unrealised, but also to become blind to the 
genuinely revolutionary moments in these memoirs. 
However, following Althusser, it is also necessary to guard against a kind of Hegelian 
"expressive causality" where the autobiographical text is seen as a mere expression of 
its social base. While one might associate such a reading with a Lukacsian Marxist 
tradition (as in History and Class Consciousness), Foucault's brand of historicism also 
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sometimes collapses into a similar homologising logic: the governing episteme 
produces subjectivities, discursive practices, and resistances that ultimately mirror and 
sustain the sign-system they derive from. Even the most cursory reading of South 
African political autobiographies will belie such an understanding: the friction between 
the apartheid episteme and the voices that emerge during this historical juncture 
evidence an unpredictable wave of historical becoming that simply cannot be described 
as the self-sustaining processes of sUbjectivation of apartheid discourse. 
The understanding of resistance that is developed throughout this thesis can be 
approached first of all by way of Frederic Jameson's notion of mediation. Jameson asks 
a similar question to the one posed above in relation to resistance in the prison 
autobiography: 
'" is the text a free-floating object in its own right, or does it 'reflect' some 
context or ground, and in that case does it simply replicate the latter 
ideologically, or does it possess some autonomous force in which it could also 
be seen as negating that context? (Political Unconscious 38) 
Jameson returns to the Althusserian insistence on the "relative autonomy" of the 
various levels of society - economic, political, juridicial, ideological and cultural- in 
order to reject the idea that each level simply expresses the other. However, unlike 
Althusser, Jameson recuperates the dialectical idea of mediation, which Althusser saw 
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as a fonn ofunreflected immediacy, where one level simply folds directly into another. 
Jameson notes: 
To describe mediation as the strategic and local invention of a code which can 
be used about two distinct phenomena does not imply any obligation for the 
same message to be transmitted in two cases; to put it another way, one cannot 
enumerate the differences between things except against the background of 
some more general identity. Mediation undertakes to establish this initial 
identity, against which then - but only then -local identification or 
differentiation can be registered. (Political Unconscious 42) 
40 
In other words, a particular superstructural phenomenon would be related to its material 
base, the two levels are interdependent, but the relationship is understood in tenns of 
difference in an overall structure rather than in tenns of an immediate structural 
homology or parallelism. 
In the case of prison writing, one could claim thatthe prison space per se connects the 
ideological and material realities of prison to the cultural fonns that arise in the penal 
space, including those fonns that explicitly reject the prison and its entire mode of 
production. In fact, the prison memoir as a fonn of resistance can be read 
















compensation for the privations of life in prison, for the impossible poverty of the kinds 
of identities that it offers to its subjects. 
The "relative autonomy" of the prison memoir from its object and raison d'etre relates 
specifically to the kinds knowledges and political beliefs that prisoners bring with them 
to prison, to the context of the production of the memoirs, and ultimately to the 
operation of the sign system itself, which would include considerations of genre, syntax 
and the play of difference intrinsic to language. The apartheid prison's incessant 
attempts to render autobiographical writing impossible, and in fact its general (and 
futile) hostility towards anything resembling a prisoners' culture, evidence its 
awareness of and deeply rooted animosity towards the relative autonomy of prisoners' 
cultural production. Indeed, the prison often seems dedicated precisely to the erasure 
specifically of literary culture. As some of the examples above illustrate, even the 
simplest attempt to record experience demands a remarkable practical and 
psychological resourcefulness, and can often only be successfully concluded outside its 
walls, sometimes only after many years of psychological readjustment. 
While it would therefore be true to say that the prison memoir emanates from the 
prison, and draws on its organisation of space and its understandings of identity, it is 
also true that the prison memoir compensates for, transcodes and displaces the prison. 
At this point, however, one should proceed with caution. If the prison produces 
compensatory voices - in other words, if the reality of life in prison produces a utopian 













vision of a free society, a dream of personal freedom, a certain militant outrage, this is 
in fact not entirely incommensurate with the ideological aim of a "reformative" penal 
institution - or, to put it differently, such a response utilises a demand that is in fact 
made by the prison itself. In short, a prison functions because it produces, through 
calculated deprivation, a desire for fundamental human needs: community, personal 
liberty, dignity, culture and belonging. The efficiency of the discipline of the prison 
rests on the production of these desires. In Hugh Lewin's Bandiet, Lewin describes an 
incident in Pretoria Central in the 1960s. A black prisoner who is condemned to death 
walks through a central Hall that has been designated a non-smoking area. The prisoner 
lights a cigarette and is reprimanded: 
Jonker advanced towards him, shouting: 'Jy rook, kaffrr, jy rookIY ou're 
smoking, kaffir, smoking! - and pointed a quivering finger at the infidel. All the 
weight of Jonker's authority went into that gesture: he could charge the culprit; 
he could take his meals, his privileges; put him in solitary, get a black mark on 
his record. He could point a finger at him and shout 'kaffir!' The young black 
man smiled at Jonker and blew a puff of smoke into his furious face. Then he 
brushed him aside and walked offwith his guard to his visit. Jonker returned to 
his box and switched off the light. We could laugh quietly. (113) 
The warder's authority becomes completely meaningless because in this instance 
freedom, or the dream of freedom, can no longer be harnessed to the prison's 
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disciplinary apparatus. The penal institution's coercive and interpellative power is 
rooted in the production of a future-directed fantasy of liberty - a fantasy that has no 
value for a man who is condemned to death. In other words, the absence of a utopian 
narrative of freedom incapacitates the everyday disciplinary authority of the prison, 
while its presence allows the prison at least a minimal power over its subjects. When 
we speak of a "compensatory" discourse, it is therefore necessary to understand that 
such a desiring discourse is not per se inimical to the prison's mode of operation, even 
though it is antagonistic to the penal space. In the same way that the prison works by 
producing an Inside that is continually haunted by its self-generated opposite, the 
Outside, the existence and authority of the prison are intimately conjoined to the voices 
that seek to displace it. This is not to say that oppositional voices are somehow 
perfectly contained by the way the prison effects power, but to suggest that the "relative 
autonomy" ofthe accounts of the selfbom in prison are, indeed, relative to the prison-
they are related to it, even if they do not function as mute reflections of the prison's 
ascendancy. 
To disentangle the voices that speak from prison from the prison's modes of 
understanding and of exercising power is in many ways an impossible task. However, 
this thesis suggests that beyond the notion of a "relative autonomy", or perhaps inherent 
to and submerged in this concept, such an "impossible" negation of the grounds of self-
relation in fact constitute the subject. In the prison memoir, we find moments in the 
construction of self that entirely obliterate the prison's epistemology - not because the 
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"self' that speaks manages to smuggle some external ideological arsenal into gaol, but 
because the prison itself produces a sign, a ritual, a demand, that begins to function in 
an entirely unpredictable and self-annihilating way. To be clear: this is not a kind of 
slow deconstructive displacement of the prison's fonns of address qua the grain of the 
autobiographical voice, but the sudden and radical disruption of the entire cultural, 
philosophical and ideological underpinning of the prison and the carceral society that it 
reflects and embodies. Such an "impossible" revolutionary element is what Lacan 
refers to as the Real, and what Badiou develops under the rubric of the event. My 
argument in this thesis rests on the assumption that the prison, as an extreme, 
concentrated fonn of a historically situated cultural moment, produced subjects both 
intimately connected to the penal space and, at least potentially, in excess to it - not 
necessarily because these subjects were "bigger" than the prison, but because the 
prison, like any ideological apparatus, was in excess to itself. To talk about certain 
continuities between apartheid and post-apartheid subjectivities is therefore not to 
suggest some seamless historical connection, but to suggest that especially the most 
profoundly altered subjectivities, the most revolutionary historical moments, are in fact 
born out of a kind of impasse, a misfired signifier, a sudden aporetic crisis, in a 
previous and superseded constellation of world-views. 
I attempt to provide examples of this tricky notion throughout the thesis. In particular, 
the third chapter, "On Robben Island", looks at Mandela's description in Long Walk to 
Freedom of his decision to enter into negotiations with the apartheid government as an 
n
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example of such an undecidable event. However, at this point another small example 
might be appropriate to clarify some of the discussion in subsequent chapters. In 1966, 
Mmutlanyane Mogoba was held in solitary confmement for his part in writing an 
account of conditions on Robben Island and trying to smuggle it out to be published in 
The Cape Times and Cape Argus newspapers. While he was in the isolation cell, he 
read a booklet called The Human Christ that Dennis Brutus managed to pass on to him 
and experienced a religious conversion. When he returned to the general cells, his 
comrades responded to his new beliefs with some incredulity: 
45 
They could not begin to understand my language - 'met Jesus in the cell!' or 
'had a conversion' or 'a call to the ministry'. What is all this stuff? They asked. 
Was this not a madness or a betrayal of the struggle? I tried to explain that I had 
not changed my political views. On the contrary, I was more committed than 
ever to the liberation struggle - only perhaps purified for the struggle. Like the 
Israelites in captivity in Egypt, I now felt that God was on our side - a great 
feeling for one involved in a struggle against impossible odds or against a strong 
and ruthless regime. (Mogoba 51) 
The "madness" that Mogoba returned with acted simultaneously to alienate him from 
his political allies - he returned from solitary confinement individualised in a way that 
they found unintelligible, even potentially traitorous - but also to galvanise his 
commitment to the struggle. His political views remained unchanged on the surface, yet 
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they also became suffused with a kind of ineffable excess that allowed him to persist in 
the struggle against apartheid despite the sense of hopelessness that his comrades 
sometimes expressed. Ultimately, Mogoba articulates his conversion on Robben Island 
to the birth of a democratic nation: 
46 
But just as God had moved in his own way as I was beaten in the 'stockade' of 
Robben Island, so he moved in his mysterious way to use men and women of 
God to contribute to the foundation of peace in a changed, beloved country. (78) 
The irony of this situation is of course that, at a certain level, Mogoba realises exactly 
the traditional Christian-inflected reformative ideal of the Enlightenment prison. The 
tableau is almost a sentimental cliche: the criminal alone in his cell with only the (hard-
won) Bible and his conscience for company, the shaft of moonlight in the depths of the 
night, the dramatic conversion, and the amazement of his unconverted companions. 
Simultaneously, the effect is the exact opposite of what the prison intended: suddenly a 
powerful, "mysterious" or irrational force experienced as both immanent to and in 
excess of ideology stabilises and strengthens the prisoner's revolutionary fervour; the 
deeply personal, individual encounter of an individual with his own interiority is 
directly related to a collective insurgency and a reborn national identity. The Bible, in 
other words, is absolutely necessary to the "reformative" prison's mode of operation, 
its self-justification and the legitimacy of its claim over the interior life of its subjects. 
Simultaneously, in this instance, it starts to act as a marker ofthe very limits of the 
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ideological reach of the prison, a testimony to its failure to subjectivate, producing a 
kind of hard kernel of subjectivity that refuses in a disturbing way to be assimilated into 
the symbolic of the prison or the apartheid state. 
Of course, there is nothing new to the idea that a sacred cultural text begins to 
undermine the field it is supposed to stabilise, as Homi Bhabha reminds us in his 
discussion of 19th century hybridity and the Bible in India in "Signs Taken for 
Wonders". In his Jail Diary, Albie Sachs recounts his long Bible-reading sessions and 
comes to the strange realisation that, as a Jew, he is more "Christian" than his Christian 
fundamentalist station commander and confidant: 
It is ironical that I, the Jew, am more interested in the later prophets, especially 
Isaiah, and in the Christian doctrine of love, whereas he, the Christian, is 
obsessed with the tribal nationalism and fierce hatreds of the early Jews. Quite 
clearly he regards Israelites as being merely the precursors in history of the 
Afrikaners, who after their long sojourn in the desert have at last entered the 
land of milk and honey. (137) 
Sachs's realisation that he is always already a Christian, despite being a Jew, is entirely 
consonant with a specific reformative ideal that characterises the modem prison space 
(although of course his acerbic irony also maintains a crucial distance from this 
ideological mechanism). Nevertheless, his perfectly logical corollary insight into the 
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obverse truth of the situation, that his captors are always already Jewish, despite being 
Christians, delegitimises the entire moral claim on which the prison and the apartheid 
state attempts to base its authority. In short, his prolonged forced encounter with the 
Bible allows Sachs to obtain a penetrating insight into his captors' psychology and 
motivation, as well as to identify an instance oftextual repression or denial that is 
essential to the constitution of their identity. 
48 
In a more mechanical way, Hugh Lewin, like many other prisoners, simply uses the 
Bible as a kind of palimpsest to record a secret diary, which later becomes the source 
for his published autobiography. Each page of the Bible represents one day inside 
prison, and events are recorded in minuscule text between the lines of Bible verses 
(Lewin193-196). The choice of the Bible is based on the fact that it is the text least 
likely to be confiscated by prison officials. In this way, the Bible begins to function as a 
kind of Trojan horse that is used to convey experience from the world inside to the 
world outside. 
In other words, the prison is almost compelled to allow prisoners access to the Bible - it 
is immanent to its coercive (and self-exculpating) project - but at the same time, the 
Bible is potentially a supernumerary element, a foreign text that constantly threatens to 
disrupt processes of interpellation in the penal space. As such, it participates in the 
logic of the event, producing meaning and realigning SUbject-positions in a completely 
unpredictable way. Slavoj Zizek notes: 
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The undecidability of the Event thus means that an Event does not possess any 
ontological guarantee: it cannot be reduced to (or deduced, generated from) a 
(previous) Situation: it emerges 'out of nothing' (the Nothing which was the 
ontological truth of the previous situation). (Ticklish Subject 136) 
49 
There is, in other words, no way to predict the radical ontological displacement effected 
through reference to the Bible in terms of the logic of the penitentiary itself. 
In the case of the radical conversion experience described by Mogoba, it is of course 
necessary to ask the rather gauche question: how do we know he is telling the truth? In 
the sense that Robben Island has become, in the post-apartheid moment, a signifier that 
confers weight and significance to experience, is it not possible that Mogoba has firmly 
located his conversion as an event that took place on Robben Island, whereas the truth 
of his assumption of a Christian identity might be more complex and diffuse? What is 
at stake in this question is really the entire project of reading the prison itself as an 
important ground of self-relation, rather than as a mythical space invoked through and 
mediated by post-apartheid narratives about hardship, survival and triumph. Can we 
really talk about the prison itself providing the Bible as an "undecidable", excessive 
element that helps to structure narrative identity - which means adhering to the 
















consider it as at least potentially an anachronistic textual import, a signifier from/of a 
future identity, drawing on a context that has little to do with the realities of prison life? 
The wager that this thesis makes is to claim that it does not matter if the conversion 
experience is mapped onto the description of life on Robben Island in the service of 
some historically distant agenda: it is still the prison itself which provides the term. In 
other words, the fact that Mogoba returns to the classic signifiers of solitary 
confinement - the isolated subject, the small cell and the Bible - in order to find the 
undecidable event that ultimately brings about an entirely new order demonstrates the 
sense in which the new understands itself, and through self-understanding constitutes 
itself, as the result of a curvature of the symbolic surface of the old. Post-apartheid 
subjectivities are rhetorically constructed out of the experience of the carceral apartheid 
state: properly speaking, resistance in the prison memoir is grounded in an 
understanding of a historical moment - past, present or future - as potentially open to 
the disruptive power of a revolutionary event. As one of the most potent instruments of 
apartheid ideology, the prison provides the symbolic frame that must be superseded for 
a post-apartheid identity to emerge, and that emergence is rhetorically constructed 
through reference to the prison. 
In order to approach the wide range of South African prison diaries, this thesis 
generally adopts a thematic rather than a chronological approach, returning frequently 
to the theoretical concerns outlined above. The primary interest of the thesis is not 















really to provide a historical outline of conditions in South African prisons, but to 
explore an interrelated range of perspectives on the relationship between 
autobiographical self-construction and the prison as total institution. Even so, it is 
important to understand that some important historical changes occurred in terms of the 
conditions of imprisonment and the legal processes governing the imprisonment of 
political prisoners, particularly between 1963 and 1994. 
The passing of the General Law Amendment Act in 1963, which allowed for detention 
without trial for an extendable period of ninety days, effectively removed even the 
appearance of legality from the process of arrest and imprisonment. People arrested 
under the Ninety-Day Detention Law had no definite rospect of a trial, no certainty 
about their release date, had no access to a lawyer, were not protected against self-
incrimination, and were kept in solitary confinement under conditions that were fairly 
arbitrarily determined by the police. In Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela notes: 
The law helped to transform the country into a police state; no dictator could 
covet more power than the Ninety-Day Detention Law gave to the authorities. 
As a result, the police became more savage: prisoners were routinely beaten and 
we soon heard reports of electric shock, suffocation and other forms oftorture. 
(402) 
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As the armed struggle escalated, so did illegal police activity - torture, kidnappings and 
murders in detention became increasingly commonplace. The power of the courts 
diminished throughout this period, especially with the formation ofP.W. Botha's State 
Security Council and the National Security Management System, both nefarious, 
secretive organisations designed to circumvent the authority of cabinet and the judiciary 
while combating political activism. In the 1980s, the military became increasingly 
involved in repressing political uprising and performing functions until then associated 
with the police. The South African Defense Force started to restructure itself in order to 
carry out its new counter-insurgency role, creating new units specifically to fulfill 
"unconventional" functions. As Jacques Pauw notes, 
[t]he Rhodesian war was a valuable source of manpower for the SADF's 
special units, especially after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, when large 
numbers ofSelous Scouts joined the SADF. It was out of this realm that 
specialised military units were born to deal with the revolutionary onslaught 
against South Africa. Highly trained commandos hunted down the enemy, blew 
up strategic installations and assassinated ANC members. Targets, aside from 
military, included civilians and members of the administrative and political 
structures of the ANC, PAC and Swapo. As the military began to play an 
increasingly aggressive role, the traditional divide between the military and the 













In And Night Fell, Molefe Pheto describes something of the political climate during this 
time, and its psychological effects on activists, their friends and family: 
Many people had disappeared and nothing was heard from them again except 
perhaps by the immediate relatives, who in most cases 'preferred' to keep things 
quiet, in the hope that they were easing the hardships of the disappeared 
detainee. After some such detention, everything would return to 'normal', and 
life would go on. 'Who's next?' would be on everyone's lips. We would live in 
the ghetto, following our usual habits, waiting in silence, horror-stricken, 
hoping all the same to hear more news of the detainee, if we were lucky, 
because no one knew what happened as soon as one of us was taken away and 
locked behind those massive prison doors. Detention in South Africa is 
incommunicado ... Detainees live and survive on suspension, tension and hope. 
The cut-off is as complete as a black night. Many break down not out of 
cowardice, but out of concern for their loved ones left to fend for themselves. 
(18) 
In addition to political prisoners who had been charged and sentenced by the courts, a 
swelling number of prisoners were effectively deprived of even the most rudimentary 
rights - by the 1980s, they were routinely held in secret, tortured and murdered. In 
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1985 alone, for instance, Murphy Morobe of the United Democratic Front reported that 
8000 United Democratic Front members had been detained, and that most of their 
national and regional executives had disappeared, been murdered or fled into exile 
(Davenport and Saunders 510). While official conditions of imprisonment might have 
improved in certain instances, especially after Harold Strachan published a series of 
articles in the Rand Daily Mail in 1965 about conditions in South African prisons,7 such 
changes seem almost meaningless when seen in the context of increased Security Police 
entitlement and brutality. 
Two prison worlds were becoming increasingly disparate by the 1970s: one "official", 
comprised of people who had been charged, found guilty in a court and sentenced by a 
judge, and another, sinister "unofficial" world of prisoners who had simply disappeared 
from society - many of whom never resurfaced. The notorious Vlakplaas Security 
Police unit, tasked in the 1980s with capturing and arresting activists, made almost no 
official arrests, despite being heavily funded by the government. This is because its real 
job, under the leadership of Dirk Coetzee, was to train a clandestine hit squad, who 
carried out political assassinations, particularly barbarous acts oftorture and Nazi-like 
medical experiments on prisoners. No written record of these activities existed at the 
time. As Antjie Krog notes in Country of my Skull: 
7 As Hugh Lewin notes, "[t]he Strachan articles ... revolutionized the entire South African prison service, 
breaking open for the ftrst time what had in fact become a secret society, subject to no sanctions beyond 
itself ... Everything related to prison reform in South Africa is post-Strachan" (73). 
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The orders were given orally, one-to-one. No diaries, no written reports. 
Amongst ourselves, says Coetzee, we developed our own body language. The 
wink of an eye, the nod of a head, could spell someone's end. (60) 
Because the real activities at Vlakplaas enjoyed no official existence, voices that could 
comment on or describe their experience of this death farm were ruthlessly silenced. 
Descriptions of more "official" imprisonment in the 1980s were haunted by these 
silences: activists were aware ofthe existence of places like Vlakplaas, and suspected 
that death squads existed, but their exact nature and intention remained open to 
speculation. It was really only during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
hearings from 1996-1998 that detailed stories about the hit squads and activities at 
Vlakplaas emerged, often told by the perpetrators. Simultaneously, stories were 
filtering back into the country about terrible conditions of detention and torture in the 
African National Congress's Quatro camp in Angola: another shadowy story in South 
Africa that few people are prepared to discuss even at the present moment. 
55 
As the apartheid state turned to more and more desperate and illegal activities in its 
attempts to curb political change, and as the possibility of imprisonment became a 
pervasive reality for even moderate political campaigfters, activists were learning more 
from one another about conditions of imprisonment and arriving in prison with a kind 
of psychological preparedness and ideological resolve that earlier prisoners were not 
really equipped with. The consequences of these historical changes are referred to 
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throughout the thesis, even though they do not fonn the basis on which the material is 
organised. 
Notwithstanding the theme-oriented structure of the thesis, the second chapter deals 
with the earliest memoir, and also the only one that has no relationship with activism 
under apartheid - Hennan Charles Bosman's Cold Stone Jug. When Bosman was 
imprisoned for murder in 1926, the idea of the prison as "total institution" was 
relatively new in South Africa. Pretoria Central, where Bosman was held for most of 
56 
his sentence, was one of the first institutions designed along "m dem" lines: prisoners 
were placed under constant surveillance, an institutionalised, military-like discipline 
characterised day-to-day life, a nuanced classification system was used to separate, 
punish and reward different classes of prisoners, the outside world was all but 
completely shut out, "scientific" ideas about diet and exercise were applied to prisoners 
and a nominal idea of "refonn" became articulated with the prison's function. With the 
completion of Pretoria Central, the South African prison completed its shift in focus 
from corporeal deprivation and punishment to the subjective interiority of prisoners: 
instead of publicly shaming and punishing disruptive members of society, the prison 
started to regard itself as analogous to a school, an institution for inculcating acceptable 
behaviour and guiding the refonnation of consciousness. In many ways, Bosman's 
prison memoir, published almost two decades after he was imprisoned, fonns the 
blueprint for subsequent gaol diaries: it clears a particular discursive space in South 
African literature, and marks the first real encounter between the fonns of interpellation 
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of the modem prison in South Africa and the narrative forms of autobiographical 
writing. Its date of publication, 1949, also happens to follow a year after the National 
Party's ascension to power, so it is also poised at a consequential historical instant in 
South African history: at this moment, South African society began its transformation 
into a form of a police state, with the prison at the very heart of its strategies of 
coercion and control. This chapter explores some of the ways in which the prison as 
total institution lends itself to narrative, and some of the consequences and problematics 
of rendering the self in such a context. 
The third chapter uses Nelson Mandela's Long Walk to Freedom (1996) as central text, 
although reference is also made to Moses Dlamini's Hell Hole, Robben Island (1984), 
D.M. Zwelonkes's Robben Island (1989), Indres Naidoo's Island in Chains, Michael 
Dingake's My Fight Against Apartheid (1987) and a few other memoirs, many ofthem 
now out of print. The aim of this chapter is to examine representations of self and 
community on Robben Island, South Africa's most important and mythologised 
apartheid prison, and the one that has been most essential to the production of the 
image of Nelson Mande1a in the global popular imagination. Part of the aim ofthe 
chapter is to highlight the diversity of experience on the island, and to take note of the 
ways in which this diversity is registered in autobiographical accounts. A related aim is 
to examine the kinds of silences, exclusions and repressions that attend on the 
production of Robben Island identity. These prohibitions and ellipses are related to the 
construction of a new hegemonic national identity, located in a specific ideological and 


















ethical matrix, with Robben Island as an authoritative and stabilising point of reference. 
In this way, the third chapter extends the discussion of the nature of the modem South 
African prison to suggest that this "modernity" was at best fractured, uneven and 
diverse, and also to suggest that the prison autobiography became a template for the 
production of national identities: even now, Robben Island functions as a stand-in for 
nation and national history. 
The fact that Robben Island was, in addition to being a black prison, also an all-male 
prison, obviously creates a further complication to its important representative function: 
one of the signal characteristics of discussions about prison identity in South Africa is 
the occlusion of women's voices and experience. In many ways, the prison space in 
South Africa, as elsewhere, is regarded as a male space, and the subjectivities that it 
produces are regarded as highly masculine. To be a prisoner, for many autobiographers, 
activists, commentators and penal functionaries, means to be a man. The fourth chapter, 
then, looks at women activists who were imprisoned under apartheid, and considers the 
ways in which the apartheid prison engaged femininity and constructed it as a special 
category, an anxiety-provoking supplement to the universalised masculinity of 
prisoners. The construction and experience of femininity in prison is afforded a separate 
chapter for two reasons. Firstly, women were compelled by the prison to occupy a 
separate material space, with distinct rituals and preoccupations. In other words, the 
logic of this chapter follows the logic of the prison's arrangement of space (as is 














ambivalent insistence on and simultaneous effacement of the femininity of women 
prisoners obliged prison autobiographies written by women to foreground and 
interrogate the intersection between the performance of gender and the exercise of 
power in ways that male autobiographical accounts often simply failed to do. The 
broader question that animates this argument, then, appertains to the production of and 
experience of gender in the penal institution. Specifically, this discussion is interested 
in the ways in which feminine roles are expected and enforced by the apartheid prison, 
but also in how, under certain conditions, the signifiers of femininity start to collect an 
oppositional force. Prison diaries discussed in this chapter include Ruth First's 117 
Days (1965), Jean Middleton's Convictions (1998), Emma Mashinini's Strikes Have 
Followed Me All My Life (1989) and Caesarina Kona Makhoere's No Child's Play: In 
Prison Under Apartheid (1988), and a few others. 
59 
One theme that runs throughout the discussion in this thesis relates to the experience of 
solitude and the desire for community in prison. The fifth chapter identifies the prison's 
relentless drive to individualise its inmates as the fulcrum of the entire configuration of 
the penal institution, and relates some of the broader national apartheid- and post-
apartheid era tensions around community, communal responsibility and the nature of 
the individual voice to the prison's deployment of space to separate and to combine 
people. In particular, in the same way that chapter four considers the raced nature of 
gender in the apartheid prison, Chapter 5 suggests that race played an important role in 














The prison's use of solitary confinement allows us a kind of cross-section view of the 
more abstract social and ideological individualising pressures that existed under 
apartheid, and particularly to understand how these pressures engaged understandings 
of race and culture in order to form identities. This chapter revisits earlier discussions in 
order to elaborate on ideas related to solitude and community in prison, but focuses 
specifically on Breyten Breytenbach's The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist 
(1984) as one of the most self-consciously "literary" texts to deal with memories of 
solitary confinement. 
Finally, the last chapter draws on some ofthe conclusions reached by previous chapters 
to look briefly at the role of the prison, its rituals and forms of address in the post-
apartheid moment. Firstly, it considers the ways in which the post-apartheid prison 
memoir has become increasingly subsumed by the language of social agencies: 
psychologically inflected "self-empowerment" writing workshops, and interviews by 
sociologists and journalists. At the same time, conditions in South African prisons seem 
to be deteriorating, and government rhetoric around prisons frequently seems 
uncompromisingly punitive. This chapter asks what is at stake in this simultaneous 
emergence of more collaborative and less overtly "political" prison memoirs and the 
relegation of the prison to an increasingly invisible and vilified social space - what are 
the consequences of this shift in the role of the prison for the production of identity in 
contemporary South Africa? Jonny Steinberg's exceptional book, The Number: One 











this chapter both as an example of a new kind of collaborative prison (auto )biography 
and as a remarkably astute self-reflexive commentary on the social and historical 
context that enables and complicates its production. Secondly, the concluding chapter 
looks at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's appropriation (and even, in some 
cases, re-enactment) of the processes of interrogation, confession and judgement that 
played such a powerful oppressive role under apartheid. These acts of repetition can be 
regarded as both an illustration of the persistent power of a historically established 
judicial and penal epistemology, and as an attempt to supersede such a penal logic. The 
ambiguity of the Truth and Reconciliation's mode of operation is related to the central 
questions of this thesis: how can a social and historical frame give way to new forms of 
understanding? What is the relationship between narrative identity and its material and 
ideological ground? When can we term an operation an event, and when is it simply the 
reiteration of established forms of understanding? 
The thesis uses a range of terms to describe the various primary texts, including 
"memoir", "autobiography" and "novel". The exact distinction between especially the 
first two terms remains hotly debated by scholars in the general field of life writing, 8 
and it is not really the intention ofthis thesis to enter the debate. Generally, I rely on an 
understanding of autobiography as a genre that derives from Western Romantic notions 
of the confessional subject: in autobiographies, the primary focus is on the self-
reflexive, individual consciousness of a single author. Autobiographical texts are 
8 Most notably recently by Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson in Reading Autobiography. See also Helen 
Buss's Reproducing the World and Julie Rak's article "Are Memoirs Autobiography?" 
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typically carefully researched, and recount an entire life rather than episodes that 
illuminate aspects of a personality, a culture, or a larger politico-historical moment 
(characteristics more closely associated with the memoir). In Reading Autobiography, 
Smith and Watson offer a similar distinction, while also drawing attention to the 
emphasis on intersubjectivity and dialogism in the memoir form: 
62 
Whereas autobiography promotes an 'I' that shares with confessional discourses 
an assumed interiority and an ethical mandate to examine that interiority, 
memoirs promote an 'I' that is explicitly constituted in the reports of the 
utterances and proceedings of others. The 'I' or subjectivity produced in 
memoirs is externalized and dialogical. (198) 
While this thesis attempts a loose adherence to this categorisation, South African prison 
writing incessantly challenges rigid classification. The apartheid context means that 
even the most conventionally "autobiographical" texts make reference to social and 
historical events, and tend to relate the lives of individuals to collective activism. True 
Confessions of an Albino Terrorist, for instance, signals its status as "autobiography" in 
the title - "true confessions" is a direct reference to the Western canon of confessional 
autobiographical writing from Augustine to Beckett - even as the text incessantly 
interrogates the status of both "truth" and "confession", opting for a memoir-like 
"telling of a person's life in terms of an event" (Rak 305). It also includes 

















on. Zwelonke's Robben Island is clearly autobiographical (the author establishes this 
fact in an introductory note), but is presented in fictional form. Bosman gives his prison 
a fictional name, and invents characters, but bases his memoir closely on his actual 
experiences, rendering "autobiography", "memoir" and "novel" equally deficient as 
descriptive nouns. In general, I have opted for "autobiography" as the inclusive term, 
and used "memoir" and "novel" where I would like to draw attention to particular 













TWO: BIRTH OF A GENRE: BOSMAN'S COLD STONE JUG 
In November 1926, Herman Charles Bosman appeared before the Johannesburg 
Magistrates' Court for the murder of his stepbrother, David Russell. Apparently 
Bosman had murdered Russell in an argument about closing the window in their shared 
bedroom. Although the judge characterised the case as "very sad and pathetic" (Gray, 
Life Sentence 120), he found no legal reason to reduce the crime from murder to 
manslaughter, and sentenced Bosman to death. A few weeks later, the sentence was 
commuted to ten years' imprisonment, allowing Bosman to be released on probation in 
1931. His account of his years in the Pretoria Central prison was published to mixed 
reviews long after the event, in 1949 - a year after the Nationalist Government came to 
power in South Africa. 
The semi-autobiographical novel, titled Cold Stone Jug, was only broadly recognised as 
a classic of South African literature in the decades to come. In many ways, it cleared 
the ground for subsequent South African prison writing, both in terms of its disquieting 
realism 1 and in its anecdotal, non-chronological form. 
I In fact, censorious reviews of the book at the time of its publication often ignored its humorous aspects 
and referred to its gratuitous emphasis on the "sordid side of prison life" (The Rand Daily Mail) and 
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Bosman was really also the first South African prisoner to write about a prison that was 
designed to be a "total institution" with an explicitly reformative, rather than a punitive, 
function. When Bosman was imprisoned in 1926, the Benthamite prison had a history 
of shorter than thirty years in South Africa. For many South Africans, public executions 
were still in living memory. At the time, most prisons for whites were still based on 
military barracks, while prisons for black inmates resembled something between a 
medieval dungeon and a mine compound. In fact, residues of the compound model have 
remained prevalent in South African prisons throughout apartheid up to the present day: 
as Sarah Oppler notes, "remnants of the past are visible in the large communal cells 
filled with rows of metal bunk beds in which prisoners are housed" (1). Against this 
background, Pretoria Central was one ofthe first recognisably "modern" prisons in 
South Africa: 
... the Benthamite concept of the prison as a total institution, in which every 
facet of the inmate's daily existence may be controlled until such time as he has 
changed his attitudes to authority, to work and to the society outside, and where 
the benefits of literacy training and religious instruction may be inculcated, 
arrive in Transvaal only with the building ofthe Fort in Johannesburg (where 
Bosman was held while awaiting trial), and then with Pretoria Central Prison as 












When Hugh Lewin entered Pretoria Central some decades later as a political prisoner, 
the institution had hardly changed at all. In Bandiet, Lewin notes: 
66 
Forty years before we arrived there, Bosman had been sent to Central for 
murdering his step-brother: condemned to be hanged, he was later reprieved and 
spent eight years in Cold Stone Jug. He wrote an absorbingly funny book of his 
experiences at Central - Cold Stone Jug, which I read for the first time inside 
Cold Stone Jug. In forty years, very little had changed. (83) 
Lewin's comment invites a number of observations. First, it shows the influence of 
Bosman's account on subsequent South African prison writers. Lewin's account of 
Pretoria Central, and his memory ofthe space, is constructed through self-conscious 
reference to Bosman's memoir. As much as Lewin inhabits the same prison as Bosman, 
he also takes up residence in his predecessor's literary form. Second, it shows the 
extent to which the apartheid state sustained pre-apartheid forms of control and 
coercion with only small amendments. The apartheid government did not really invent 
new modalities of discipline and punishment to reflect its new ideological disposition, it 
simply used the forms of compulsion that it inherited and extended their use 
dramatically. As the state's actions became more violent and illegal, it sustained a 
recognisably Benthamite favade that screened the existence of other, more sinister 
rituals of punishment and oppression: the interrogation room, secret death farms, police 
holding cells, and so on. It never abandoned the outward show of the reformative 
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penitentiary: even Robben Island, one of the apartheid state's harshest prisons for black 
inmates, could be transformed overnight, like a Potemkin village, into a benign 
rehabilitative institution for the benefit of visitors from the Red Cross. The apartheid 
government had a particular iniquitous genius for preserving and using the material and 
ideological resources that it had become heir to on its accession to power. In this sense, 
Herman Charles Bosman could write about his experience of prison in South Africa in 
the 1930s in a way that is entirely resonant with the experiences of (mainly white) 
prisoners throughout the remainder of the twentieth century. 
Bosman's particular ability lies in his adoption of an oral-style narrative form, narrowly 
associated with a self-consciously organic, artless literary tradition that stretches back 
to A.W. Drayson, Frederick Boyle and J. Forsyth Ingram,2 and inflecting it through an 
encounter with the institutionalised disciplinary culture of the modem penitentiary. 
Time in the Benthamite prison bends back on itself: every day is similar to every other 
day, so that any sense of an extended chronology becomes difficult to sustain. Narrative 
conventions that rely on continuous linear time, where events unfold in clear historical 
succession, are inimical to the structure ofthe modem prison. The oral-style story 
provides a stylistic technology that can incorporate the experience of space and time in 
the penitentiary: its use of episodic, anecdotal narrative corresponds to the experience 
of time in gaol. Moreover, the production of culture in prison is essentially oral: 
prisoners have very limited access to the written word and few opportunities to produce 
2 See Craig MacKenzie's The Oral-Style South African Short Story in English (15-43). 
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writing, so any concession to mimesis makes it necessary for the autobiographer to find 
written forms that reproduce oral structures. In this way, two apparently diametrically 
opposed cultures - the culture ofthe "fireside tale", associated with a rural frontier 
colonial tradition, and the quintessentially modem, soulless culture of the penitentiary, 
become conjoined in Bosman's narration. Bosman's style is in fact characterised by the 
interpenetration ofthe "modem", with its focus on interiority, and its use of irony and 
ambiguity, and the more traditional, anecdotal and episodic oral-style narrative with its 
strong emphasis on the situation of telling. In Bosman's memoir, the prison is a 
material structure that sustains this interpenetration. 
The opening episodes of Cold Stone Jug provide a good illustration of the disconcerting 
movement from humorous, anecdotal narration to complex self-reflexivity that is 
characteristic of Bosman's style. In the first chapter of the memoir, Bosman recounts 
his stay in the condemned cell through a series of droll anecdotes told at the expense of 
the warders. One particularly dull-witted warder, for instance, is persuaded by Bosman 
and his cellmate to demonstrate his dancing abilities. While he is prancing about in his 
stockinged feet, the ight head-warder arrives and guffaws at the ridiculous sight. The 
absurdity of an eruption of laughter in the most serious of places is amplified by the 
night head-warder's ridiculous admonition: 
'You condemned men mustn't laugh so loud ... The hard-labour convicts got to 
sleep. They got to work all day. You two don't do nothing but smoke cigarettes 
















all day long and crack jokes. You'll get yourselves in serious trouble ifthe 
Governor finds out you keep the whole prison awake night after night, romping 
about and laughing in the condemned cells.' (Bosman 54) 
69 
Humour functions here as counterpoint to and as a barrier against the grim reality of the 
setting. Bosman's wry wit and intelligence create an illusion of autonomy in an 
environment that is adversative to the very idea of agency. In this scene - as in many 
others - Bosman's irony elevates him above the terror of what he describes. 
However, Bosman immediately calls into question the very basis of this apparent 
distance: 
We spent much of our waking hours in pulling the warders' legs. We didn't 
know, then, that we were in actual fact engaged in a time-honoured prison 
pastime. We didn't know that 'kidding' the warders was a sport regularly 
indulged in by prison lags, and that this form of recreation had venerable 
traditions. We didn't know that. We merely followed our natural bent of trying 
to be funny, and we found, afterwards, that we were all the time conforming to 
accepted prison custom. (53) 
By remarking that a "natural bent" has always already been "prison custom", Bosman 
makes a central aspect of his style function in a remarkably complex and interesting 











way. What appears on the surface as idiosyncratic humour, a form of detachment from 
the serious reality of penal life, is in reality integrally part of the functioning of the 
prison. The memoir's incessant production of comic detachment becomes prescribed by 
the "venerable tradition" of the prison itself: every instance of ironic distance is haunted 
by the possibility of being, after all, the voice of the prison. The laughter in the 
condemned cell is not exceptional - it is normal. In fact, when Henrietta Mondry 
celebrates the subversive "carnivalesque" features in Cold Stone Jug (87-92), she is in 
fact ignoring precisely this dimension of Bosman's self-construction. If Bosman is 
indeed operating in the carnivalesque mode, it is always with a kind of Todorovian 
attentiveness to the potential for carnival to serve the interests of the dominant 
ideology. Bosman's insight at this point relates directly to the status of resistance in and 
to the structures of the prison: the prison is not only a material space, encountered as 
one object amongst others, but directly constitutive of a form of subjectivity. What 
starts off in the memoir as a description produced from a semi-autonomous narrative 
position bends back on itself, in an Escher-like fashion, until the storyteller encounters 
his own subject-position as an effect ofthe material density ofthe space that he 
occupies. In this way, Bosman renders his irony doubly ambiguous. Not only does it 
serve the conventional function of marking a certain equivocal distance between the 
narrating subject and the events that are described in the narrative, it reinscribes the 
distance as potentially an effect of the same narrative events. Prisoners, as Bosman 














The final chapters ofthe memoir, which deal with Bosman's struggle against madness, 
further question the possibility of a point of view that unambiguously supersedes the 
environment that it describes. While under medical observation, Bosman befriends a 
safe-blower called Parkins, who explains to Bosman how to act insane in order to enjoy 
the relative luxury of the prison hospital. Characteristically, Bosman is captivated by 
the possibility of such a cynical manipulation of the system. "I reasoned," he writes, 
"that a man couldn't be as good a safe-blower as Parkins and not know a thing or two 
about life" (183). He even goes so far as to imagine that "this was the exact course that 
I was myself pursuing, unconsciously, and just out of perversity ... " (183). Parkins's 
main ploy is to tell the doctor that he believes he has hidden one and a half million 
pounds worth of Kruger sovereigns in an old mine dump. However, at the very moment 
Bosman seems most impressed by Parkins's ingenuity, Parkins admits that he 
genuinely believes the sovereigns are hidden under the mine dump, and outlines his 
plan to dig up the treasure once he is released from prison. Bosman writes: "I walked 
away from him then. And I know my footsteps were unsteady ... " (184). This incident 
reveals how Parkins consciously exploits the doctor's credulity - rather in the way 
Bosman and his companion "kid" the warders in the opening chapters - while at the 
same time believing his own shrewd lie. Parkins's voice is vertiginously divided against 
itself, apparently "playing the system" while in reality conforming to the institution's 
diagnosis. Bosman encounters in Parkins a reflection of himself - an "Ideal-I", who 
promises to stage a form of narration that guarantees a minimal degree of separation 
between the self and the harsh regime of penal life. However, following the logic of 
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reflection, when Parkins reveals his self-deluded nature, Bosman is led to a devastating 
encounter with his own delusions. The "lie" that is offered as evidence of madness 
turns out, in fact, really to be evidence of madness, so that the idea of a calculated 
ironic distance between narrator and narrative collapses: the eminently "sane" distance 
between self and world, subject and self-representation, is revealed as nothing other 
than the void of madness produced by the privations of the prison. 
Throughout Cold Stone Jug, Bosman is interested not merely in describing the prison, 
--------------------------------------------
but in how the prison inscribes him: he is incessantly preoccupied with the ways in 
which the prison marks and contains the voices and bodies of the prisoners. It is this 
self-reflexivity that makes Cold Stone Jug into a document that, in many ways, opens 
t~ter-S~~th.African prison autobiographies. Bosman is one of 
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prisoners. The memoir's preamble opens with Bosman telling informing his cellmates 
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-------------that he is in prison for murder. At his confession, they all move to the opposite side of 
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the cell. The label "murderer" renders him visible in a particular way, both accounting ----. __ ...... . 
for his presence in the cell and excluding him from the other prisoners. Moreover, his 
answer immediately reorganises the space ofthe cell, so that he becomes doubly -- -_.-._-" ... 
excluded: on the one hand, there is the physical exclusion of the prison cell from the 
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world outside (made all the more apparent by its almost unbearable proximity to the 
city street, tlie activity of cadging cigarettes from passers-by), and on the other there is 
his physical distance from his cellmates. The memoir opens by underscoring the 
relationship 1:1etween space and identity, architecture and labeling. This episode is 
further complicated by Bosman's insinuation that he deliberately provokes fear and 
respect thr0.ugh his answer, that he plays the role of the murderer: 
'Say, what are you pinched for?' he asked, eyeing me narrowly. 
'Murder,' I said. And in my tone there was no discourtesy. And I did not 
glower much. I only added, 'And I'm not feeling too good.' 
'Struth!' my interrogator remarked. And his jaw dropped. And that 
bunch of prisoners in the cell, the whole dozen of them, moved right across to 
the other side, to the comer that was furthest away from me.' (46) 
From the outset, there is a confusion between a role that is imposed and role that is 
adopted: it is uncertain whether Bosmanconsciously creates a distance between himself 
and others, or whether his exclusion is beyond his control, an effect of the way the 
prison and the courts have categorised him. This is especially important when we 
consider that the first word of the novel is his answer, "murder". In a sense, he 
introduces himself not only to his cellmates, but also to his reader, as a murderer: in one 
respect the reader's first experience of the novel is one of dialogic inclusion, as a 















with the cellmates. This places Bosman in an ambiguous position with respect to his 
audience: to what extent does he rhetorically construct himself, and to what extent is he 
constructed by some process outside himself? It seems that where he is most self-
consciously in control, "pulling a fast one", he is often in fact most thoroughly 
subsumed by a discourse that he exercises little control over. 
74 
The narrative often focuses on incidents where the prison's inscription of identity is 
invisible, unconscious, or visible to others, but not the self. In this sense, Bosman is 
interested precisely in the operation of ideology as an invisible force that determines the 
individual while remaining inaccessible to apprehension. For instance, Bosman 
introduces Swartklei Prison through a lengthy description of the Dutch Reformed 
Church service in honour of mothers' day. Prisoners are issued with paper labels -
green for prisoners whose mothers are- alive, and purple for prisoners whose mothers 
are dead. It soon becomes apparent that this anecdote in fact deals with th60diff{rrellce 
between "inside" and "outside", between the sign system of the prison and the sign 
system of "ordinary people": 
No pins were provided, but the backs of these strips of coloured paper were 
gummed. So we stuck the labels on with spit. And we sat there, on the wooden 
benches, straight up and very proud, feeling not only that we were doing 
horiIage to our mothers, but that we were participating in a ceremony that was 















Bosman's point here is of course that no "normal" adult in the outside world would 
wear a label like this, or for that matter celebrate mothers' day in this way. The labels 
are specially modified for their surroundings - no pins for the prisoners to put to 
nefarious use - and in any case act as substitutes for real mothers. Moreover, the absurd 
colour classification is redolent of the prison's obsession with categorisation and 
distinction, what Foucault terms "penal accountancy" (180). The labels have exchange 
value between the men in prison, not really between the men and their mothers. 
However, the very signs that betray the men's captive status, that inscribe them in the 
institution, are mistaken by them as evidence of their participation in the world outside 
the prison. It is not just that the labels are in a sense "misrecognised", but that they are 
misrecognised as their exact opposite, as signs of freedom and normality where they are 
in fact markers of bondage and deviance. Bosman includes one anomalous category of 
prisoner who is not successfully interpellated by the labeling procedure: 
(The Predikant pointedly made no reference to those convicts in his 
congregation who, through ignorance or misguided zeal, had stuck whole rows 
of labels, purple and green mixed up just anyhow, on to their jackets, like they 
were military ribbons.) (47) 
In a sense, it is'these prisoners who are not successfully formed into classes who 
threaten to betray the silliness of the entire ceremony as much as their own foolishness: 
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in consequence, they simply become unmentioned and therefore invisible. Bosman 
does not tell us what class of prisoner he belongs to - instead, this entire episode is 
narrated in the first person plural, an ironic "we" that occasionally becomes a "they": 
Bosman is both inside and outside this narrative, both one ofthe prisoners and 
somehow beside the scene, a lone ironic eye. 
Bosman returns explicitly to the notion of the "invisible" signs that inscribe penal 
identity in his description of a typical prisoner's appearance: 
Because he is, in the first place, abnormal, the average convict is less good-
looking than the average healthy minded citizen who is too clever to manifest 
his criminal tendencies to the point where he gets landed behind bars. Then, 
you've just got to think how a convict is dressed. Those battered, shapeless 
boots; those ridiculous kneebreeches surmounting legs encased in black , 
stockings variegated with horizontal red stripes ... and your towel: oh, I have 
forgotten to mention that funny white linen towel: it is easy to realise why I had 
forgotten about that apology for a towel until this moment. You are not allowed 
to leave your towel in your cell, because it gets grabbed and burned as tinder, so 
they have got this regulation that you have got to carry your towel on your 
person all the time: you have got to carry it folded, with part of it tucked into 
your breeches at the back, the other part to hang out three inches below your 


















you remember something that you don't see, because it hangs out from the back 
of your breeches, underneath your jacket? But you see the other man's towel, of 
course - whenever he turns his back on you. (91) 
The description progresses here from natural features (a kind of "degeneracy" which is 
manifested in the physical appearance of prisoners3) to the more artificial signs of the 
institution. Finally, he comments on the part of the prison uniform that is invisible to 
the prisoner himself - while the towel is an unmistakable part of the prison uniform, the 
prisoner's own towel is not available to his gaze. Interestingly, Bosman dramatises how 
this imperceptibility threatens to become a gap in memory and therefore an omission in 
the text. It is not merely that the prisoner is identified and produced through signs that 
are invisible to him, but that his own autobiographical narrative - produced outside the 
prison, decades after the experience - remains potentially constrained by the prison's 
c.~nfiguration~. In other words, the fact that the towel cannot be seen makes it difficult 
to remember, suggesting that memory itself is structured by its material objects. 
I 
Ideology is first of all realised in a material way; the abstract characterisation of 
prisoners as looking "abnormal" is underpinned by the concrete reality of the clothes 
prisoners are forced to wear. 
3 Of course, Bosman is not adopting this Darwinian-sounding discourse seriously. His "average healthy 
minded citizen" is simply more adroit at concealing "criminal tendencies". In Bosman's world, everyone is 
deviant at some level, some people just hide this fact better than others. He makes a similar point with 
respect to insanity later on: 
... I had learnt one thing. And that was that I was mad, stone mad. And that all the other people in 



















Another way in which Bosman highlights the ways in which the prison produces 
identity is through his preoccupation with the transformation of the material reality oJ 
the pnson ~ its architecture, its regulation oftime - into subjective consciousness. The 
one obvious example is the gallows chamber: 
Disguise it how one will, the fact is that the Swartklei Great Prison is 
dominated, spiritually as well as architecturally, by the gallows chamber, the 
doors of which rise up, massive and forbidding, at the end ofthe main wing in 
the building - the penal corridors. (51) 
78 
Like many other prison writers, Bosman is acutely aware of the relationship between 
the "spiritual" and the "architectural"; the ways in which the experience of prison and 
self attend on the prison's demarcation, circumscription and regulation of space. In one 
telling scene, he explains that during his time in prison, he had seen people leave prison 
in only two ways: if they were dead, through the mortuary gate, and if they were alive, 
through the front gate. When a warder dies, and Bosman doesn't see him leave the 
prison in either one of these conventional ways, he can't bring himself fully to believe 
that the warder is dead: 
Because he had died while in the prison service, I expected to see him come out 
through the mortuary gate, on a wheel-barrow and with sacking over all of him 
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If prison space is highly regulated, so is prison time. Bosman contrasts penal time and 
"outside" time in his account of the convict Botha, who is instructed to sort the type 
that is discovered beneath the floorboards of the printers' shop. When Bosman asks him 
how long he imagines the job will take, Botha replies that he should be busy for about 
seven years. This prompts Bosman to ruminate on the meaning and value of seven 
years: 
What doesn't happen to a man outside prison in seven years? The good years 
and the bad years. The adventures that come his way. The triumphs and the 
heart-breaks that are bound up with seven years ofliving ... And during this 
time Botha the convict would be sorting the type out of the box. Only after 
seven years would his fingers close around the last pica space. And nothing 
would be happening to Botha during these years. Just nothing at all. (131) 
Botha's time is essentially circular - the same thing happens to him every day - while 
time in the outside world unfolds in a linear, progressive way. This sense of "nothing 
;. 
happening" of course poses a range of problems for a prison autobiographer, since an 
autobiography is traditionally a linear narrative. Indeed, the prison memoir has to find 
new ways to deal with time. When Bosman is about to be released, he comments on the 
way prison time, which drags on so inordinately slowly, seems like no time at all in 















And they said, yes, that was the marvel of doing time; the longest stretch came 
to an end, they said; and when you found yourself on the last lap, like I was 
now, it was difficult to believe that those years actually had been served, one by 
one, in prison. You didn't know what had happened to those years, they said. It 
was only when you got back into the world outside that you realised that the 
years had indeed gone by .... (191) 
Bosman's memoir is exceptional in the way it both starts and ends in prison. Bosman 
never constructs a chain of cause and effect, explaining how he ended up in prison, or 
what he did once he was freed: essentially, he refuses to open prison time up to history, 
and experiments with a narrative that is claustrophobic ally enclosed - and produced -
by the signs and temporality ofthe penal institution. 
81 
While Cold Stone Jug displays a remarkable self-reflexive awareness ofthe ways in 
which the prison produces subjectivity, the memoir is also attentive to the kinds of 
culture and the types of texts that convicts make. There are complex tensions between 
the prison's manufacture of meaning and the meanings produced by the prisoners. Cold 
Stone Jug can in fact be read as a text about texts: in the absence of a clear linear 
progression of events, it becomes a memoir dealing with the memories, confessions, 
petitions, traditions, stories and dreams of the convicts. Describing a "wave of culture 












rather superior way on the autobiographies that illiterate convicts begin to produce. He 
lists the kinds of "snappy titles" that the prisoners come up with for their work: 
... Put in Boob by a Nark, or Twenty Years in Jug for Bugger-All, or I Don't 
Care Now, Much, or Why I Done Time, or Cold Stone Jug. (155) 
82 
By calling his own autobiography Cold Stone Jug, he effectively classes it alongside 
the other prisoners' texts. The memoir functions ambiguously both as a transcendent 
narrative, focused around a stable, somewhat detached narrator, and as a prison story 
among other prison stories, each jostling for space, erecting its own chronology, its own 
actors and its own account of reality. 
One aspect of convict culture that interests Bosman in particular is the "venerable 
institution" of dagga smoking. Dagga is overprovided with names, reflecting, as 
Bosman points out, its "important place in prison life," (72) and entrenching it in prison 
argot. It is written into the language ofthe prison, which is so mysteriously invisible 
from the outside: 
It was incredible that here, in South Africa, there was actually a class of person 
who spoke an argot that was known only to his kind ... I had never known that 
there really was a world such as this, here in our midst, with its own criminal 















The ritual of naming and consuming dagga in prison is part of an entirely separate, 
underground culture, a "secret language" invented and spoken by prisoners. Labeling, 
mixing and smoking dagga in a particular way signifies belonging to prison: dagga is at 
the centre ofa collective, inclusive construction of identity. As Bosman observes, "[t]he 
real place for smoking dagga was, of course, inside a cell with a whole lot together" 
(75). Bosman admits that his main reason for taking "a pull or two at a zol" was that he 
"didn't want to be thought to be acting in a superior way" (73): he participates in the 
ritual in order to be included in the community of prisoners. This is rather ironic in light 
of convicts' claim that dagga allows them to escape from the world of the prison, and 
the dull monotony of its rules: it affords a kind of freedom of affect and indifference to 
power: 
'The tree of knowledge,' the bluecoat would repeat, 'Give me a few pulls every 
morning with the mealie-pap and I'll tell the Governor that he can go and 
bugger himself, every morning with the mealie-pap.' (74) 
Dagga simultaneously opens a space outside incarceration - an inner freedom - and 
functions as one of the instruments through which an incarcerated identity is produced, 













One prisoner underscores this irony when he comments on how dagga frees him from 
the reality of prison, thereby enabling him to be a prisoner: 
'The tree of knowledge. When I is blue like what I is now, then I says you can 
maar keep me locked up in the boob as long as you blerrie like.' (74) 
This paradox is extended when another prisoner answers: 
'What do you want to pick on us for, Boet? What you want to say for we keep 
you locked up? It's not us, man. We ain't keeping you here. It's the walls and 
the screws (warders) and the john what pinched you. Why blame us blokes?' 
(74) 
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He reads his partner's 'you' as literall  referring to the other prisoners, invoking in a 
free-associative way the possibility that the prisoners are "walls and screws and 
warders", that the convicts in some sense collude in their own internment. The point 
here is that one of the most transgressive offenses in prison, smoking dagga, is in actual 
fact involved in the prison's exercise of power. To what extent is dagga culture 
invented by the prisoners, and to what extent by the prison? As always, the stories and 













Bosman further complicates issues by understanding the drug according to his own 
romantic preconceptions, some of them derived from The Count of Monte Cristo. This 
is one of few instances where Bosman allows clear evidence of his life before 
imprisonment to intrude in the narrative: dagga, a principal signifier of "inside", has for 
Bosman connotations with "outside", with another world and other texts. He reveals his 
attraction to dagga's associations with decadence and abandonment, an attraction which 
precedes his incarceration. For Bosman, dagga therefore becomes a meeting-place 
between his consciousness as it is shaped by the prison, and the consciousness that he 
brings to the prison. 
In the memoir, dagga is poised precariously between inside and outside, the past and 
the present, and freedom and captivity - it can be read both as an example of and a 
metaphor for all texts produced in prison, an exemplification of the confusions and 
tensions that mark the manufacture of convict culture. It is a disruptive enjoyment that 
threatens the very order of prison, a secret ecstasy in a world violently opposed to the 
pleasures of the body, but it is also an enjoyment that is necessary to ensure the smooth 
functioning of prison life. It is both tacitly acknowledged by officials as a part of prison 
culture and officially disallowed. 
We find a similar pattern of excess and incorporation in Bosman's anecdote about the 
warder Marman's novel, Die Liefdesgeskiedenis van Bloubaadjie Theron (The Love 
History of Blue coat Theron). Marman's book, about an innocently convicted bluecoat, 
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is "full of slush and sentiment and melodrama and bad grammar" (131). Both in theme 
and in style, the warder's novel seems remarkably similar to the prisoners' literary 
endeavours, perhaps again pointing to an affinity of experience and values between 
guards and inmates. Marman gives the prisoners working in the printers' shop a tin of 
tobacco apiece to print the book for him illegally. After Marman takes delivery of the 
books and leaves the prison, the prisoners realise that they have forgotten to distribute 
the type back into cases. Rather than risk discovery, they prise the floorboards up: 
And the remaining chapters of Discipline-warder Marman's novel, in the form 
of column after column of loose type set by hand, were shot through the hole in 
the floor. (132) 
In this case, the printing room becomes the location of an unlawful materialisation of 
enjoyment: a guard and the prisoners collude to create a forbidden text. The novel 
alludes to both history and love, dimensions of time and experience typically 
unavailable in prison, with its cyclical time and its (official) proscription of sexual 
relationships. The printing of the novel breaks prison rules, but the content of the novel 
exceeds the prison's epistemological frame. 
However, when the text is buried beneath the floorboards, it is not merely hidden from 
the view of authority. It becomes reintegrated into the industry ofthe prison; the novel 
literally becomes prison labour. These are, after all, the very same floorboards that 
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concealed the type that Botha has to spend seven years sorting. Hiding the type beneath 
the floorboards provokes the most tedious, repetitive kind of solitary labour; the 
epitome of prison work. In a sense, the "history" is transformed into unremitting 
repetition and the "love" into solitude. While the text beneath the surface ofthe 
printers' room bears testimony to the covert culture and the secret stories of the warders 
and the prisoners, it also serves as a vehicle for the power of the penal institution. 
The "craze for culture and erudition" (156) that sweeps the prison is another case in 
point. On the surface, it seems like an original and spontaneous convict practice, but the 
ridiculous controversy over the difference between a quagga and a zebra betrays its 
immersion in and dependence on the discourse ofthe prison. Being able to recite the 
dictionary definitions ofthe two words becomes a measurement of erudition: 
And if you couldn't recite those two definitions off pat, no matter how you 
mispronounced the word , or how ignorant you were of their meaning, then you 
were regarded as a person with no educational attainments. (156) 
Ultimately, this new "culture" is entirely formal, concerned not so much with acquiring 
knowledge about the world as with constructing hierarchies - a process surprisingly 
similar to the prison's characteristic obsession with the invention and supervision of 
status categories. In other words, prison culture, at a certain level, borrows from and 
reflects the culture ofthe institution. 
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There is one description of a convict ritual in Cold Stone Jug that strains against such a 
Foucaultian notion of convict culture as inescapably recuperated and contained by the 
hegemonic discourse of the institution. One night, during Bosman's descent into 
insanity, scores of prisoners start howling at the full moon: 
The noise each convict made, while it differed from the sounds emitted by his 
neighbour, nevertheless had one thing in common with this general howling, 
and that was that it had a warm, animal ring: but it wasn't so much like an 
animal on heat as like an animal dying - or an animal smelling the stink of 
death. I know I didn't join in with this general howling. I pulled the blankets 
over my head and lay on the concrete floor of my cage and shivered. I was very 
frightened, that night. (168) 
Fearing that he hallucinated the event, he asks Pym, a fellow inmate, whether he heard 
anything. Pym at first denies having heard the noise - apparently to tease Bosman -
and then laughingly confesses: 
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, ... Of course I heard them howlings. I would have been mad, all right, if I 
hadn't. Anq so would you. But you won't find any of the boys talk about it. 
Especially not them that howled. It don't happen very often. Not more than once 










think, during all the years I been in the boob. The boys just sort of let 
themselves go. One bloke starts them off and then they all join in. And they 
dunno what they're doing. The first time I heard it, when I was a youngster, I 
got crap-scared. I thought as the whole boob was going mad, and me also.' 
(170) 
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The howling is a macabre upsurge of something utterly atavistic, unregistered in the 
symbolic order except as a refusal to speak. It is certainly occasioned by the prison - it 
clearly has the status of a "prison tradition" - but at the same time, it uncannily exceeds 
the prison. There is a core of "inhumanity" that cannot be contained or addressed by the 
penal system, since this system is ultimately based on notions of reform and contrition, 
on a particular brand of individualising subjectivation. Men who howl like beasts at the 
full moon cannot be transformed into subjects: the very brutality that is deployed in the 
service of penal individualisation produces an inhuman kernel that resists the prison's 
attempts to reduce its inmates to reformable individuals. The uncanny noise is an 
indivisible remainder to the operation ofthe prison, a supernumerary event that cannot 
be accounted for and remains unmentioned by both the authorities and the prisoners. 
In some respects the howling might serve the interests of the prison, functioning as a 
powerful shared secret that helps to shape a homogenous "convict identity" in the same 















invisible marks. However, a homogenous "convict identity" can very easily turn into 
"convict solidarity", as when the food demonstrations start breaking out (135-150). The 
howling is properly speaking unconscious, a point where the prison is unavailable to 
itself, where penal discourse fails to realise self-identity. If the howling were named 
and discussed among the prisoners, it would be drawn into and contained by the 
inexorable sign system ofthe prison. Precisely through their silence, the prisoners 
maintain the howling as a radical, potentially destabilising practice, an aspect of what 
Bosman terms "the mass mind" (138). 
Bosman is always intensely aware of the ways in which "convict culture" both resists 
and submits to the structures of the prison. Cold Stone Jug is remarkable for the way it 
brings this awareness to bear on itself, fully aware of its own status as a prison artifact: 
the text posits a narrator whose implicit sense of intellectual superiority and critical 
detachment is always potentially a form of delusion occasioned by the prison itself. 
Throughout the memoir, Bosman places a high premium on individuality. In some 
ways the memoir invents Bosman as romantic outsider, dramatising his rebellious, 
idiosyncratic nature. There are myriad scenes that praise originality and condemn the 
thoughtless reproduction of received ideas. One small example is where the convict 
Slangvel starts a fight with Bosman. Bosman responds by asking him to wait a moment 
while he takes off his jersey. Slangvel begins to take off his own jersey: 














I don't suppose he really wanted to discard his jersey. I think it was merely 
some sort of moron imitativeness. Perhaps he thought it was a more official sort 
of thing to do, taking off his jersey before beating up a man. (128) 
Bosman takes advantage of Slangvel's "moron imitativeness" by beating him senseless 
while his jersey covers his eyes. 
However, the memoir is just as happy to question the possibility of an original, 
spontaneous voice, constantly deflating the authenticity of the narrative "I", and 
drawing intention to the insidious encroachment of the signs and rituals of the prison in 
its self-construction. In fact, true "interiority" and separateness are experienced as a 
form of disintegration - it is an unbearable and unsustainable state. 
For instance, Bosman finds the possibility that he imagined the convicts howling - that 
it was a private fantasy - unbearable. The howling becomes associated for Bosman 
with an intolerable interiority, a torment that can be diffused only through contact with 
others. Eventually, he can act "normally" only when he is looked at. The moment he is 
in private, he gives in to the madness: 
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And every time, at night, when the steel door was banged shut on me by the 
warder, and I heard the key grate in the lock, then my head would start spinning, 

















round, with great difficulty, on my hands and knees, because ofthe narrowness 
of the walls ofthe cage. I would crawl round and round, like that, until I would 
drop down from exhaustion. And yet I had a strange cunning, with all this. I 
would time myself. The warders, coming along the corridors at hourly intervals 
and looking in through one peephole after another, would never catch me out 
crawling round and round the steel cage. Whenever I sensed that the warder was 
almost due I would grab up a book, any sort of book, and I would sit down on 
the floor and pretend to read. (186) 
His sanity becomes carefully spaced to accord with the regular intervals during which 
he falls under the gaze of the warders. In the interstices, when he is alone, he is 
completely mad. 
Towards the end ofthe memoir, it is increasingly apparent that the rational, separate 
"I", supposedly free of inter subjective bonds and allegiances, is in fact a locus of 
madness and disintegration. Real "interiority" is no island of calm, separate from the 
ideologies of the world - instead, it is a radically disruptive, violent and formless 
nightmare. In this sense, the Benthamite prison is both the realisation of an 
Enlightenment ideal and its aporetic limit. Individualisation and isolation, rather than 
disclosing the autonomous, reasonable subject behind the distortions of history and 
culture, in fact reveal, to use Slavoj Zizek's formulation, that the "pure transcendental" 














Remainder 124). When Bosman is in his cell, he splits into two - on the one hand, he 
presents a fayade of rationality - a static, passive body engaged in the profoundly 
individual, introspective activity of silent reading. On the other hand, when not under 
the gaze ofthe warders, he reveals the truth beneath the fayade: the uncontrolled body 
of the madman, with a fragmented, paranoid consciousness. These can be read as the 
two faces ofthe Cartesian subject: the rational selfis a consequence of the prison's 
Benthamite interpellation of the prisoner as a reformable individual, while the 
disconnected lack of consciousness attends on the same process of individualisation, 
where the individual is severed from the intersubjective bond. Paradoxically, Bosman 
makes a "rational" - and subversive - choice to hide his irrational side from the prison: 
in other words, he renders his madness, which is a direct consequence of his 
imprisonment, invisible (and therefore irresolvable). The madness functions as mute 
testimony to the excess of the prison; of the remainder of the Real that attends on its 
process of subjectivisation. 
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Ultimately, Cold Stone Jug is an interesting memoir not because it talks about "prison 
experience" or "prison identity" in some generic way, but because it talks about prison 
as a place where subjectivity is produced, where no "I" can be taken for granted. It 
takes the narrating self and systematically reveals its connections and dependencies, the 
machinery behind its production. In the process, it also reflects on the complexities of 
resistance in prison: for Bosman, subversive acts always seem in danger of serving the 















memoir are those where Bosman seems to agree with the way he is constructed by the 
prison - as a murderer, as deviant, as lacking in intelligence and ordinary morality -
andfully assumes the role ofthe prisoner. While the rich ironic tone of the text suggests 
that this identification is not really serious - that there is in fact a gap between his inner 
self and the projection ofthe penal institution - this gap is never filled in with some 
determinate content, some appeal to a subjective autonomous "substance". Moreover, 
the very idea of an "inner self' is radically unsettled by the fact that when we encounter 
Bosman alone, he seems completely deranged. In this sense, the narrator never 
performs a judgment on behalf of the reader: he never exposes the culpability and error 
of the penal institution through reference to his own innocence and authentic interiority. 
This means that the reader is forced to formulate a position with respect to the 
operation of power in the prison. There is simply no explanatory text to fall back onto 
in order to judge the prison, or to judge Bosman's actions. In this sense, the 
unarticulated excess of subjectivity - the suggestion that Bosman is not coterminous 
with his determination by the prison, even while the text refuses to explain, evaluate or 
concretise the difference - introduces a radical form of undecidability to the memoir 
that is perhaps its most subversive attribute.4 In fact, not one ofthe other memoirs 
discussed in this thesis places the same kind of burden of decision with the reader, 
suggesting that Bosman's memoir was not only the first of its kind, but in some ways 
4 In many other prison memoirs, the older narrator looks back on events in order to evaluate and judge the 
actions of the narrated self. In Bosman's text, the narrator is the gap: he introduces an ironic distance 
without a determinate content. 
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also the most sophisticated and genuinely unsettling. Bosman's strange refusal to resist 
the prison's interpellation becomes a potent form of resistance. 
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As a text, Cold Stone Jug occupies a significant transitional moment in South African 
politics. It was published in 1949, during the embryonic stages of the "penalisation" of 
South African society under the Afrikaner Nationalist government. The modes of 
control, classification and surveillance associated with the prison would increasingly 
come to echo the modes of operation of the State. Indeed, for many later political prison 
writers, the difference between "inside" and "outside" is not as stark as one would 
Imagme. 
In Cold Stone Jug, the world outside is like a dream, a world of infinite freedom and 
possibility. The convict Donald Hughes provides one of the memoir's images of 
"outside": 
'I been discharged several times,' Donald Hughes reassured me, 'And you can 
take it from me, it's ------- marvelous, the feelings you get when you walk out 
there. No matter if you've done only six months. And it doesn't matter, either, 
how often you've been in the boob. You get those same feelings every time. 
And when you sit in a tram, and a girl comes and sits next to you. Or you go 
into a bioscope cafe, and you sit next to a girl, and you are allowed to, and she 
doesn't move away, but lets you go on sitting there ... ' (119) 












Of course, for black South Africans, the kind of freedom of movement described by 
Hughes had always been difficult under white rule, and would become impossible as 
apartheid legislation intensified in the 1950s. Hughes' celebration of "outside" 
describes a reality that belonged to only a few, in a country where the rule of the prison 
was steadily expanding. The next chapters of this thesis deal with memoirs that reflect 
the growing continuity between the prison and the world outside, where the prison 
simply focalises and intensifies the technologies of subjectivation and control that 
appertain more broadly in society. 
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THREE: ON ROBBEN ISLAND 
Of all prisons under apartheid, Robben Island was certainly the most infamous. In his 
Robben Island Dossier, written in 1974, Neville Alexander claims: "Whatever the 
public stance of officialdom, there is no doubt that they realise, as everyone else does, 
that Robben Island Prison is the most important prison in South Africa" (11). Both as a 
symbol for the injustices and hardships suffered under the apartheid regime, and as a 
potent symbol of resistance, Robben Island was a place apart, a significant point of 
reference in the construction of an oppositional identity. In 1992, Jacobs could claim 
accurately that Robben Island "has grown into a central trope for the displacement of 
Nationalist Party dominance" (74). This special status of Robben Island has survived 
the demise of apartheid: Robben Island, now an officially sanctified heritage site, has 
become one of the principal signifiers of a post-apartheid national identity. The Island 
itself is visible off the coast of Cape Town, an inescapable visual coda that serves to 
confer a marketable, unifying identity onto a fractured nation, even as it remains a 
memorial to the trauma and divisiveness of apartheid. 
The enduring symbolic importance of Robben Island has lent a particular significance 
to the voices that have spoken from it. Under apartheid, Robben Island became a 
privileged site for the construction of emergent notions of citizenship and leadership, a 
kind of testing-ground for new notions of South African identity. One of the most 
important documents for reworking the concept of the freedom fighter into a model for 
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post-apartheid citizenship is undoubtedly Nelson Mandela's Long Walk to Freedom, 
South Africa's first democratically elected president's account of his life and his long 
incarceration on Robben Island. This text is central to the present discussion precisely 
because it is governed by two conditions of emergence: on the one hand, it is marked 
by and reacts to the prison, but on the other it answers also to the post-apartheid 
moment and the requirements of nation-building. The experience of prison is 
reappropriated in the service of a new national identity. 
As Riouful points out, post-apartheid representations of Robben Island have tended to 
background painful and divisive aspects of life on Robben Island in favour of 
descriptions of the prison as a place of community, resistance, survival and triumph 
(24-27). Riouful's division between apartheid and post-apartheid understandings of the 
prison is echoed in a great deal of the critical literature on Robben Island (see, for 
instance, Grunebaum-Ralph; Nuttall). While it is clear that Mandela in many ways 
domesticates the Robben Island experience, and uses it in order to develop a new post-
apartheid value system, it is dangerous to insist that there is some impermeable 
boundary that separates apartheid and post-apartheid Robben Island narratives. New 
models for subjectivity under the post-apartheid state did not, after all, arise ex nihilo, 
but always in dialogue with the apartheid past. The very fact that Robben Island 
continues to be revisited, re-explained and reconstructed shows that a particular aspect 
of apartheid interpellation, exemplified by the prison as institution of control, remains 















Freedom is interesting as much for the ways in which it differs from earlier Robben 
Island memoirs as for the ways in which it is the same. If we ask how the experience of 
prison and the exigencies ofthe post-apartheid moment collude to produce a particular 
kind of citizen and subject, we are suggesting that post-apartheid identities remain 
ineradicably linked to apartheid formations - the new inclusive, conciliatory 
"multicultural" subject valorised in post-apartheid discourse retains a dialectic 
relationship to the kinds of sUbjectivities that emerged under the ideological institutions 
of the apartheid state. To insist on a point of diachronic connection is to insist on the 
continued relevance and value of apartheid-era prison memoirs in our understanding of 
post-apartheid South African identity. In this sense, Long Walk to Freedom is an 
important mediating document, since it demonstrates how, through shifts in emphasis 
and subtle displacements, oppositional voices are transformed into the dominant voice. 
In order to analyse Long Walk to Freedom, it is necessary to compare it to some other 
texts that reflect on the experience of incarceration on Robben Island. While this 
chapter does not aim to provide a sustained analysis of these earlier texts, it refers to 
them in order to show how Long Walk to Freedom echoes and transforms many of the 
themes and issues that they introduce. 
For this purpose, this section refers to a range of Robben Island memoirs. Most 
important for this chapter is Moses Dlamini's Hell Hole, Robben Island, first published 
in 1984 while Dlamini was living in exile in Tanzania. Dlamini was imprisoned on 
Robben Island from 1963 to 1966 for furthering the aims of the Pan Africanist 
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Congress (PAC). In his Robben Island Dossier, Neville Alexander identifies the years 
from 1962 to 1966 as particularly brutal and dehumanising (11-12). He observes that 
"[f]rom 1962 to 1964 assaults, very often brutal and mass assaults, of political prisoners 
was a weekly, often a daily, occurrence." (20) The hardship of life on Robben Island 
during this time was compounded by the use of criminal prisoners to demoralise and 
intimidate the political prisoners. Dlamini's memoir, then, reflects on a remarkably 
violent and ruthless chapter of Robben Island's history, and does so from a perspective 
informed by the politics of the PAC, whose members substantially outnumbered 
supporters ofthe African National Congress (ANC) during 1963-1965. Dlamini 
published his memoir in 1984, at the inception of the most successful and wide-ranging 
mass mobilisation against the apartheid state in South Africa under the auspices of the 
United Democratic Front. In this sense, the memoir is not just reflecting on life under 
apartheid in the 1960s, but is fully engaged in the turbulent politics of resistance that 
characterised the early 1980s. While Long Walk to Freedom also recounts the early 
years of imprisonment on Robben Island (Mandela arrived on the island in 1964), its 
account is mediated by what Alexander calls the "relatively humane" (14) conditions of 
life on Robben Island after 1973, and by the need for nation-building and amity during 
the time of its publication in 1994, after the demise of apartheid. Moreover, the ANC's 
politics have always been more receptive to compromise and in some senses more 
inclusive than the PAC's generally hard-line Africanist ideology. In many respects, 












Island: its tone is essentially pessimistic, and it is more explicit than Long Walk to 
Freedom about ideological tensions and personal ambivalence. 
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There are strong similarities between Dlamini's account of the early years on Robben 
Island and other autobiographies reflecting on this period and published in the 1970s 
and 1980s. D.M. Zwelonkes's Robben Island, a semi-fictional narrative based on his 
incarceration on Robben Island, is if anything even bleaker and more cynical than 
Dlamini's memoir. While Zwelonke notes that prisoners who, like the narrator, arrived 
late in 1964 had an easier time than their predecessors (14), the novel- which revolves 
around the life of Bekimpi, a leader ofPoqo (the armed wing of the PAC) - is an 
unremittingly grim catalogue of tortures. It ends with a graphic description of 
Bekimpi's dead, mutilated body. Perhaps the most interesting thing about this memoir 
is its strong personal voice and its focus on interiority: on dreams, fantasies, anxieties 
and the general process of remembering. Zwelonke's prison is characterised by 
descriptions ofthe weather, the gait of the warders, the expression on people's faces: 
his narrative is textured by the minutiae of personal observation. Indres Naidoo's Island 
in Chains, first published in 1982, and ghost-written by Albie Sachs, recounts his 
incarceration from 1963-1973 in a similarly grim fashion, although this memoir also 
contains a few humorous anecdotes and is ultimately a more optimistic text. In 
Naidoo's account, Robben Island is represented not only in terms of torture and 
















trope of Robben Island as "university" are sketched by Naidoo in his memoir (but 
certainly without the sanguinity or nostalgia of some later accounts). 
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In contrast to these memoirs, the Robben Island that Michael Dingake describes in My 
Fight Against Apartheid is much closer to the prison that Mandela describes in Long 
Walk to Freedom. Dingake was imprisoned on Robben Island between 1966 and 1981, 
and published My Fight Against Apartheid in 1987, two years before the release of 
most of the ANC's senior leadership from prison in 1989. He arrived at Robben Island 
after the removal of criminal convicts in 1965 and during the immediate aftermath of 
the successful 1966 hunger strike, an important turning point for an improvement in 
conditions on the island. For Dingake, Robben Island afforded opportunities to 
strengthen political solidarity and for personal growth. At the end of his memoir, 
Dingake declares that he " ... was leaving Robben Island in one piece, unbroken in 
spirit and in flesh" (Dingake 1987: 227). At least some of this optimism attends on 
Dingake's sense in the 1980s that apartheid was in an inescapable state of decline, a 
view that he links explicitly to improvements in prison conditions: 
The granite was crumbling right at its heart. Prison is the heart of oppression in 
any oppressive society. And once any 'heart' assumes a new complexion or gets 
a 'pacer' then some life is in danger - the end is in sight. Imprisonment, thou 



















The impression of incessant repetition - in Denis Brutus's words, of being "embalmed 
in time" (72) - that characterises Dlamini and Zwelonke's accounts of imprisonment 
opens up in Dingake's memoir to a more linear sense of progress and transcendence. 
Although Dingake is often more candid than Mandela in his robust descriptions of the 
frictions and stresses that typify life in prison, Robben Island is identifiable as the same 
place of survival, progress and victory as it is in Mandela's Long Walk to Freedom. 
Perhaps the most important difference between Robben Island memoirs written during 
apartheid and those written after the democratic election in 1994 is a shift in the 
addressee. In memoirs written during apartheid, the person who is being addressed is 
frequently foregrounded: the texts dramatise a contextualised self, and they explicitly 
serve a specific social function. Thus in the 1993 introduction to his Robben Island 
Dossier, Neville Alexander explains how the style and the content of his account are 
informed by the political context and the intended audience of the dossier: 
The intended readership to a very large extent co-determined the content and 
style of presentation of the report. Besides a genuine commitment to reporting 
strictly only that which I knew to be true, I realized, of course, that any material 
produced in anger and without due regard to accuracy and probability would not 
be treated seriously by the men and women I was attempting to reach. 














though, on occasion, my real emotions broke through the screen of academic 
precision. (viii) 
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D.M. Zwelonke prefaces his fictional account of his incarceration, Robben Island, with 
a chapter entitled "Why I Write", where he speculates on his aversion to discuss his 
experiences on Robben Island with anyone, and recounts his search for an appropriate 
audience: 
I did not know whom I should address, the businessmen, the intellectuals, the 
clergy, the students or the masses. The student was the person I always 
respected: I always remembered the number of students on the Island, whisked 
offthere from the classrooms. (3) 
The very fact that this memoir is presented as a work ofjiction introduces a reservation 
to the sense of spontaneity and authenticity that typically accompanies a first-person 
autobiographical narration. 
Even where the intended reader is not so overtly foregrounded, as in Moses Dlamini's 
Hell Hole, Robben Island, there is a very strong sense of the memoir itself as part of an 
ongoing struggle, as a socially useful document. In Hell Hole, Robben Island, the 
dedication suggests the nature of the intended audience: 
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Dedicated to Sobukwe, to all Azanian patriots who are languishing in prison, 
and to those who died at the hands of the police and in prison in their noble 
struggle for a free Azania. 
In his introduction to Island in Chains (2000), Indres Naidoo gives some indication of 
the social uses of his prison autobiography, originally published in 1982: 
105 
Island in Chains was immediately banned in South Africa. However, ANC 
underground units managed to smuggle hundreds of copies of the book into the 
country. It was much sought after. In the Western Cape activists used the book 
in their underground political study groups. In the Johannesburg and Pretoria 
area comrades made photocopies of the book which went from hand to hand all 
over the country. (xii-xxii) 
In contrast to this strong sense of audience and social context, the addressee of post-
apartheid memoirs is often much more tenuous. In Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela's 
original reason for writing the memoir is unambiguous, and his intended audience 
obvious: 
One day, Kathy, Walter and I were talking in the courtyard when they suggested 















book to be published would be on my sixtieth birthday. Walter said that such a 
story, iftold truly and fairly, would serve to remind people of what we had 
fought and were still fighting for. He added that it could become a source of 
inspiration for young freedom fighters. (567) 
106 
The themes here are familiar ones: the autobiography is in a sense collaborative 
(Ahmed Kathrada and Walter Sisulu enjoin Mandela to write his story, and help him to 
edit it, hide it and smuggle it out of prison), it is designed as an instrument of struggle, 
its realism serves a political end, and its readers are "young freedom fighters". 
However, who is the addressee of Long Walk to Freedom in 1994, in the post-apartheid 
moment? Mandela explains that while the original notebooks were smuggled out of 
prison, they were lost in Lusaka: 
I heard nothing from Lusaka about the manuscript and still don't know precisely 
what Oliver did with it. Although it was not published while I was in prison, it 
forms the basis ofthis memoir. (572) 
These "lost notebooks" function as a kind of interposition in the text, they mark the 
memoir as reiteration, a repetition that carefully maintains the imprint of its original 
historical conditions of its production even as it raises itself above these original 
incentives. The memoir maintains a complex ambiguity where it is both acutely 














contingencies. It is not so much that the original context has been erased, as that it has 
been supplemented. In the process, both the narrator and the addressee become 
universalised; the voice that addresses the reader arises for no particular reason from 
some indefinable, interior space, and it addresses a vague, inclusive readership. It 
should also be noted that if the more recent autobiography contains vestiges of its 
"collaborative" authorship on Robben Island, this collaboration is supplemented by the 
fact that it is also in part ghost-written by Richard Stengel: that is, the earlier 
collaborative voice is extended to a form of collaboration that is by its very nature 
invisible, and directly related to the requirements of marketing the text. 
We see a similar process at work in a text like Jan Coetzee's Plain Tales from Robben 
Island. The very title implies that earlier tales, for all their claim to veracity, were not 
"plain tales": that they served an ideological purpose, that their narrators enjoyed some 
kind of special status. This book carries all the trademarks of a poststructuralist 
reappraisal of history that seeks to denounce metanarratives and resurface the localised, 
textured experience of ordinary life. Coetzee claims that his book "focuses on 
individual people" (1), that it provides "a door to understanding the grassroots 
experiences of the large number of 'ordinary' Robben Island political prisoners" (4). In 
fact, the stories are of fairly limited interest, and hardly surprise with new, startling 
revelations. Many ofCoetzee's claims are exaggerated and some are simply wrong.! 
1 For instance, his claim that "[n]ever before has it been documented that 361 young political prisoners 

















The stories have the appearance of spontaneous autobiography, but on closer reading 
they are obviously cobbled together from interview responses, as evidenced by 
comments such as "You ask me where did it all start?" (14) The theoretically 
fashionable focus on the ordinary and the everyday creates the illusion of voices that 
speak in some unprompted way about the everyday micro-politics of prison life, about 
their interior lives, about their friendships, about their "traditional culture", and so on. 
In its attempt to escape from metanarratives, Plain Tales falls prey to one of the signal 
Western metanarratives: the naturalisation of the autobiographical voice, which it 
achieves through the suppression of the conditions that govern the emergence of the "I" 
that speaks.2 In his foreword to the book, Mandela betrays some of the ironies that 
underpin Plain Tales when he comments that "[t]he stories themselves are re-told by 
the author in such a way as to capture the authenticity ofthe spoken word" (v). The 
"authenticity" of the spoken word has to be represented in are-telling of the "original". 
Ultimately, what distinguishes post-apartheid memoirs from apartheid memoirs is not 
so much a determinate difference in content as this shift towards a naturalised 
emphasises the practice of circumcision on Robben Island, he does mention it in Long Walk to Freedom, 
and notes that "[i]t was a rite that strengthened group identification and inculcated positive values" (511). 
2 In fact, any attempt to uncover the everyday texture of life on Robben Island, to penetrate the 
demagoguery and censorship that obscure "real life" on the island, is necessarily misguided. In the South 
African parlance of resistance, Robben Island enjoyed importance as an almost spiritual site of pilgrimage 
and suffering, as attested to by stories like Matshoba's "A Pilgrimage to the Isle ofMakana" (1979). 
Prisoners were well aware that they were entering a space of exceptional symbolic significance, a "place of 
martyrs" (Zwelonke 13). From the outset, they adapted their identity to accord with the status of the island: 
as much as the island is retrospectively reinvented in prison memoirs, the lives that are described by these 
autobiographies are always already invented, their subjectivities oriented towards the role imposed by the 
island as metaphor for resistance and survival. It is simply not possible to isolate some anterior, authentic 
experience of Robben Island, because such an "authentic" experience is from the outset anticipative of 
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autobiographical voice addressing a universal audience. As the role of social context 
becomes de-emphasised in post-apartheid memoirs, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
understand the social and historical moorings of the voice that speaks, to notice the 
particular tensions that produce it. It is not so much that more recent accounts of 
Robben Island are historically "incorrect" as that their compelling promotion of a 
normative self, a "good" New South African citizen, belies the specific conditions that 
allowed and conditioned the emergence of such a self. It is therefore necessary not to 
read post-apartheid memoirs "against" apartheid memoirs, but to read them alongside 
one another. 
A first important point of commonality across Robben Island memoirs is the agonistic 
nature of the identity that they posit. Robben Island comes to embody apartheid 
ideology - metonymously, the rules of Robben Island represent the rules of apartheid, 
and the struggle for rights and dignity on Robben Island exemplifies the struggle for 
rights in South Africa. As Mandela observes: 
I was in a different and smaller arena, an arena for whom the only audience was 
ourselves and our oppressors. We regarded the struggle in prison as a microcosm of 
the struggle as a whole. We would fight inside as we had fought outside. The racism 
and repression were the same; I would simply have to fight on different terms. (464) 
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Seemingly, identity on Robben Island is constructed through a systematic rejection of 
every aspect of apartheid ideology as it is manifested on Robben Island: prisoners 
simply refuse all attempts to interpellate them. However, a closer reading of the texts 
soon reveal a more complex interrelationship between the discourse of power and the 
forms of resistance that inform many Robben Island autobiographies. 
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An incident that occurs during the early years of Mandel a's incarceration on Robben 
Island provides a useful demonstration of this point. The prison officials give the 
prisoners some worn jerseys to fix, instead of their normal hammers for work in the 
courtyard. The prisoners soon discover that the reason for this change in routine is a 
visit from two journalists from the London-based Daily Telegraph. Mandela observes 
that the prisoners treated this visit with skepticism, since "they were brought in under 
the auspices of the government" (470) and since the Daily Telegraph had a reputation 
as a conservative paper. Mandela comments that "it was in the government's interest to 
show that we were not being mistreated" (470). Nonetheless, Mandela consents to be 
interviewed, and talks candidly about the Rivonia Trial and about prison. When he is 
asked whether the photographer could take his picture, he reluctantly consents because 
he feels that friendly pUblicity abroad might do the liberation cause some good. On an 
earlier occasion, he invokes prison regulations in order to refuse that a warder take his 
picture "on the ground that it is generally demeaning to be seen as a prisoner" (469). 
IS
IS
U1"1"",,. LV.laI.IU' .. 
IS











What makes this brief encounter interesting is the way it shows Mandela's 
preoccupation with the gaze and control over representation. In the first interaction with 
the warder, Mandela simply refuses to have his image appropriated and used by the 
prison. He insists on maintaining control over his own representation. The second 
encounter is less clear-cut. On the one hand, Mandela insists on a degree of influence 
over the picture by insisting that Walter Sisulu should join him (470): in this, he refuses 
the individualising operation of the prison and composes an image of solidarity and co-
operation (a gesture that underpins the entire autobiography). On the other hand, his 
acerbic remark that "the reporters were barely out of sight when the warders removed 
the jerseys and gave us back our hammers" (471) serves as a reminder that the picture 
is ultimately staged by the prison, and the fact that he "never saw the article or heard 
anything about it" (471) underscores his lack of control over the use ofthe picture and 
the meanings it was made to generate. In this instance, it is difficult to say with finality 
who has power over the image, or whose agenda is ultimately being served: the picture 
is marked by a worrying ambivalence, an uncertainty appertaining to ownership and 
controL It demonstrates how even the most oppositional model for identity invariably 
threatens to become entangled with the operation of power. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the agonistic identity constructed across many 
Robben Island memoirs is the insistence on a collective identity against the prison's 
attempts to individualise prisoners. Mandela's description of the role of solidarity is 














Our survival depended on understanding what the authorities were attempting to 
do to us, and sharing that understanding with each other. It would be very hard, 
if not impossible, for one man alone to resist. I do not know that I could have 
done it had I been alone. But the authorities' greatest mistake was to keep us 
together, for together our determination was reinforced. We supported each 
other and gained strength from each other. Whatever we knew, whatever we 
learned, we shared, and by sharing whatever courage we had individually. (463) 
As Schalkwyk notes: "It is one of the reiterated and paradoxical platitudes of prison 
writing and its criticism that prison both depersonalizes the individual and renders 
communality indispensable" ("Writing from Prison" 280). Throughout Long Walk to 
Freedom, the "I" of the narrator slips into a collective "we": Mandela constantly speaks 
on behalf of a community, in direct contrast to the prison's explicit injunction that 
prisoners are allowed to speak only on their own behalf.3 In My Fight Against 
Apartheid, Dingake writes in some detail about the censorship of letters from Robben 
Island, and focuses in particular on the prohibition against the use of the word 'we'. 
After recounting the frustration caused by this kind of censorship, he notes: 
3 According to Naidoo, "[ d]epartment policy for warders was the same as it was for us: no one talked in 
terms of 'we'. Only in terms ofT." (230) In many ways, the warders on Robben Island were treated rather 
like the prisoners, with severe punishments for infractions and a poor diet for bachelor guards (Naidoo 
230). James Gregory, one of the Robben Island warders, points out: "Robben Island was more than just a 
prison for criminals and subversives, it was also a place of hardship for the warders. Being assigned to 'die 
Eiland' was seen as a punishment transfer or the place where the prison department sent young recruits to 


















The problem with restrictions or prohibition of any sort is that they hardly ever 
achieve their purpose. Every measure has its own countermeasure, every weight 
has a counterweight, every action has a counteraction. The victims of self-
censorship developed styles of letter writing that meant absolute nonsense to the 
censors and yet were sensible and informative to the correspondent. If 'we' was 
objectionable as the plural of '1', many ways, varied construction in syntax and 
grammar existed to convey the same 'we' concept. It was an exercise in futility. 
(168) 
Dingake's point here is astute: as much as the separation of prisoners from one another 
is effected physically (through isolation cells and prohibitions against communication), 
it is effected symbolically, through language. But language is flexible and inexhaustibly 
expressive: in this case, resisting individualisation takes the form of a grammatical 
detour, a form of expression that inhabits the oppressive grammar of the prison even as 
it eludes it. A subversive communal voice is in a sense always available in the 
interstices and equivocations of the language of the prison. 
In order to ensure the coherence and stability of this imagined oppositional community, 
prison memoirs often underplay divisions among political prisoners and produce fairly 
static sUbjectivities. Mandela's description of watching films on Robben Island 
illustrates something of this process: 
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The authorities seemed to have a weakness for historical films, particularly ones 
with a stem moral message ... We were intrigued by The King and I, for to us it 
depicted the clash between the values of East and West, and seemed to suggest 
that the West had much to learn from the East. .. Later, we were permitted to 
select documentaries - a form that I preferred - and I began to skip the 
conventional films ... I was particularly affected by a documentary we saw 
about the great naval battles ofthe Second World War. .. What moved me most 
was a brief image of Winston Churchill weeping after he heard the news of the 
loss of the British vessel. The image stayed in my memory a long time, and 
demonstrated to me that there are times when a leader can show sorrow in 
public, and that it will not diminish him in the eyes of his people. (596-597) 
On the one hand this anecdote suggests the possibility of multiple reader positions and 
divergent interpretations. The " tem moral message" the prison authorities hoped to 
impart by screening The King and I was almost certainly not that "the West had much 
to learn from the East". This departure from the "preferred reading" is, however, not 
idiosyncratic but consensual. It is not Mande1a offering this reading, but the ubiquitous 
"we" who apparently agree on this "dissident" understanding. While the subversive 
polysemy of the text is acknowledged and utilised, the range of possible readings is 















interpreting "I", one who "skips conventional films", it is soon subsumed by the figure 
ofthe leader, undiminished under the gaze of his people - an eminently public "I". 
When Mandela receives the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize not as a tribute to his personal 
contribution to the struggle, but on behalf of "all South Africans and especially ... those 
who had fought in the struggle" (Mandela 734), the collective is extended to the level 
of the nation. It is for precisely this reason that Long Walk to Freedom functions as both 
an exemplary South African prison memoir and a seminal post-apartheid nation-
building document: in the face of a history of division and individualisation, it posits an 
"us" that in due course became a kind of blueprint for a new national identity - one that 
is ultimately so expansive that it includes even the former oppressors. However, as in 
the case ofthe photograph, the collective retains an ambiguous relationship to the 
discourse of the prison, and remains haunted by a sense of uncertainty and division. 
Black activists were not individualised successfully by the apartheid prison partly 
because they resisted the process, but also because the prison resisted interpellating 
them as individuals, and largely refused to concede that they had a subjective interiority 
at all. While a leader like Mandela was still accorded a minimal "special status", 4 
4 Neville Alexander explains the way this hierarchy operated by the mid 1970s: " ... the prisoners in the 
single-cells section are treated much more politely (albeit grudgingly so) than those in the general section, 
and these in turn are treated much better than those in the 'Terrorist Section', the inmates of which are even 
now treated with the most offensive contempt imaginable. Moreover, even within sections there are often 
great variations of response. The same warder who might have been swearing and cursing at one prisoner 
could the very next moment approach one of the more well-known or 'influential' prisoners in a completely 
















ordinary prisoners were frequently physically brutalised (at least until 1967) and 
constantly verbally abused and denigrated. Neville Alexander points out in his Robben 
Island Dossier that "there is no doubt that until 1965 in its intention, and until 1967 in 
practice, South Africa's penology was largely retributive" (12). As Buntman 
maintains: 
In theory, imprisonment is meant to rehabilitate a prisoner. .. In the case of 
political prisoners in South Africa, the state had little hope of 'rehabilitating' 
them. This would have involved a renunciation ofthe anti-apartheid struggle 
and an acceptance of the racist perspective of the gaolers. ("Resistance 1963-
1976" 111) 
The gaolers did not in general regard political prisoners as distinct individuals who 
could be "reformed", but tended to see them as an amorphous, threatening mass, as 
wholly other. In his rather awkward tale of political conversion, Goodbye Bafana, 
James Gregory, one of the warders on Robben Island, describes his original impression 
of the political priso ers: 
The dreaded Poqo: the band of criminals who had turned our beautiful land into 
a desperate battleground. Who were responsible for turning black man against 
white man. Who had made it very clear that they wanted what we had, earned 

















country to be freed from their evil. (8) 
If it was possible for political prisoners to invoke the sense of the collective, it was in 
the context of a punitive prison discourse that was not entirely inimical to the idea of 
collective identity.5 In the Benthamite model, individualisation is closely tied to the 
ambition to reform, and the apartheid prison was at best inconsistent in its pursuit of 
this goal. To a certain extent, the almost feudal attitude of the warders on Robben 
Island encouraged an awareness of commonality among the political prisoners, a sense 
of shared aims and ideals. While the official discourse of the prison promoted the 
notion ofthe penal institution as a site for the production of rational, reformed 
individuals, the prison often adhered to a completely different model in private: in fact, 
it is one of the characteristics of the apartheid prison that it is split in this way between 
a fac;ade that seems consonant with Enlightenment notions of imprisonment while its 
true operation proceeds in a completely obverse manner. As Chapter 5, "Solitary 
Confinement", illustrates, such a split operated both within single penal institutions and 
between institutions. Since at least the end of the 19th century, the racial segregation of 
prisons supported two completely different models of incarceration: one that was 
essentially punitive and one that was at least nominally preoccupied with 
5 This kind of characterisation of prison warders' attitudes appears consistently over a wide range of 
prisoners' texts. For instance, Neville Alexander cites a warder saying that "rehabilitation is a swear word. 
No prisoner has ever been rehabilitated, not even White prisoners. The people at headquarters are merely 
playing housey-housey when they come with all their bird-brained, unrealistic schemes. A prisoner is a pig 
and he must be treated as such!" (96) In Plain Tales from Robben Island, Joseph Faniso Mati notes that for 
the warders, "a kaffir was a kaffrr - you have got to mistreat him" (Coetzee 19). He goes on to explain that 
the warders "never made any effort to try and change us. What happened was that we were the people who 
















"rehabilitation" and "reintegration". In this sense, Dingake's ability to enunciate a 
shared identity by varying syntax and grammar construction is enabled not merely by 
the polysemic quality of signs, but also by the fundamental indifference of the prison to 
the purported purpose of its own rules. The prohibition against the use of "we", in other 
words, is purely formal: as Dingake implies, the rule is enforced in a mechanical way 
so that its purpose is more to inflict "humiliation upon humiliation" (Dingake 167) on 
the prisoners than to effect individualisation. 
In other ways as well, the prison often inadvertently facilitated the sense of group 
identity eroded outside its walls by banning orders and the difficulties of living 
"underground", on the run from authorities, and by general divisive apartheid 
legislation. Mandela describes the cell he shared with other political prisoners in 
Johannesburg in 1956, when he was charged with treason: 
Suddenly there were no Xhosas or Zulus, no Indians or Africans, no rightists or 
leftists, no religious or political leaders; we were all nationalists and patriots 
bound together by a love of our common history, our culture, our country and 
our people ... In that moment we felt the hand ofthe great past that made us 
what we were and the power ofthe great cause that linked us all together. (235) 
A similar sense ofthe prison as a place where imposed differences are collapsed runs 













idealism. The idealism is almost entirely absent from Dlamini's Hell-Hole, Robben 
Island, and much more complexly described in Dingake's My Fight Against Apartheid. 
When Dingake is locked in a communal cell in the Johannesburg Fort, he expresses a 
modest pleasure at being among people: 
Now here I was in a dim-lit No.4 cell crowded with fellow awaiting-trial 
prisoners who had appeared in court that day and were remanded in custody. It 
felt good to be among so many people after almost 12 weeks of isolation. I 
knew it was a matter of time before I would recognise an old acquaintance, 
maybe a former friend, in the cell crowd. That would be super. (125) 
However, Dingake also describes the Fort as a "crime factory" (123) and describes the 
chaos and intimidation that characterised his weekend in the communal cell: 
During the weekend I witnessed some of the most callous bullying of prisoners 
by fellow prisoners in the communal cells. Hardened prisoners, for sheer sport, 
bullied, terrorized and assaulted newcomers to prison ... When the ganging up 
against the cheeky ones took place, an impromptu choir would be organised to 
sing some tune. Harmony or discord in the music did not matter, what mattered 


















the assaults, not through Saint's intercession but thanks to the 'clevers' who 
knew me in Sophiatown or Alexandra (124).6 
Dingake's community is fractured and constantly shifting - the prison affords the 
possibility for a kind of community, but it is a community held together by strategic 
alliances and pulled apart by power play. While singing often serves to forge a sense of 
comradeship in South African prison memoirs, the singing in Dingake' s cell in fact 
disguises an assault. To a certain extent, Mande1a's ideal community reflects a certain 
potential for affiliation enabled by the prison (a potential registered also by Dingake), 
but de-emphasises the complex reality of this kind of fellowship. It is worth 
remembering, in this respect, that Mandela spent a large part of his sentence on Robben 
Island in a single cell, and was therefore somewhat inured from the day-to-day 
negotiations between people who are forced to share an enclosed space. 
While the prison's drive towards individualisation was actively resisted through the 
constant hard labour of manufacturing a cohesive collective identity, the prison 
ambiguously also occasioned and demanded a kind of communality. While it would be 
incorrect to claim that the sense of solidarity portrayed in Long Walk to Freedom and 
6 The apartheid government's experiment of mixing non-political criminal convicts with political prisoners 
was abandoned on Robben Island in the mid-1960s. The apparent aim, namely to demoralise political 
prisoners, seemed to be backfiring (see below). Nonetheless, the presence of non-political prisoners was 
clearly a source of distress and apprehension for the political prisoners. One is struck by the vehemence of 
Dlamini's description of criminal convicts as "wretches - dregs of humanity who had been crushed by the 
system and had been brought by our political opponents to come and demoralise us, turn us into 
homosexuals and make us opt for Bantustans" (165). In his account, the non-political prisoners seem to 
function as screens for the projection of fantasies of alterity - he hardly allows them any humanity 
whatsoever. 
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other prison writing is simply an immediate epiphenomenal reflection of the discourse 
of power in the prison - in Jameson's terms, an "unreflected unity" (Political 
Unconscious 41) - it would also be misguided to claim that it exists in a completely 
autonomous or entirely adversarial relation to this discourse. In fact, neither the 
formation of a transgressive unity nor the discourse of the prison are stable practices: 
both are haunted by structural antinomies and moments of equivocation, and both 
ultimately refer to and emanate from the same contradictory inner logic of apartheid. 
121 
Ifthe utopic communality espoused and enacted in Long Walk to Freedom and in other 
Robben Island memoirs generally seems stable and cohesive, this is often undermined 
by moments of uncertainty and tension. 
Firstly, it is not always clear who is included under the rubric "we". One of the most 
problematic lines of demarcation is between the political prisoners and the general 
prisoners. While the prison occasionally mixed political and criminal prisoners in order 
to undermine and intimidate political prisoners, this practice eventually became less 
common and stopped altogether with the removal of gang members from Robben 
Island in 1965 (Dlamini 164). As Buntman points out, most prisoners believed that 
non-political convicts were eventually removed "because the political prisoners had 
begun to neutralize, politicize, and even recruit them into political organizations" 



















on the very periphery of his sense of communal identity. He describes his intermittent 
contact with criminal convicts near the lime quarry: 
Although our work at the quarry was meant to show us that we were no 
different from the other prisoners, the authorities still treated us like the lepers 
who once populated the island. Sometimes we would see a group of common-
law prisoners working by the side of the road, and their warders would order 
them into the bushes so they would not see us as we marched past. It was as if 
the mere sight of us might somehow affect their discipline. Sometimes out of 
the comer of an eye we could see a prisoner raise his fist in the ANC salute. 
(480) 
Here Mandela outlines the equivocal way in which the prison locates political 
prisoners: on the one hand they are simply "criminals", ostensibly the same as the 
common-law prisoners on the island. On the other, they are anxiously separated from 
the criminal convicts, and accorded a special status. For Mandela, who is suspicious of 
all the prison's attempts to divide and classify,7 the criminal convicts' ANC salute 
betoken the possibility of solidarity, a sense of a community that transcends the 
prison's categories. Nonetheless, in this extract and throughout Long Walk to Freedom, 
7 He notes: "We despised the classification system. It was corrupt and demeaning, another way of 
repressing prisoners in general and political prisoners in particular" (Mandela 473). 












the criminal prisoners remain a "them", "raw material to be converted", (484) but at the 
same time never trustworthy, always potentially in collaboration with prison officials.8 
In many earlier prison memoirs, the situation is less ambiguous: the criminal prisoners 
are simply entirely other; the collective identity of the political prisoners is formed as 
much in opposition to the criminal convicts as to the racist warders. Zwelonke 
describes the criminal convicts as "servile, ignorant, selling each other for favours, full 
of fear, every man for himself' (68), and his descriptions naturalise their criminality 
through reference to physiognomy:9 
He had drawn features which told of his long years in prison, and thuggery was 
spelt out glaringly on his face, so that you might be inclined to agree with that 
Italian professor who said that incorrigible criminals are distinguishable by their 
features. His feet were crippled; they had permanently assumed, perhaps from 
childhood, the shape of a woman's high-heeled shoe. (61) 
For Dlamini, the criminal convicts are simply the servile agents ofthe warders, willing 
to relinquish all dignity and integrity for the sake of self-interest. His original sympathy 
8 For instance, Mandela recounts how he tried to help a convict called Bogart, who was assaulted by a 
warder at the quarry. However, Bogart was bribed and denied that the assault ever took place, humiliating 
Mandela in front of the commanding officer (485-486). 
9 For more on Robben Island political prisoners' recourse to criminal physiognomy in their self-definition, 
see Schalkwyk's "The Rules of Physiognomy: The Convict in South African Prison Writing" (1998). 
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for their predicament as "products of apartheid justice" (23) is eroded throughout the 
memoir. He describes the constant fear of sexual assault on Robben Island (an aspect 
that is entirely overlooked in Long Walk to Freedom), and conjoins homosexuality to 
criminality. When he discovers that two PAC members are having what appears to be a 
consensual homosexual relationship - one which in fact stems from before their 
imprisonment - he comments that political comrades "are prepared to die rather than be 
made homosexuals" (132), and conducts some "research" into their background which 
reveals that they had been arrested for criminal offenses on an earlier occasion. He 
suggests that they joined the PAC in 1963 because "[t]hey had hoped that. .. there was 
going to be countrywide looting and burglaries and they had hoped to join the gang of 
looters and burglars, or possibly to lead them." (133) The two men are severely beaten 
and ostracised by the other political prisoners. In this way, the division between 
political prisoners and convict prisoners is incessantly reasserted and policed. The 
political prisoners enforce a remarkably repressive and conservative notion of criminal 
delinquency, reinforced by physiognomical categories and beliefs about sexual 
orientation that are entirely consonant with apartheid criminology. The recoil from 
homosexuality of course also highlights the sense in which heterosexual masculinity is 
upheld as an implicit (and, certainly in prison, very idealised) norm both for the 
political prisoner and, by extension, the political activist. In fact, Dlamini's memoir is 
of interest precisely because he occasionally renders explicit the more general unspoken 
understanding that tends to universalise heterosexual masculinity. In this sense, he 
reflects on and participates in the assumptions and exclusions that govern the 
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construction of political identities under apartheid as essentially masculine and 
heterosexual. 
While Mandela seems to accept that criminal convicts become comrades when they 
become politicised, Dlamini never allows for the possibility of such a conversion. He 
refers to criminal prisoners who join the PAC in prison as "Poqo-criminals" (Dlamini 
128), maintaining them as a separate category through hyphenation. He describes one 
such "Poqo-criminal", Dum-Dum (the same criminal that Zwelonke describes above), 
at some length: 
125 
He appeared to me to be an imbecile. At school, he had been unable to catch up 
with other children in the grades and had early become a drop-out. Life as a 
thief had proved more attractive, since little intelligence was required there ... 
He had not mastered the rudiments of speech. He lisped his words and was 
always incoherent. We did not understand what he said and I doubt whether the 
warders did ... His physical shape was repugnant. Take a child suffering from 
kwashiorkor and tum it into an adult and you have a good picture of Dum-dum. 
He had tiny legs, a big extended belly, protruding but unequal buttocks; he had 
a big head with an ugly-shaped forehead, tiny lurking eyes, a small flat nose, 
with nostrils just big enough to inhale and exhale air. That was the complete 
outfit of the human phenomenon Dum-dum. (128-129) 
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What is conspicuous about this description is the complete absence of any sympathy, 
understanding or social analysis: Dum-dum embodies the grotesque condition of the 
hybrid. He is excluded by his lack of intelligence and lack of speech from any kind of 
belonging, and serves to mark, through his monstrous nature, precisely the 
impossibility of being both criminal and comrade. 
126 
The constant insistence on the line between political and criminal prisoners in these 
memoirs betrays, perhaps, an uneasiness about the legitimacy and elasticity of the 
boundary. Despite its use of stereotypes, Dlamini's Hell-Hole, Robben Island is 
characterised by an astute analysis of the origins of criminality and delinquency under 
apartheid. Dlamini's father's contention that "all the gangsters here in Jabavu ... are ... 
the products ofthe present system" (90) is echoed throughout the memoir. In Dlamini's 
father's account, the desire to join a political movement and the proliferation of crime 
in the township respond to the same root cause: the economic inequalities enforced by 
apartheid. While Dlamini choo es to join the ANC Youth League, his cousin Abel 
responds to his hatred of apartheid injustice by turning to crime. He frames his life as a 
gang leader as a form of action against oppression, in contrast to the apparent passivity 
of Dlamini's political involvement (94-95). When the criminals leave Robben Island, 
Dlamini uncharacteristically refers to them as "our fellow brothers" (166) and recalls 
his cousin. He comments: "I was never to be totally free of him. He would not be a 
thing of the past which would no longer gnaw at my thoughts." (166) In Zwelonke's 


















'If you are not a sissy, if you are a toughy, that is, on a criminal offence, don't 
hope you will get out when your term expires. So be happy that you are in for a 
political offence ... That is the plight of the common African prisoner. .. A 
jailbird might start in on you, and if you turn to bash his jaws you invite a 
further charge. A raw criminal wants to compel you to a homosexual act. You 
lift your hand in desperation and commit murder. You'll never see the outside 
again.' (46) 
In this account, the harsh conditions of the prison under apartheid produce criminality: 
being a political prisoner is in fact a defense against a process that would otherwise be 
inevitable. Read in this way, the differences between political and criminal prisoners 
are not quite as straightforward as they might appear at first. Dlamini transcribes the 
words of one of the prison songs sung by criminal convicts: 
'It is I who is the rogue - because I was born Black. I'm White society's 
scourge - condemned to live under harsh prison conditions. And prison is the 
only place for me where every day in the morning our only consolation is to 
sing about parole - to yearn for parole - and to wait for the guerillas to release 













If being black is a crime, then all the prisoners on Robben Island are in fact "criminal" 
convicts. Hell-Hole, Robben Island is extraordinary also for the way in which it 
intimates a kind of intern ali sat ion of this racist construction of "criminality": 
128 
Last night I had a bad dream. It was so bad that I woke up at night and sat up, 
wondering about its meaning. It was the dominee again preaching ... He was the 
only holy man and we were all rogues ... The dominee was right. I'll have to 
tum my black heart to the White God. That is the only way in which I and those 
of my ilk can be saved. And the dominee will help us to repent. (104) 
What Dlamini discloses here is the sense in which his demonisation and rejection of the 
criminal convicts attend on an uncomfortable unconscious identification with the 
criminals, on a recoil not so much from the apartheid prison's attempts to criminalise 
political prisoners as from the possibility of his own acquiescence to this interpellation. 
Dingake alludes to the same process of criminalisation in My Fight Against Apartheid: 
Blacks are always in one prison or other. They cannot escape imprisonment for 
one moment. Blacks also know the prison of fear. They fear the whites. They 
fear the terrorist laws, the laws that terrorise them, brutalise them and tum them 
either into common-law criminals, political rebels or cringers and fatalists ... All 
















Mandela's Long Walk to Freedom does not really reflect on the origins of the criminal 
convicts. In general, Long Walk to Freedom takes pains to demonstrate an underlying 
commonality between all people - a commonality that implicitly extends to the 
common law prisoners. However, the realisation of sameness is frequently located at 
some future point, a utopic moment that will arrive once the differences are resolved. 
For writers like Dlamini and Zwelonke, the sameness is located in the past, in a 
common point of origin. The gesture that informs their descriptions of the common law 
criminals is one of disavowal, a horrified recoil from a deeply repulsive potential 
similitude. For Dlamini and Zwelonke, this recoil is all the more powerful for the fact 
that they constantly have to negotiate a relationship with the criminal convicts - in the 
leadership cells, where Mandela was kept, this was simply not an issue. To some 
extent, Mandela's more idealised account of the relations between people is assisted by 
his relative isolation from the sometimes vicious politics of the general section of the 
pnson. 
While the collective voice dominates almost all narration in the Robben Island 
memoirs, the collective is by no means a self-evident, stable category, but is a fraught 
and mutable concept, constantly troubled by the possibility of schism and dissolution. If 
communality implies inclusion, it also entails exclusion, and what is excluded 
inevitably maintains a threatening presence at the boundaries of identity. In his memoir 
Memoirs of a Saboteur, Natoo Babenia reflects on the Afrikaans notion of "saamwerk", 
or "working together": 
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The tenn 'saamwerk' is old as the racial settler colonial rule. In English it 
probably means 'co-operation' or 'let's work together'. The Afrikaners got a 
narrow, twisted and sinister interpretation. To them 'saamwerk' means infonn 
or pimp on your friends. For that you get treated a bit better and may even end 
up sleeping on a bed at the prisons hospital. The Big Fives, other gangster 
criminals, and even some politicos without commitment became pimps and had 
cozy work. (140) 
When "cooperation" is given an Afrikaans inflection, the possibility of employing the 
tenninology of communality or collaboration to create schisms, to instate hierarchies of 
power and privilege, and to exercise disciplinary surveillance over others suddenly 
becomes glaringly obvious. 
Another obvious problem with the shared "we" of political prisoners on Robben Island 
is that political prisoners did not necessarily have a common ideology. In fact, there 
were sharp differences between ANC and PAC prisoners on Robben Island. Mandela 
takes care to point out the many points of commonality between political prisoners, but 
frequently also comments on what he considers shortcomings and errors in the PAC 
position. He characterises the PAC as "competitive rather than cooperative" (523), and 
"unashamedly anti-communist and anti-Indian" (523). Indres Naidoo is much more 
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Politically there was never any chance of uniting with the PAC; their whole 
philosophy was totally opposed to the ANC vision of a totally liberated and 
non-racial society. They were hopelessly organised and penetrated by infonners, 
split into a dozen factions. They had no coherent strategy; they simply reacted 
emotionally to situations. But we were prisoners together, had daily contact with 
each other and had to get on together socially. (218) 
Naidoo's uneasy belief that they "had to get on" is imperiled by his sense of the PAC as 
factionalised and enfeebled by emotion: in effect, he tentatively extends the first person 
plural to include the PAC and simultaneously denies them the capacity to belong to a 
community at all. Buntman cites Sath Cooper's particularly pessimistic analysis of the 
feud between political parties on Robben Island: 
When the sordidness of prison behaviour is examined there is little difference 
between common law and political prisoners generally. Where the fonner are 
often organized into deadly rival gangs, the latter are organized into often 
warring political groupings. (Robben Island 142-143) 
Moreover, Long Walk to Freedom tends to downplay differences of opinion among 
















Mbeki around the issue of participation in apartheid structures (Mandela believed that 
the ANC should entertain the possibility of supporting participation, while Mbeki and 
Raymond Mhlaba firmly rejected this stance). (Buntman, "Resistance 1963-1976" 125) 
Where Mande1a describes differences of opinion, it is frequently in the context of a 
debate that results in consensus, or in order to make the point that the choice for unity 
should supercede localised conflict. For instance, Mandela decides not to act as a 
character witness on behalf of ANC colleagues who were beaten up by PAC and Black 
Consciousness Movement members in the general section on the grounds that "[i]t was 
more important to show the young Black Consciousness men that the struggle was 
indivisible and that we all had the same enemy" (580). While this comment seems to 
suspend judgement, it is of course framed as the expression of an inclusive ANC 
policy, with the ANC in a rather didactic and superior role. Mandela frequently 
represents himself in the objective role of a mediator. When confronted with the 
militancy of the young Black Consciousness prisoners after the Soweto riots of 1976, 
Mandela notes: 
... just as we had outgrown our Youth League outlook, I was confident that 
these young men would transcend some of the strictures of Black 
Consciousness. While I was encouraged by their militancy, I thought that their 
philosophy, in its concentration on blackness, was sectarian, and represented an 
intermediate view that was not fully mature. I saw my role as an elder statesman 
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who might help them move on to the more inclusive ideas of the Congress 
Movement. (578) 
133 
In the face of ideological opposition, Mandela represents his own ideological view, 
which is fully conflated with that of the ANC, as the more mature, transcendent 
resolution. By presenting the Black Consciousness point of view as a kind of inchoate 
manifestation ofthe ANC position, he is in effect universalising ANC ideology. His 
role becomes to help others realise that their standpoint is always already the position 
of the ANC, which in tum is simply a resolved reflection of all possible points of view. 
In this way, the ANC's specific political stance starts to function as a stable position 
above the political, a position that might serve as the collective voice of a nation rather 
than a political faction. In My Fight Against Apartheid, Dingake positions the ANC in a 
remarkably similar way: 
These apparently incorrigible criminals were very ordinary human beings 
playing brutes in a brutal environment. From the moment one of them 
recognised me as an ANC member and the subsequent talk I had with them 
about our obligations to each other as an oppressed group, our cell was 
transformed into a new cell, where peace and sensible social intercourse became 
the order of things ... The principle of harmonious relations was further 
entrenched and consolidated by a series of talks I gave on the ANC, its aims and 
objectives. (128-129) 
 












The apparently immutable difference of the "incorrigible criminals" is removed through 
reference to the aims and objectives ofthe ANC; the cell becomes a "new cell", a 
harmonious society, only when Dingake is recognised as a spokesperson for the ANC. 
What is eroded is precisely the sense of the ANC collective as a distinct grouping with 
contestable principles: instead, the "we" on whose behalf Mandela and Dingake speak 
are also always implicitly "they". 
For Mandela, solidarity is ultimately about a kind of organic consensus, an inclusive 
agreement based on universal values. Other accounts of Robben Island, however, 
remind us that communality is forged against enormous difficulties and is by definition 
unstable and contingent. 
This is not to say, however, that Long Walk to Freedom fails altogether to register these 
inconsistencies and contradictions. One of its most lubricious and complex categories is 
the first person singular, and many of the memoir's most significant moments of 
tension occur in the passage from an individual to a collective voice. 
From the outset, Long Walk to Freedom posits the self as inherently unsubstantial, and 
the experience of individuality as essentially negative. An early example is where 
Mandela describes his circumcision: 
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I looked down and saw a perfect cut, clean and round like a ring. But I felt 
ashamed because the other boys seemed much stronger and firmer than I had 
been; they had called out more promptly than I had. I was distressed that I had 
been disabled, however briefly, by the pain, and I did my best to hide my agony. 
A boy may cry; a man conceals his pain. (32-33) 
As he is symbolically inscribed with a cultural identity, his individuality surfaces as an 
experience of shame - his transformation into Xhosa manhood attends on an act of 
concealment. This sense of individuality as a site of trauma is powerfully reinforced in 
the experience of solitary confinement in prison: 
... I found solitary confinement the most forbidding aspect of prison life. There 
was no end and no beginning; there was only one's own mind, which can begin 
to play tricks. Was that a dream or did it really happen? One begins to question 
everything. Did I make the right decision, was my sacrifice worth it? In solitary, 
there is no distraction from these haunting questions. (494) 
In fact, the trauma of solitary confinement is one of the few consistent themes across all 
prison memoirs: to a large extent, the craving for community that is so central to prison 
writing as a genre attends on the need to obviate the painful experience of institutional 
isolation. Subjective interiority does not offer some sort of humanist respite from the 
pressures of the public world: instead, the prison constructs interiority as the greatest 
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and most tortuous pressure. The interior life ofthe subject removed from all 
intersubjective bonds is experienced as the grounds of disintegration and madness. 
Implications of solitary confinement for the prison autobiography are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 5, "Solitary Confinement". 
In Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela tends to avoid the realm of the private, and 
constantly translates the personal into the political. Even an innocuous private 
enjoyment of gardening is extended to a metaphor for public responsibility: 
136 
While I have always enjoyed gardening, it was not until I was behind bars that I 
was able to tend my own plot ... A garden was one of the few things in prison 
that one could control. To plant a seed, watch it grow, to tend it and then harvest 
it offered a simple but enduring satisfaction ... In some ways, I saw the garden 
as a metaphor for certain aspects of my life. A leader must also tend his garden; 
he, too, sows seeds, and then watches, cultivates and harvests the result. Like 
the gardener, a leader must take responsibility for what he cultivates; he must 
mind his work, try to repel enemies, preserve what can be preserved and 
eliminate what cannot succeed. (582-583) 
In this passage, the direct experience of an "I" becomes the experience of a more 
general "one", until the subject disappears entirely in a noun clause and re-emerges as 
the pastoral leader discharging his duties. Mandela only very intermittently voices his 
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personal feelings without articulating them to a conjoint sensibility or persuasion. 
When he does, it is mostly when he cites letters to his wife, Winnie, and one of his 
daughters, Zindzi. This is hardly surprising, since overtly political statements were 
censored from prisoners' letters by the prison censors. In an ironic twist, the 
reproduction of these letters becomes a way of smuggling the private and the personal 
out of the relentlessly "political" Long Walk to Freedom. to 
Occasionally, the memoir registers some uneasiness with the assumption of a collective 
perspective. For instance, Mandela describes an occasion when Walter Sisulu brought 
Evelyn's brother to the office to discuss problems in Mandela's marriage: 
We were discussing this issue cordially among the three of us, when either 
Walter or I used a phrase like 'Men such as ourselves', or something of that 
sort. Evelyn's brother was a businessman, opposed to politics and politicians. 
He became very huffy and said, 'If you chaps think you are in the same position 
as myself, that is ridiculous. Do not compare yourselves to me.' When he left, 
Walter and I looked at each other and started laughing. (241-242) 
\0 While Dlamini's Hell Hole, Robben Island also strives towards communality, it is often more candid 
about private fears and fantasies, and the adoption of a strong collective point of view is often quite 
strategic and contextualised, as, for instance, when Dlamini tells Captain Fourie that his views are 
"synonymous with those of the PAC" (135) in response to Fourie's clumsy attempt to "reason" with him. 
Dlamini's memoir remains preoccupied with the confusing immediacy of experience at the expense of a 
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While this rather inconsequential incident points to the folly of presuming a communal 
viewpoint, it also suggests that Mandela's brother-in-law had an inflated sense of self-
importance. More often, Mandela stresses the importance of placing the group before 
the individual, even where there is a difference of opinion. For instance, when Mandela 
discusses hunger strikes in prison, he mentions that he found them personally counter-
productive, but was often outvoted by his colleagues: 
Once the decision was taken, however, I would support it as wholeheartedly as 
any of its advocates. In fact, during the strikes I was often in the position of 
remonstrating with some of my more wayward colleagues who did not want to 
abide by our agreement. (503) 
Here Mande1a not only concedes to the will of the group, but also becomes its active 
voice. Mandela represents this process as an entirely natural response to the prison's 
attempts to brutalise and divide its inmates. Through solidarity, the weak become 
strong: 
Men have different capacities and react differently to stress. But the stronger 


















It is interesting to contrast Mandela's notion of the collective as a space of safety and 
inclusion to Dlamini's somewhat harsher appraisal ofthe stakes of a shared identity. He 
describes being inspected on the morning after their first arrival on Robben Island: 
The warder then moved up and down the lines looking us in our faces. We 
looked right in front of us pretending that we were ignoring him with our 
defiant faces. And then he stopped. He had found the weakest link in the chain. 
It was old man Tolepi. Years of working as a farmhand had tamed him. I'm sure 
when their eyes met, he smiled and blushed apologetically. He shouldn't have 
looked at the warder - he should have avoided his eyes. Since he was one of us, 
he had to observe our code of conduct towards the enemy. (Dlamini 23-24) 
In Dlamini's narrative, the weak compromise the integrity ofthe group. Despite his 
obvious sympathy towards Tolepi, the modals of obligation imply a coercive 
relationship between the collective and the individual - what is missing here is 
Mandela's prominent sense that individuals choose to belong to a group. In Dlamini's 
world, the group asserts itself against the individual, sometimes even through physical 
violence. 
Ultimately, however, Mandela's promotion of a shared identity should not obscure the 
ways in which the narrator of Long Walk to Freedom in fact incessantly strains against 
the idea of an unassailable collective. Often, the ennobling of the communal serves 
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precisely to mask the sense of individual agency which animates the memoir. After all, 
it is first of all a story about Mandela's escape from his destiny in traditional Xhosa 
society, and his refusal to submit to the will of others. 
Where Mandela acts in ways that are really entirely idiosyncratic, he often displaces the 
"I" with the figure of the third-person figure of the leader who is, in a sense, the agent 
of the people. "As a leader," he notes, "one must sometimes take actions that are 
unpopular, or whose results will not be known for years to come." (Mande1a 1996: 464) 
Mandela puts this philosophy into practice when he starts negotiations with the 
apartheid government. His description of how he takes this decision is quite 
extraordinary: 
I chose to tell no one what I was about to do. Not my colleagues upstairs nor 
those in Lusaka. The ANC is a collective, but the government had made 
collectivity in this case impossible. I did not have the security or the time to 
discuss these issues with my organization. I knew that my colleagues upstairs 
would condemn my proposal, and that would kill my initiative even before it 
was born. There are times when a leader must move out ahead of the flock, go 
off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the right way. 
Finally, my isolation furnished my organization with an excuse in case matters 
went awry: the old man was alone and completely cut off, and his actions were 














In retrospect, Long Walk to Freedom can posit this deeply individual decision as the 
realisation of the will of the ANC, or the "right way" of historical necessity. The 
profoundly unrevolutionary (or perhaps post-revolutionary), nation-building agenda of 
Long Walk to Freedom necessitates this kind of understanding of South African history, 
where the "will of the people" is exercised in a logical, progressive and intelligible way 
through its individual agent-instruments. However, Mandela's decision becomes the 
will of the people only after it has been made; it is the collective will only from the 
post-apartheid framework that this very same decision inaugurates. The individual 
choice, in a sense, creates the context that will allow the decision to be reinterpreted as 
communal. In fact, his "splendid isolation" (Mandela 626) from the ANC enables these 
negotiations, which he presents to Oliver Tambo, the actual leader ofthe ANC, as a fait 
accompli (Mandela 632). Mandela could act in a unilateral way because he was 
effectively isolated from the structures of the ANC: 
I had concluded that the time had come when the struggle could best be pushed 
forward through negotiations. If we did not start dialogue soon, both sides 
would soon be plunged into a dark night of oppression, violence and war. My 
solitude would give me an opportunity to take the first steps in that direction, 












Both Walter Sisulu and Ahmed Kathrada agree "not to stand in his way" (Mandela 
638), even though they feel strong misgivings about the path he is embarking on-
hardly a ringing collective endorsement of his role as instrument of the people's will. I I 
At the moment of agreeing to negotiations, Mandela is alone - his decision deviated 
from the dominant principles informing the struggle against apartheid. Mandela's 
decision is essentially excessive and unpredictable, an imminently - and perhaps 
characteristically - individual choice, in part enabled by the physical space of the 
pnson. 
In general, Long Walk to Freedom promotes a belief in rational individuals who are 
capable of making decisions for the common good from a standpoint elevated above 
ideology. In many respects, Mandela's understanding of subjectivity accords with a 
typically liberal understanding, as propagated for instance by David Miller in his 
analysis of the position ofthe individual with respect to national identities: 
... we always begin from values that have been inculcated in us by the 
communities and institutions to which we belong; family, school, church and so 
11 Lacan's understanding of evolutionist and creationist thought is instructive here. For Lacan, evolutionist 
thought understands history as a "continuous process" that operates through "ascending movement" 
towards a "summit of consciousness and thought" (Lacan, Ethics 213). Creationist thought regards the 
historical signifying chain as a distinct order with its "own specific dimension of the memorable and the 
remembered" (Lacan, Ethics 214) brought into being through a disruptive act. Lacan sees evolutionist 
thought as in fact fundamentally misguided, a "form of defense, of clinging to religious ideals" (Lacan, 
Ethics 126), since it rests on the assumption that the summit of consciousness and thought was "there at the 
beginning" (Lacan, Ethics 213). In evolutionist thought, "Being [l'etre] [is] always implied in being 
[l'etant]" (Lacan, Ethics 214). While Mandela's act here can best be understood under the creationist 
heading - it is the disruptive founding of a new order - he represents it as an evolutionary moment, where 
Being (the inevitable logic of struggle) is implied in being (the actual decision to negotiate). 



















forth. As we come to reflect on these values, we find we can no longer adhere to 
some, we find tensions and contradictions between others, and so forth. Finally, 
we reach a point where we have established the competing demands upon us 
and established our own scale of priorities between the different values. At that 
point we have worked out our own distinct identity ... we now have an 
independent vantage point from which we can define our relationship to the 
various communities and other sources from which our values were first taken. 
(Miller 44_45)12 
The Bildung of Long Walk to Freedom is based on precisely such an awareness ofthe 
"tensions and contradictions" between different values - in Mandela's case, the 
traditional values of his Transkei upbringing, the values of the mission school, the 
values of communism, African nationalism, and so on - that progresses through the 
exercise of reason towards the development of a "distinct identity" which occupies an 
"independent vantage point". For Mandela, the culmination of such independence is, 
ironically, his isolation cell in Pollsmoor prison. In Long Walk to Freedom, the 
collective struggle for rights concludes with Mandela's experience and exercise of 
individual autonomy: a pattern that Etienne Balibar identifies as the emblematic gesture 
of citizenship in the Europe of Enlightenment thought: "the property of the human 
12 Miller's On Nationalism is purportedly written from a socialist perspective, but arrives at an analysis of 
nationalism that constantly uses classic liberal arguments (such as the one above). He does, however, reject 
the liberal notion of cosmopolitan individualism. In this uneasy fusion of liberal ideology and nationalism, 
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being is the collective or transindividual construction of his individual autonomy." (12) 
As much as the Mandela of Long Walk to Freedom is a product of a revolutionary 
movement of the African people, he is also a product of the liberal rationalism of the 
mission school - the same rationalism that underpins the Enlightenment fantasy of the 
prison as a space for the manufacture of individuals through a process of isolation, self-
reflection and reform. 
In Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela never fully rejects this underpinning Enlightenment 
ideology of the prison, although he speaks passionately against its "pathological" 
excess. Frequently, Mandela's sounds more like the Cartesian subject interpellated by 
the Benthamite prison - a man called before the inner Law - than like a committed 
revolutionary speaking on behalf of the people. When the generation ofthe 1976 
uprisings arrive at Robben Island, Mandela comments: 
These young men were a different breed of prisoner from those we had seen 
before. They were brave, hostile and aggressive; they would not take orders, and 
shouted 'Amandlal' at every opportunity. Their instinct was to confront rather 
than cooperate. The authorities did not know how to handle them, and they 
turned the island upside down ... They chose to ignore our calls for discipline 
and thought our advice feeble and unassertive. (576-577) 
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Mandela's bewilderment at their "impertinence" (577) reveals the extent to which his 
agenda on Robben Island was reformist rather than revolutionary. The post-'76 
freedom fighters' aim to make the country ungovernable extended to the prison. The 
idea of rejecting the very foundation of social order - in this case, the social order of 
the prison - is in many ways quite alien to Mandela's more restrained aspiration for 
change through debate, consensus, and localised noncompliance. To a certain extent, 
this reflects Mandela's roots in the more moderate ANC of the 1940s and 1950s,13 but 
of course it also reflects a leader's anxiety at the thought of an ungovernable populace: 
as much as Long Walk to Freedom recounts a struggle against oppression, it also 
establishes a framework for order and compliance that has to serve a new political 
dispensation. In the passage above, it is striking that Mande1a positions the ANC 
leadership, for a moment, alongside the prison authorities: "The authorities did not 
know how to handle them ... They chose to ignore our calls for discipline." One should 
not ignore, however, the underlying admiration that comes across in Mandela's 
description: this section of Long Walk to Freedom is marked by the dissonance that 
attends on a voice that speaks both on behalf of and against a particular principle of 
order. 
13 Although it would be a mistake to see the historical difference in such simplistic terms. A writer such as 
Dlamini, for instance, constantly categorically denies the prison any kind of epistemological legitimacy. In 
his introduction to Hell-Hole, Robben Island, Bennie Bunsee summarises Dlamini's prison as a place 
where "your spirit is broken to accept the perverted logic of the oppressor" (Dlamini 9) and claims that 
Dlamini's memoir "describes a struggle between the temptation to acquiesce or to say NO" (Dlamini 11). 
This kind of binary logic simply does not exist in Long Walk to Freedom: in part it is consequent on the 
harsh conditions of Dlamini 's imprisonment, and in part on the PAC's militant political stance. The '76 
generation's refusal of order is simply more visible, in large part because Robben Island authorities were 













Throughout Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela struggles against the obscene excess of 
violence that underpins life in prison, sometimes by invoking the rules of the prison, as 
when he refuses to have his picture taken: 
I motioned to my colleagues not to move, and I addressed the warder: 'I would 
like you to produce the document from the commissioner of prisons authorizing 
our pictures to be taken. ' ... It was always valuable to be familiar with 
regulation, because the warders themselves were often ignorant ofthem and 
could be intimidated by one's superior knowledge. (469) 
Mandela insists on a kind of enlightened disciplinary space, a prison that adheres to its 
own rules, its own purported reformative goal. What makes the behaviour ofthe 1976 
generation so shocking is their absolute rejection of the structure of the prison, their 
refusal to treat any of its disciplinary mechanisms with anything other than contempt. 
Mandela rejects what Foucault calls "the discipline blockade, the enclosed institution, 
established at the edges of society, turned inwards toward negative functions" (209) in 
favour of a "discipline-mechanism" (209), where coercion is more subtle and discipline 
is internalised and self-imposed. "In a way that even the authorities acknowledged," 
Mandela observes, "order in prison was preserved not by the warders but by ourselves" 
(464). The problem with such a notion of the prison as a benign space regulated by the 
prisoners themselves is that it allows the prison a kind of ontological priority and 
inevitability - in fact, in Long Walk to Freedom, the prison as a space of reform, where 












both prisoners and warders strive towards a form of normative "humanity" under the 
gracious and understated guidance of the ANC, becomes the blueprint for a new nation. 
Such a concept ofthe prison appears in a number of Robben Island texts: Neville 
Alexander's Robben Island Dossier, for instance, is more or less a plea for a 
rehabilitative rather than a punitive prison. He notes that even political prisoners, who 
do not need to be "rehabilitated", would benefit from such a system: 
Except possibly in certain prisons, the claim enshrined in the Prisons Act that 
rehabilitation is the goal of incarceration remains a dead letter ... The term 
'Rehabilitation' is used in its technical criminological sense here. In this sense, 
of course, it is not relevant to the treatment of political prisoners who, in 
general, are not anti-social. However, in South Africa, since the category 
"political prisoner" is defined by the authorities, such prisoners have always had 
a vested interest in the adoption and proliferation of programmes of 
rehabilitation in South African prisons, not only because of the intrinsic value of 
such programmes for many non-political prisoners, but also because the ethos 
and the spirit of rehabilitation have implications which positively affect the 














Foucault frequently reminds us that it is the individual who is isolated and addressed by 
the rehabilitative discipline-mechanism. 14 In this respect, it is also remarkable to what 
an extent prison memoirs "individualise" when they adopt the language of rehabilitative 
criminology (especially with respect to the warders). Neville Alexander, for instance, 
employs the characteristic language of the prison biography in his description of Head 
Warder Carstens in an addendum titled "An Extreme Case of Bigotry" (96-98). In a 
more implicit way, the many stories of warders who are won over to the principles of 
non-racialism often involve a process of separation (where the warder is addressed 
alone) and individual conversion, an accession on the part of the warder to a minimal 
degree of humanity. In My Fight Against Apartheid, Dingake points out that "below the 
official level, individual inmates went on a systematic campaign to educate individual 
warders on our human dignity." (150) James Gregory's Goodbye Bafana (1995), the 
autobiography of one of Mandel a's warders, is in some ways a full realisation of this 
kind of "systematic campaign" .15 Rather than rejecting the underpinning philosophy of 
the prison, Long Walk to Freedom seeks in a sense to universalise it, so that all its 
inmates, from all political persuasions, both prisoners and guards, become fully 
subjected to its mode of operation. 
14 See, for instance, Foucault 124-125; 170; 236. 
15 In contrast, Zwelonke and Dlamini tend to resist the language of rehabilitation and individualisation. In 
their memoirs, the guards are rarely awarded the kind of humanity and interiority that would allow reform. 
Dlamini's comment that they had to "tame the warders" (27) is a far shot from Mandela's focus on the 
guards' inherent but concealed humanity. Dlamini does speculate that after apartheid psychiatrists would be 
needed to "cure" hardened criminals, but his notion of "special rehabilitation camps" (165) sounds 
ominously Stalinist rather than rehabilitative in a Benthamite sense. 















More significantly, towards the end of Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela is himself 
completely individualised, separated from his comrades and under constant 
surveillance. Describing the panoptic on, Foucault notes: 
... in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a 
schoolboy ... they are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each 
actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible ... the arrangement 
of his room, opposite the central tower, imposes on him an axial visibility; but 
the divisions of the ring, those separated cells, imply a lateral invisibility. And 
this invisibility is a guarantee of order. If the inmates are convicts, there is no 
danger of a plot, an attempt at collective escape, the planning of new crimes for 
the future, bad reciprocal influences ... (200) 
In some respects, this is a perfect description of Mandela's incarceration in the 1980s, 
imprisoned in rooms that increa ingly efface their status as prison cells, highly visible 
to authority and completely isolated from his colleagues: 
Though my colleagues were only three floors above me, they might as well 
have been in Johannesburg. In order to see them, I had to put in a formal request 
for a visit, which had to be approved by the head office in Pretoria. (626-627) 
It is interesting that his house in the Victor Verster prison becomes the floor plan for his 
house in Qunu after his release: 
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People often commented on this, but the answer was simple: the Victor Verster 
house was the first spacious and comfortable house that I ever stayed in, and I 
liked it very much. I was familiar with its dimensions, so at Qunu I would not 
have to wander at night looking for the kitchen. (728) 
In the sense that the prison inscribes and effects its ideology through its architecture, 
Mandela's assertion that he built his Qunu house in imitation of his house in prison-
because he was "familiar with its dimensions" - accrues a disquieting significance. The 
house at Victor Verster occupies a strange intermediary location: in some ways it marks 
the penetration of "normal" civic life into a prison that seems increasingly permeable 
and diffuse, and in other ways it marks the spread of the prison into civic life, the 
distortion oflife "outside" by the logic of "inside". At the end of Long Walk to 
Freedom, the model for a new South African nation seems similarly intertwined with 
the logic of a reformed prison, a kind of Benthamite utopia. Mandela seems to posit the 
transformed prison - a space for self-reflection, for reasonable co-operation with others, 
for responsible action and befitting diffidence, with the individual at its very core - as a 
model for the nation. In the same way that it is difficult to locate Mandela's house at 
Qunu - is it inside or outside? - it is difficult to assess whether Mandela's idea of a 
democratic nation interpenetrates his memory of prison, or whether it is precisely the 
experience of prison that generates a particular carceral model of the nation. 
Ultimately, then, Long Walk to Freedom is traversed by disquiet and equivocation. The 
rather restrictive fantasy of the self-disciplining Cartesian subject plays a central role in 













this memoir's construction of citizenship. Nevertheless, Long Walk to Freedom also 
reminds us that the individual understood as a point of refusal and dissidence has a 
radical potential: the "I" of Long Walk to Freedom is caught between an understanding 
of the subject as inherently docile and submissive, and an understanding ofthe subject 
as a locus oftransgressive agency. Simultaneously, Mandela's autobiography is 
divided, despite its eloquent and influential attempts to downplay the difference, 
between the adoption of the individual and the collective as centres of meaning. These 
are ultimately antinomies and tensions that confront new understandings of the South 
African nation: on the one hand, the nation as a totalised, imposed category, and on the 
other, the nation as something that is invoked in spontaneous and constantly shifting 
performative acts of self-definition; on the one hand, an understanding of the South 
African citizen as an autonomous individual, and on the other, as a committed member 
of a revolutionary collective. The point is that these tensions are not new - they do not 
arrive from nowhere at the moment of the inception of democracy in South Africa - but 
are present already in apartheid-era prison memoirs, where we find the specific material 
practices that helped to give rise to the consciousness of nation that now seeks to name 
and naturalise itself. 
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FOUR: WOMEN IN PRISON 
This chapter discusses the prison memoirs of a range of women prisoners incarcerated 
for various lengths of time between 1964 and 1982. Particular attention is paid to Ruth 
First's 11 7 Days (1965), Jean Middleton's Convictions (1998), Emma Mashinini's 
Strikes Have Followed Me All My Life (1989) and Caesarina Kona Makhoere's In 
Prison Under Apartheid (1988). Reference is also made to Helen Joseph's If This Be 
Treason (1998), Ellen Kuzwayo's Call Me Woman (1996) and Fatima Meer's Prison 
Diary (2001). Ruth First was detained in solitary confinement for 117 days in 1964, and 
wrote the diary soon afterwards while living in exile. Middleton was detained under the 
90-day law in 1964 and sentenced to three years in prison in 1965. Emma Mashinini 
was the secretary ofCCA WUSA, the shop and distributive workers' union, from 1975 
to 1986. She was arrested under section 6 ofthe Terrorism Act in 1981 and spent six 
months in solitary confinement in Pretoria Central Prison. Caesarina Makhoere 
belonged to the younger militant generation of students that protested in 1976 against 
the government's pla s to introduce Afrikaans as medium of instruction in schools, 
leading to the 1976 Soweto uprisings. She was arrested in 1976 and held for almost a 
year in solitary confinement before being convicted in 1977. She was released from 
prison in 1982. Of these memoirs, Makhoere's is perhaps the least conciliatory, 
reflecting the fully developed language of Black Consciousness that enjoyed pre-















contrast, employs a more self-reflexive and analytical tone. This might, of course, be 
ascribed to the fact that the memoir was published three decades after her 
imprisonment, after the demise of apartheid rule. In this sense, it reflects a more general 
tendency in memoirs published after 1994 to shift the focus away from the necessity of 
ending apartheid rule towards a more historicising, investigative inclination (Meer's 
diary is another example). 
As outlined in the introduction, this chapter is devoted specifically to women's 
experience in prison because the prison manufactured a separate domain for women, 
with its own rituals and rules. In this space, the femininity of the prisoners generated a 
range of anxieties, particularly because the sentimental ideal of femininity, in South 
Africa as elsewhere, never really accommodated the possibility of women as criminals 
or political prisoners. As I discuss in detail below, penal logic linked the "criminality" 
of women prisoners explicitly to their femininity: they were not womanly enough, or, in 
contrast, their femininity was seen as in some way constituting a pathological 
explanation for their "unruliness". Simultaneously, many male activists tended to see 
the struggle against apartheid as a confrontation led by men, despite obvious evidence 
to the contrary, such as the 1956 pass law march. Molefe Pheto, for instance, in 
discussing the roots of his identity as an activist, dismisses his grandmothers by 
observing that "they were two old sweet women I adored, but we boys belonged to the 
company of men" (215). Women autobiographers, then, find that their femininity arises 
as a troubling supplement to the imposed, universalised masculinity of the identity of 
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both prisoners and freedom fighters: in a certain sense, they are obliged to engage their 
femininity explicitly because it is so clearly entangled with, and also an obstruction to, 
the exercise of power. 
Given the generalisations above, it is striking how remarkably differently the writers 
discussed in this chapter experience and recount their imprisonment. Part of this 
difference is ascribable to differences of historical context and personal background, 
but the divergence in experience and description attends also on the very different ways 
in which the prison treated prisoners from different cultural and racial backgrounds. 
Indeed, one of the functions of the apartheid prison was precisely to reinscribe notions 
of separate cultures and discrete races in the face of a mass struggle that attempted to 
remove these barriers. Thus Fatima Meer comments: 
We were all women, but so classified and separated that we could not be women 
together: we were divided by the impregnable barriers of law and custom, in 
addition to race. (209) 
One collective category that extended the possibility of transcending the prison and the 
apartheid state's division was precisely the category "woman", and all the writers 
discussed in this chapter test the oppositional power of this collective notion. However, 














firmly imbricating these notions in the rituals and discipline of the institution. One 
problem confronted by these prisoners was precisely the problem of extracting the 
apartheid state's conception of femininity from an empowering, conscious 
appropriation of shared womanhood. In this sense, the problems collecting around the 
use and imposition ofthe idea of womanhood in the apartheid prison opens up to more 
general questions concerning the use of a culturally burdened collective concept in the 
practise of SUbjectivity and citizenship. On the one hand, "woman" is a contested 
signifier, a site of struggle. On the other, as this chapter will try to show, it is a sign of 
membership, in Raymond Williams's sense of the word as "describing an individual's 
positive identification with the society in which he [sic] lives" (75). Prisoners use the 
term in positive, strategic (and shifting) terms in order to counter the culture of the 
pnson. 
The prison addresses both First and Middleton as white and middle-class subjects, 
routinely linking these categories to their femininity. Consistent with the racial 
hierarchy of the apartheid state, both these women occupy positions of relative 
privilege in the arrangement of the prison. First is allowed to retain her suitcase, which 
contains a range of prohibited items: a tweezer, a mirror, a needle and cotton, her wrist-
watch and her glass bottles of medicine (First 15). First implies that the male 
Commandant overrules the wardress's protestations and allows her to keep these items 














The cell warder went off at the double. Red suitcase appeared in the 
doorway, tied up with pink tape. The Station Commandant started to finger 
through it, then recoiled when he touched the underwear. 
'She can have the lot!' he said. (15) 
From the outset, First's status as a long-term political detainee, her middle-class 
background and her femininity are articulated - in this case, through the concessions 
allowed by the authoritative and manifestly male voice of the Commandant. 
Throughout their detention, First and Middleton are accorded a special status. 
Describing her cell at the Gezina police station, Middleton notes: 
156 
On the concrete floor were four felt mats and some blankets. In this, I was 
privileged, since the black men who generally occupied these cells got only one 
mat and one blanket each. I was there because I opposed apartheid, but it still 
worked in my favour. (38) 
Later, she comments that the warders' upbringing "had taught them to speak to whites 
as equals, in a courteous, friendly way" (88) and recalls a wardress who burst into tears 
because she couldn't bring herself to treat Middleton and her colleagues with contempt, 
 












since they were 'just ordinary women" (88). In her memoir, First expounds on a similar 
theme: 
I, a prisoner held under top security conditions, was forbidden books, visitors, 
contact with any other prisoner; but like any white South African Madam I sat 
in bed each morning, and Africans did the cleaning for the 'missus'. (36) 
It is clear from the writing of women like Helen Joseph, First and Middleton, 
imprisoned in the 1960s, that the apartheid prison found it difficult to interpellate them 
as delinquent or iniquitous. In fact, their very presence in prison precipitated a crisis of 
perception: one ofthe sentimental justifications of racial oppression hinged on the 
figure of the vulnerable white woman, a kind of bearer of civilised culture, whose 
protection necessitated the practice of apartheid. In the figure of the white woman 
freedom fighter, the apartheid state encountered an impossible conflation of the object 
of its self-justifying chivalric fantasy and the very enemy it had sworn to safeguard her 
from. During First's disastrous attempt to make a statement, one of her interrogators 
loses his self-composure and rages at her: 
'You can count your lucky stars that we still have respect for women in our 
country. You could have been charged in the Rivonia case. But we didn't want a 
woman in that case. We still have some feeling for women. We picked our 












The fact that First is a white woman, in this detective's eyes, places him in an absurd 
position where he is compelled to protect her against himself and the legal process that 
he serves. This deference to white women, of course, increasingly evaporated as the 
apartheid carceral system became more entrenched and the pretense of legality was 
abandoned in the 1970s and 80s, as shockingly evidenced by the letter-bomb that killed 
First in 1982. 
If the prison tends to accord white political women prisoners an ambiguous middle-
class status, First and Middleton vacillate between recognition of the artifice of their 
position and a kind of passive concurrence with this construction. Both memoirs 
disclose an uncomfortable awareness of the plight of other, less fortunate prisoners, but 
this awareness is also recurrently pushed aside. Thus Middleton, describing doing the 
laundry in Barberton prison, notes: 
Nearly every week, at least one of the shirts - and usually a pair of shorts too-
a came in caked and stiffwith dried blood over the kidneys, from floggings. 
There were also caked deposits of the yellow sulphur ointment that was applied 
after floggings. It was evidence of dreadful suffering, a sign that, while life was 
bad for us, it was far worse for others. I remember one morning when, faced 
with a shirt like this, Mollie couldn't stop crying. (85) 
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Like the sign that First sees reading "dead man banned" (First 87), these traces of 
suffering and deprivation intrude into a sphere that is generally carefully bordered by 
the architecture and discipline of the prison. They suggest other narratives, other 
experiences, that can often be recovered only from outside the prison. First, for 
instance, includes the story of Looksmart Solwandle Ngudle, the "dead man banned", 
as a journalistic parenthesis narrated in the third person. Middleton's description of the 
bloodied shirts is interesting for the way it displaces the reaction to the evidence of 
violence to someone else: it is Mollie who "couldn't stop crying", while Middleton 
simply remembers. In this way, she retains a sense of the narrating self as principally 
objective and impassive. Throughout Middleton's memoir, and to a lesser extent 
First's, there is a kind of detachment from the plight of others: it is registered, but it 
doesn't seem to gain visceral presence in the text. 
In contrast, Ellen Kuzwayo' s entire experience of detention is shaped by her awareness 
of the young women in the cell next to hers who, as section 6 detainees,! could not 
receive visitors, were denied proper medical attention and were subject to interrogation: 
It was an invidious position, at my age, to listen to these young girls talking 
among themselves about their very terrifying plight. .. It was a heart-rending 
situation. Some days, hour after hour, I sobbed in vain, when the conversation 
of these children penetrated my cell. If! had my way, I would have fled from 
1 Section 6 of the Terrorism Act of 1967 allowed the security police to hold a detainee indefmitely without 
recourse to lawyers, their own doctors or their families. 
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hearing those innocent voices ... There I was, with my own problem of being 
detained, as well as having to live beside these young girls - with all their 
thinking and suffering - when I had nothing to offer them. (Kuzwayo 203) 
For Kuzwayo, the predicament of her own detention is placed on a level with the 
unbearable awareness of the presence of others who are treated with even more 
contempt than she is. 
160 
Of course, this is predicated at least in part on the conditions of detention. White 
women political detainees comprised an exceptionally small group of prisoners -
especially during the early period of 90 day detention laws - who were therefore easily 
isolated and susceptible to scrupulous surveillance and control. First and Middleton 
were simply not in a strong position to forge bonds of solidarity with other prisoners. 
Even so, it is remarkable how their often incisive cognisance of the prison's forms of 
interpellation is counterbalanced by an unexamined adoption of the role that the prison 
sets aside for them. Middleton, for instance, takes care to distinguish herself from 
prisoners convicted for common-law offences: 
There are a few ways in which political prisoners are better off than those 
convicted of common-law offences. For one thing, they feel pride, not shame, at 


















feeling, and are happy to give what support and encouragement they are able to. 
In this way, our group was fortunate - more fortunate, certainly, than the often 
pathetic prostitutes, petty thieves and vagrants we'd known in the Fort. (112) 
While Middleton justifiably attempts to draw a distinction between common-law and 
political prisoners in the face of the Department of Prisons' public refusal to 
differentiate between them, it is significant that she does it around the concepts of 
shame and community. Her logic implies that common-law prisoners should feel shame 
for their deeds, and don't deserve the support of their friends and families. In stark 
contrast, Caesarina Kona Makhoere declares: "all prisoners, black and white, are 
political prisoners, irrespective ofthe crimes that land us in the prison. It is the system 
that makes people hungry and illiterate. It makes people desperate" (103). 
Ultimately, the prison ritualises identity in a manner that reproduces the performance of 
identity - of gender, of race, of status - in South African society. Women are separated 
from men and divided into different races. Middle-class women are interpellated 
differently to working-class women. Women perform "women's work" in prison-
specifically, washing, ironing, sewing and cleaning the prison. They are placed under 
constant scrutiny, and are more likely than men to be held in solitary confinement. As 
Middleton points out, "women political prisoners suffered more hardship [than men], 
not less, because the fact that they were few made it possible for prison authorities to 
isolate them, singly or in small groups" (118). Fatima Meer also notes that while her 
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male comrades at Modderbee prison were allowed to be together, the women prisoners 
at the Fort were held in isolation: "Do they consider us women more dangerous, hence 
our isolation from each other?" (58) Especially for white women, there is an 
intersection between notions of imprisonment and hospitalisation: thus when Middleton 
is moved to the Fort, she learns that her communal cell is called a "hospital cell" and 
the nearby administrative room is called the "surgery", which allows the doctor to state 
under oath that the women detainees were held in hospital (54). First provides a graphic 
description of a common-law prisoner being confined in a strait-jackets despite her 
desperate insistence that she is not mad (32). Makhoere draws an explicit connection 
between the prison and a mental asylum, claiming that "[t]hese people had decided to 
treat us like mad people, but all identically mad, a uniform insanity." (21) She describes 
how prison officials threaten to put an ill hunger striker in a strait-jacket, "as if she were 
mad" (33). 
In their empirical study The Imprisonment a/Women (1986), Dobash et at observe that 
the relentless surveillance, frequent use of solitary confinement and pathologisation of 
prisoners is in fact typical of women's prisons under Enlightenment-influenced prison 
regImes: 
It is clear that women in prison are more closely observed and controlled, more 
often punished, and punished for more trivial offences than are men in prison. 




















been and still is the main work available to women in prison, whether its 
proposed aim has been to produce good servants, good wives, or most honestly, 
to keep the prison going ... [W]omen offenders gradually came to be conceived 
as 'disordered' and 'abnormal', the yardstick of normality often being a 
stereotype of femininity. (207-208) 
The memoirs discussed in this chapter constantly show how the rituals of prison are 
also rituals of femininity. The docile prisoner becomes conflated with a "properly 
feminine" subject: submissive, isolated, scrutinised and preoccupied with domestic 
routine. In this sense, it is interesting that while femininity is a kind of troubling 
supplement to the discourse ofthe prison - the prison is not a "woman's place" - the 
ideal compliant subject of a penal regime is a feminised subject. The technologies of 
control that characterise the prison space reflect the broader patriarchal social structures 
that govern the performance of being a woman. In this sense, the interrogation ofthe 
meanings and uses of femininity articulates with the scrutiny ofthe prison's specific 
forms of subjectivisation: thinking through the meanings of being a woman in prison 
becomes a way of engaging the manner in which the prison presents and disciplines the 
subject. 
First and Middleton are perceptive in their analysis of the prison's construction of 














First, for instance, often displays subtle insight into the ways in which gender roles and 
the exercise of power intersect. Her description of the "prize exhibits" that women 
prisoners are forced to wash is a case in point: 
On the last line three large pairs of aertex underpants with nifty American-type 
press studs hung side by side. They were marked P.K. Le Roux. P.K. Le Roux 
is South Africa's Minister of Agriculture. Suddenly the shot went home. The 
prisoners were earning the jail's keep by taking in the washing of Cabinet 
Ministers, important civil servants, and well-to-do Pretoria families who were 
having a good laundry job done cheaply and were at the same time aiding the 
rehabilitation of the country's reprobates. The women scrubbed for their sins the 
sheets of the Director of Prisons and the hand-towels of the myriads of civil 
servants who stamped, cancelled, and countermanded their passes and their 
permission to remain in the city; and I took my exercise amidst the underpants 
of the Minister of Agriculture. (66) 
The burlesque focus on the Minister's underpants simultaneously draws attention to the 
phallic nature of power and deflates its sanctimonious seriousness. First here connects 
the performance of women's duties, prison labour, the exercise of bureaucratic and 
penal authority, and the prison's hidden collusion with capitalist modes of production. 
If she literally takes her exercise amidst the underwear of apartheid functionaries, being 














one of First's skills as a writer is her ability to recognise that the material practices and 
spaces of the prison are in reality coterminous with the figurative reality - the 
subjectivity - that the prison invents. 
First is also conscious ofthe ways in which the prison's understanding of women 
prisoners' roles reflect, extend and realise a broader social "disciplining" of women. 
This is clear, for instance, in her description ofthe "Key Man": following a breach in 
prison security, double locks are installed on all the prisoners' doors. The wardresses 
are no longer allowed direct access to the cells of political prisoners. Instead, a special 
warder - the Key Man - is employed to guard the key to these cells. First notes: 
The wardresses locked the prisoners in their cells, but were themselves 
powerless to regulate their incarceration. They had degenerated into skivvies, 
into messengers sent to fetch a man carrying a key ring. (26) 
As First remarks, the double lock fulfils a dubious function in terms of utility, since the 
locks had always been impassable. She notes that "[i]t was human frailty, not steel, that 
had proved invincible" (26). Properly speaking, the apparent utility of the double lock 
system disguises an ideological arrangement where a male officer is put in a position of 
authority over the wardresses, keeping them under surveillance and dictating the kind 
of access they have to the spaces ofthe prison. First points out that all the actors in this 















whenever a political prisoner needs to leave the cell, and the Key Man, since "all he did 
was tum keys in locks, at the beck and call of those who might have yielded to 
temptation" (26). In this way, despite the variations in symbolic status, both the Key 
Man and the wardresses are sUbjected to a purely formal ritual which deploys social 
understandings of gender and uses the prison space in order to control the wardresses. 
Throughout the memoir, First is sensitive to the ways in which not just the prisoners, 
but all the officials in control of her incarceration are made to play particular social 
roles. In her memoir, Fatima Meer also comments on the way gender and race 
hierarchies determine the status of prison officials: 
Within the prison, authority was exercised through women - through the 
superintendent down to the wardresses and vangaashes, but the line of 
command went beyond the prison and there it was all male, albeit invisible, 
from the State President to the lowliest police officer. (209) 
For First, there is always the possibility of using the roles and structures imposed by the 
prison to her own advantage. Like many other prisoners, for instance, she points out 
that the key-hole that the prison officials use to look in at her, can also be used to look 
out (27). Similarly, she describes attempting to use conventional understandings of 
femininity to her own benefit. Thus when she decides to pull back from her decision to 
make a statement to the security police, she endeavours to "play the fluffy-minded 
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frightened girl in a spot, given to inconsequential comment, with an inflexible inability 
to concentrate and grasp the essence of a problem" (126). 
If the prison creates particular "feminine" roles for its middle-class white political 
prisoners, it is notable that the prisoners often experience the rituals and masks of 
femininity as a form of resistance to the authority of the prison. Thus while the prison 
condones a specific notion of femininity - by, for instance, allowing prisoners to keep 
their make-up, read women's magazines (Middleton 90) and encouraging "tidiness", 
the fayade of middle-class femininity is experienced as a barrier against dehumanisation 
and deviance. In an exceptionally complex way, the role that the prison demarcates for 
white women prisoners is seen by the prisoners as both an artificial imposition and a 
defense against the prison, a repository of authentic humanity. 
Middleton describes the difficulty of maintaining a feminine appearance in prison and 
recounts the decision to appear "presentable" in court: 
The Communist Party had been banned for nearly fifteen years, and we felt that, 
in the media and in popular mythology, communists figured as maladjusted, 
unreasonable and dangerous, different from ordinary, decent people. Looking 
presentable in public was a matter of pride. We were going to wear high-heeled 
shoes, sheer stockings, our most elegant dresses and appropriate jewellery. (62) 
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Part of Middleton's strategy of defence, in other words, is to appear in "ordinary, 
decent" (and, incidentally, middle-class) feminine apparel, resisting the popular fantasy 
ofa "criminal", deviant physiognomy. Normative femininity functions here to refuse 
the logic ofthe prison, even while the "ordinary, decent" feminine subject is 
purportedly the reformative goal of the prison. Middleton and her colleagues' 
calculated use of a conventionally middle-class feminine fayade betrays their split 
interpellation by the prison: on the one hand, they are disciplined into particular 
normative feminine roles, but on the other hand they are constructed by the prison as in 
some sense outside the ambit of normality. Nonetheless, it is notable that their right to 
present themselves in this "feminine" role is never in doubt. In contrast, Caesarina 
Makhoere fights a legal battle around the issue of being allowed to wear "normal" 
clothes instead of the prison uniform of overalls and doek in court. When the magistrate 
orders her to wear a doek in court, she exclaims: "Why don't you tell white prisoners to 
wear doeks? What is it you are trying to hide on my head - or are you expecting me to 
hide my head from something?" (58) White women prisoners are allowed more control 
over their self-representation than black women prisoners: for white prisoners like 
Middleton, a middle-class feminine role is accommodated by the penal institution, 
while this role is entirely proscribed for most black women prisoners. 
Femininity is also connected to humanity and normality in less calculated ways. First's 
mounting depression is symptomatically registered when she forgets to apply make-up 


















Van der Merwe was with Viktor, driving the car, and on the way through the 
city he said, 'Why no 1-' and stropped himself. I knew what he was asking. 
Why had I put on no lipstick, no make-up that morning? This was the first time 
even in my detention, apart from the first day when I had no make-up because 
my suitcase was locked away, that I had permitted anyone to see me without 
make-up. I had simply forgotten that morning. (First 122) 
Interestingly, First introduces the omission through the eyes of Lieutenant Viktor, one 
of her interrogators. Even though the import of her description is that she had stopped 
caring what she looked like to others, it is through her attention to the gaze of another 
that the lack is registered in the text. The ambivalence is carried through to her 
explanation of why she forgot to apply make-up: "I had simply forgotten" implies a 
lack of volition and agency that is belied by the intention suggested by the earlier "this 
was the first time ... I had permitted anyone to see me without make-up". Her failure to 
wear a feminine mask in point of fact draws attention to her femininity, evoking 
Viktor's half-sympathetic, sexualising gaze. The rituals of femininity are constantly 
ambiguously poised as either a locus of agency and control, or as a form of social and 
penal coercion. In the instance above, even the failure to perform the ritual remains a 
radically equivocal act. 
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The ambivalence that governs femininity - is it an effect of the prison's interpellation, 
or evidence of some inner core of self that resists the prison? - is reduplicated in 
Middleton and First's broader relationship to privacy, to the notion of an interior self. 
When First is first imprisoned, she notes: 
Aloneness and idleness would be an unutterable prolonged bore, but it was early 
to worry about that, and for as long as I could, I would draw satisfaction from 
the time I had, at last, to think! Uninterruptedly, undistracted by the commands 
of daily living and working. (16) 
The prison compels First's withdrawal into sUbjective interiority by isolating and 
immobilising her, but she manages to regard this forced inward turn as a form of 
freedom. To her surprise, her inner life in fact fails to deliver a coherent or sustainable 
alternative to the public life of the prison: 
This was the time I should have been able to feed on the fat of my memory, but 
I had always had a bad memory .. , and had relied all my life on pencil, 
notebook, Press clipping, the marking in the margin of a book to recall the 
source, a fact, a reference. Poetry that I had learned at school fled from me; 
French verbs were elusive ... I put myself through a concentrated self-scrutiny 
but in a scattered, disorganized fashion and I found myself not with clearer 
















past diverting me from the poverty of the present. I was appalled at the absence 
of my inventive and imaginative powers. (70-71) 
Middleton finds that her inner life is similarly limited: 
Before I was arrested, I'd thought I'd be able to keep my mind occupied in 
solitary by reciting poetry to myself, and by singing songs. I know a good deal 
of poetry by heart, and quite a few songs but, in that cell, I found the poetry had 
all gone, and so had the songs. (Middleton 40) 
Indeed, as Schalkwyk points out, the isolated prisoner's recourse to interiority is 
anticipated and used by the modem prison with its emphasis on self-scrutiny, contrition 
and confession ("Chronotopes" 15). First and Middleton preserve a sense of 
subjectivity, a sense of an "inner self' that retains at least a minimal distance from the 
demands of the prison, insofar as the prison addresses them as if they have sUbjective 
depth. This is precisely what Zizek aims at when he asserts that 
... an ideological identification exerts a true hold on us precisely when we 
maintain an awareness that we are not fully identical to it, that there is a rich 




"''''UU'", I as ., .... ·","1''''<1 
HR'''',",''''. ,-",",ltH;;U.<\.  t  "' .. ..-" .. ,,.,. .... IS
IS











am also a human person' is the very form of ideology, of its 'practical 
efficiency'. (Plague of Fantasies 21) 
Thus it is specifically when First begins to interpret her relationship with Viktor, her 
interrogator, as implicitly romantic that Viktor comes closest to fulfilling his 
interrogative function. Viktor treats her as someone with subjective depth who is not 
identical to her role as political prisoner, sexualising both First's mockery of him and 
the violence and inequality implicit in their relationship: 
172 
When his fist clenched I tilted my chin upward in mock acceptance of the blow. 
He had regained control. 'I'd rather kiss it,' he said. (First 138) 
A kind ofje ne se quai arises as a supplement to their relationship as interrogator and 
prisoner, an excessive, sexual quality born out ofthe mutual recognition of each others' 
inner qualities. However, it is this same excess, this sexualised fantasy of sUbjective 
depth, that brings First dangerously close to confession: 
I loathed myself but it seemed I could not resist taking part in this exchange 
with another human being, talking, responding, proving I was not a caricature, a 
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In this instance, First's femininity and her "inner self' are simultaneously excessive to 
the "normal" relationships that govern the prison and the very forms through which the 
prison fulfils its particular purpose. It is precisely by treating First as more than "just" a 
prisoner and by suggesting that he is more than ''just'' her interrogator that Viktor 
compels First to comply with the interrogation sessions. 
In contrast, Emma Mashinini and Caesarina Makhoere are rarely allowed this kind of 
interiority. As black prisoners, they are subjected to a particularly brutalising, 
dehumanising treatment. 
Mashinini's experience of prison is marked from the outset by humiliation. The most 
basic markers of politeness and reciprocity that would allow her some sense of dignity 
and self are lacking from the language of the prison officials and the security agents. "I 
was nothing but a Kaffir," she comments (74), occasionally contrasting their actual 
words to what she would normally expect another person to say: "Nothing like, 'Get 
yourself ready to go' or whatever. It was just 'Out' and out I went" (64), or, "Then, at 
the end ofthe questioning, they would just leave me. They wouldn't say goodbye or 
anything" (74). She understands the language of the prison through what it constantly 
fails to do. While she is never physically assaulted, she characterises her interrogation 
sessions as "emotional battery" (76). Although she is detained in order to talk, she is 
never really accorded a position to talk/rom in the same way as First or Middleton: she 
is essentially treated as an object rather than a subject, someone who is incapable of 
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functioning in a meaningful, autonomous way in discourse, who is at best capable of a 
kind of mimicry of human attributes and desires: 
174 
I put my hand out to say, 'Please, I'm dying,' you know, of thirst, and she made 
ajoke out of this. 'She wants to chew because we are chewing.' She made a 
joke and she never gave it to me. (65) 
Moreover, while the prison registers and responds to First and Middleton's femininity, 
one of Mashinini' s first experiences of detention is of losing her status as a woman: 
This was my first time of being handcuffed. I wasn't handcuffed the time when 
I left home. And Ijust asked, 'Has any woman been handcuffed before?' I had 
never seen a woman walking in the streets with handcuffs on. (65) 
Similarly, Makhoere's memoir catalogues her consistent angry attempts to force the 
prison officials to treat her with humanity. She is acutely aware of the differences 
between the treatment of black and white prisoners, bringing it up at her trial for 
assaulting a prison wardress (Makhoere 70) and commenting on the kind of agency 
enjoyed by white prisoners: "they were feeling at home" (21). She unequivocally 
rejects the prison's construction of black femininity, refusing to wear the prison 
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reasonable person could see that this was insane" (21). Throughout the memoir, she 
sustains a remarkable consistent notion of a "normal, reasonable person", simply 
inverting the prison's attempts to construct her as deviant by labeling the prison itself as 
mad. "I am not a prisoner" (45), she claims, disallowing the fundamental way in which 
the prison positions her. For both Mashinini and Makhoere, the prison and prison 
officials are relentlessly other. They are never addressed as individuals, and there is 
only very rarely a sense of recognition of a shared humanity between prison officials 
and prisoners. 
Since the prison never invites individuated voices from Mashinini or Makhoere, or 
appeals to the interiority of self-reflection and contrition, it makes sense that prison is 
not experienced or recorded in an interiorised and interiorising way. In addition, the 
tradition of Black Consciousness writing that informs Mashinini and Makhoere's 
writing de-emphasises individual experience in favour of collective experience. In this 
sense, the particular philosophical matrix that governs the writing of these memoirs 
colludes with the prison's forms of interpellation to create a more communal sense of 
identity than in First and Middleton's memoirs. 
However, there are also significant differences between Mashinini and Makhoere's 
accounts of imprisonment. Mashinini' s memoir contains more moments of ambiguity 
and uncertainty, and, as Driver points out, there is a distinct difference between the 
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older, narrating self and the younger self in prison that is altogether lacking in 
Makhoere's account ("Review" 352). 
176 
One of the most striking features ofMashinini's memoir is her intense sense of 
groundlessness and isolation. Unlike Makhoere, Mashinini was never formally charged, 
and spent her detention in solitude. Moreover, as part of an older generation of activists, 
she did not have access to the same practiced rhetoric of Black Consciousness as 
Makhoere, or share the uncompromising spirit of defiance that characterised the politics 
ofthe younger 1976 generation. Throughout Mashinini's memoir, one finds a struggle 
to identify an imaginary collective point of reference, a sense of a communally located 
self that is equipped to counter her isolation in the alienating world of the prison. 
Unlike First or Middleton, she simply finds no common ground with any ofthe prison 
staff. The prison functionaries, amalgamated by their whiteness, are almost 
indistinguishable, and Mashinini routinely rejects any attempt by security agents or 
prison officials to interact with her, refusing to respond even to routine enquiries about 
her needs, claiming" ... they knew all was not well with me. They did not need to ask 
what was wrong" (64). 
If Middleton finds that an impoverished external life leads to inner experiences 
adopting "a stronger, clearer reality than that of the external world" (Middleton 101), 
Mashinini experiences the inner world as impoverished and amorphous. When she is 
taken to prison, she comments that "Pretoria Central Prison was a place for people who 
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have been sentenced to death" (55), and indeed seems to experience her solitude as a 
kind of symbolic death, a state of complete abjection and estrangement: 
177 
I was cold. Everything was taken. I had a gold chain which my daughters had 
given me for my fiftieth birthday. That was taken. Everything was removed, up 
to my rings. I sat in that place with nothing to read. Just with myself. The bare 
me. (61) 
While she catalogues the physical effects of confinement, she rarely narrativises her 
inner experience, avoiding what Schalkwyk terms "freely discursive and speculative 
modes" of self-consciousness ("Chronotopes" 25). Instead, she tends to represent her 
inner life through tautology ("I was myself' (62)) and repetition ("And the days went 
by. The days went by." (70)). Her selfis experienced essentially as a locus of passivity 
and discomfort: agency is recuperated only when it is possible to invent a collective 
identity, as when Neil Aggett's death allows her to realise that she is not the only 
detainee: 
And I started realising that there were many of us inside here. It made me feel 
braver. I all of a sudden just gained strength. (80) 
Her moment of greatest abjection arrives when she forgets her daughter's name (86), 














remember the name, the sense of absence and obsessive longing exemplifies the 
experience of being a self without others in Mashinini's memoir: it is a state ofloss and 
desire. 
However, communal experience does not offer an entirely unproblematic ground for 
self-experience. When Mashinini's interrogators offer her food and coffee, she remarks 
that she "didn't want to be seen drinking coffee with these people" (74). On the one 
hand, she is refusing the possibility of any kind of reciprocity or community with her 
interrogators. On the other, she invokes in the passive voice an interlocutor who might 
see her drinking coffee with the police and judge her: the gaze of what she refers to 
elsewhere as "the community" (94). Throughout the memoir, there is a sense of being 
subjected to the penetrating gaze of the prison, of being constantly visible and exposed. 
Here, however, the scrutiny of the community - comrades, friends and family - is 
experienced in almost the same anxiety-provoking superegoic way as the 
depersonalising panoptic gaze of the prison. In fact, while Mashinini often invokes the 
collective as a space of agency and solidarity, it also sometimes appears as an 
oppressive power that seems to apply a coercive, internalised pressure very similar to 
that of the prison. Thus the frightening experience of lying in bed, trying to sleep, and 
then seeing "two eyes piercing" at her through the aperture in the door as if she is "an 
animal ... in a cage" (64) - a powerful invocation of the disembodied, individualising 
gaze of the prison - is later echoed by the gaze of her own grandchildren, which is 















I had a picture of my grandchildren. I was excited to see this the first time. It 
came out of the books my husband brought me. But afterwards when I looked at 
the picture it seemed as though those children were talking to me and saying, 
'Granny, what are you doing here?' You know what it is to be a grandmother. 
It's a very important thing. I became very anxious and I was ashamed to look at 
that picture. I put it right underneath the blankets and slept on top of it, and 
when I did that it was as though I was squeezing the life out of my own 
grandchildren. I just did not have anywhere to hide them. I didn't want to 
destroy this picture, but at the same time I didn't want to look at it because it 
hurt me. Their eyes were so pressing, as though asking me what I was doing 
there. (85-86) 
Here the appeal to a shared understanding of what it means to be a grandmother is 
accompanied by the accusatory stare of her grandchildren. While Makhoere represents 
herselfas an embodiment of the people's will, Mashinini often experiences the 
expectations of her family and her community as a difficult, external pressure, fearing 
that she might fall short of expectations and be rejected. There is always the possibility 
of straying outside the boundary of her symbolic community and not being allowed 















They were singing and chanting, 'Siphe Amandla Nkosi Okunge Sabi' - 'God 
Give Us Courage' - about fifty of them black and white, singing 'Give her 
strength, Lord, not to be scared. Give her strength, Lord, for her to stand up and 
face whatever they are going to expose her to.' I was strengthened by these 
people, and all the goodbyes, the waving at me, and the good things they were 
saying, that there will come a day when all this will be over, one day. (53) 
In contrast to this moving description of finding strength in the support of the 
community, her reaction to her father telling her to be strong is more ambivalent: 
My dad told me. 'I know you will be all right and you will come home, and I 
know you have not committed any offence. Please be strong.' Everybody 
always said I must be strong. (77) 
In this instance, being told to have strength is experienced more as a burden than as a 
comfort, a demand made by people who do not fully grasp the difficulty of her private 
expenence. 
Indeed, Mashinini represents the social space as complex and fraught, and she is candid 
about the difficulty of negotiating an identity in the face of contradictory demands. In 
part, her solitude is unbearable precisely because she experiences herself as already in 


















into the male world of the white "bosses", straddling the divide between middle-class 
and working class, between the traditional and the modern, unable to maintain a 
coherent social identity. Her early career as a shop steward in the 1950s illustrates some 
aspects of her awkward subject position: 
It was not easy to act for the workers at that time. A lot of awareness had been 
created over the last years, but then they were also frightened to say aloud that 
they were not happy with their salaries. Also, they didn't always tell their plans 
to me, as shop steward. They would always be surprising me. They would say to 
each other, without my knowledge, "Tomorrow we are not going to start work 
until a certain demand is met." I would always be early at work, because I 
would arrange things before the workers came in, and when I got there I would 
see people were not coming to start work, and I would stand there like a fool. I, 
a black person and a worker, would be inside with all these whites standing 
around with me and saying, "Why aren't they coming in to work?" And when 
the whites would address the workers and say, "What is your problem?" perhaps 
somebody would answer, "We do have a problem." So they would say, "Who 
are your spokespeople? Let your spokespeople come in and talk to us." And 
they would say their spokesperson was Emma, meaning me. So the whites 
would think I had instigated the stoppage, that I was playing a double role, 













She stands "inside with the whites", ignorant of the workers' plans, yet intimately 
identified with (and in fact responsible for) them: her "double role" here becomes in 
many ways emblematic of her entire trade union career. 
182 
The prison harnesses, exacerbates and refracts tensions that already threaten her 
stability as a subject. The very form of her memoir is poised somewhere between a 
confessional individualised autobiography and a more didactic Black Consciousness 
document which focuses on collective experience. In her foreword, Nomalizo Tutu 
frames the memoir as "a triumphant record ofa woman's resilience in the face of men's 
oppression" (Mashinini xi). In her own preface, Mashinini makes no reference to 
patriarchy, but foregrounds the collaborative nature ofthe autobiography, and frames it 
as a book about "the struggle to uphold human rights" in the context of trade unionism 
(xv). In the same preface, she claims that writing the memoir was painful because it 
forced her to remember traumatic moments, but that "putting on paper some of these 
terrible times was therapeutic" (xvii). The idea of talking about the self as therapeutic is 
raised again when her doctor in a clinic for ex-detainees insists that she talk about her 
experiences, but Mashinini sees the clinic as "yet another detention" (91) where she is 
isolated and interrogated, (literally) in danger oflosing her name (she is expected to 
register under a pseudonym). 
In fact, Mashinini writes a document that intersects at least in part with the memoir as 
part of her interrogation in detention: 
 















Always they wanted the truth, when I had no more truth to tell. I don't think 
they ever understood that in fact there was nothing to give away. But they 
always tried to find it, this nothing. They'd make me sit down and write, and 
perhaps in my writing they wanted me to say things, but there was nothing I 
could write that would give anybody away, because I'd write about my trade 
union matters. I would sit and write, and write, and this was better for me. 
Maybe it was a way of being able to think what to say without for once anyone 
pushing me and going on - 'Come on, come on, now. Speak.' And being rough 
about it. (75-76) 
Driver's assertion that this passage illustrates how "writing offers itself as a space for 
the kind of SUbjectivity allowed her in prison" ("Transformation" 46) and serves as an 
example of how Mashinini sees "the act of writing as a place of thinking, sometimes 
also dreaming" ("Transformation" 46) patently misses the point. The interrogation 
space occasions the writing; it sets a particular demand that both produces the writing 
and is deferred by the writing. Mashinini "escapes" the threat of physical violence, the 
overbearing proximity ofthe voice and the violence ofthe other, by producing a 
document about her "trade union matters": an exact realisation ofthe ideal of 
interrogation, to displace the dialogue between the interrogator and the interrogated 
with a spontaneous private self-confessing "discipline". Mashinini's narrating voice is 















confessional demand of the prison and the psychiatric institution (explicitly linked by 
Mashinini) becomes entangled with the demands of a Black Consciousness "conduct 
book". Similarly, Thomas Thale's assertion that Mashinini's trade union involvement is 
"pivotal to the development of self and provides the structural framework for the 
narrative of the self' (619) foregrounds one aspect of her memoir, but fails to recognise 
the complex ways in which the experience of imprisonment grounds and mediates the 
experience of the self as a trade union leader. 
While First and Middleton automatically fall back on an individualised confessional 
voice in order to discuss their experience of prison, Mashinini is painfully conscious of 
the ways in which such an autonomous voice is born out of the demands ofthe 
institution. The prison and the psychiatric clinic open a painful void of confessional 
SUbjectivity that Mashinini simply refuses to fill, but can nevertheless not escape. The 
split between the experiencing self and the narrating self in fact relocates and 
temporalises this irresolvable fissure in the narrating "I". 
Makhoere, however, simply forecloses the dimension of a private subjectivity 
altogether. Where she speaks about private experience, it is immediately related back to 
a collective level: thus when she recounts growing up in a small house, she explains 
that most houses in Mamelodi township are small, and remarks: "they do not comply 
with the Freedom Charter" (3). In many ways, the Freedom Charter serves for 















itself. " as witness to the Truth" (Lacan, Bcrits 305). The Freedom Charter, which 
prefaces Makhoere's autobiography, represents the collective will on whose behalf 
Makhoere speaks, and confers meaning on her individual experience. In contrast, it is 
precisely this fantasy of meeting the desire of a coherent Other that begins to 
disintegrate for Mashinini. For Makhoere, even looking at the stars and fantasising is an 
incontestably communal experience: 
It grew dark. We looked up at the stars. It was the only time in six years in 
prison that I was able to gaze at the stars. Being outside my cell, standing 
beneath the stars, dreaming, dreaming of freedom. If only we could climb that 
wall, ifthey could find us gone, if we could touch the sky, if. .. (Makhoere 20) 
The shift from a private experience to a collective experience is signaled by the 
duplication of the word "dreaming": the first use of the word intuitively refers to the 
subject "I" in the previous sentence, and the second use ofthe word anticipates the 
"we" who dream of freedom. The grammatical subject ofthe verb "dreaming" is 
occluded: one could say that Makhoere's subjectivity is located in such an interstitial 
position, where the individual opens up effortlessly to the collective. This logic is 
carried through the memoir: thus, for instance, Makhoere's pain at not being able to see 
















I could not take it. My heart was so sore, the pain was so severe. Apartheid, how 
I hate you, you must be crushed once and for all. You have caused so much pain 
to human beings. (27) 
The active voice ("I hate you") is conjoined to a passive sentence with an implied 
collective subject ("you must be crushed"), with the repetition of the object ("you") 
marking the shift from singular to plural. 
As Schalkwyk points out, Makhoere glosses over her time in solitary confinement, 
devoting most of her memoir to the five years she spent in the company of other 
prisoners in Kroonstad and Klerksdorp ("Chronotopes" 31). It is in a sense precisely 
through solidarity and conversation with others that she is able to obtain such a stable 
sense of self and such a coherent notion of the other: her time alone is next to absent in 
the text, while Mashinini, in contrast, is forced to find some way of representing the 
self alone, since she spent her entire detention in solitary confinement. Thus 
Makhoere's ability to resist is frequently predicated on intersubjective bonds. Her anti-
individualist ethic is made possible by the fact that she shares the prison space with 
other prisoners: 
When they see us fighting for others, as in this case where newly convicted 
prisoners were differently treated, they are taken by surprise. They themselves 

















that what you fight for must be yours only, never mind about the next person. 
And we completely defeated that poison in prison. We are here as sisters, 
fighting for one thing; we are united by oppression, by apartheid, united by the 
imperialists, united by the exploiters. And when we stand so united, we can 
break these exploiters. Totally. (Makhoere 47) 
187 
While Mashinini is simply totally alienated in the symbolic universe of the prison, 
Makhoere draws on a collective understanding in order to render the prison itself alien, 
to insist on her own normality and the aberrance of the prison space. Her constant aim 
is to imprison the prison officials, to entrap them in their own logic: 
Immediately I arrived at that prison the prison staff started to serve my sentence 
with me. Each prison had its role to play. It is not nice to serve a sentence alone, 
the warders must not be allowed to think you are unearned wages. I used to tell 
them that they must not think they would enjoy those fat cheques as easily as all 
that. After all, we were all in this prison together. Uh huh. (77) 
As Schalkwyk observes, Makhoere insists on experience as collective, and extends this 
sense of the collective to include the antagonistic relationship between prisoners and 
warders ("Chronotopes" 33): she simply does not allow the prison officials to use their 
power in order to disregard the social bonds that tie them to her. Her constant strategy 
is one of reversal: in this sense, she borrows the language ofthe prison and of the 
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apartheid state and turns it against itself. If prisoners have to ask permission to fulfill 
basic human needs such as eating, so should the warders: thus Makhoere and her 
friends force the wardresses (and the male prisoners) to ask permission before they pick 
peaches from the tree in the exercise yard (19-20). If the prisoners are treated "like mad 
people" (21), it is in fact the prison system itselfthat is insane (23). If she is 
dehumanised and physically assaulted, she refuses to acknowledge the humanity of the 
warders, and physically attacks one ofthem (64), and so on. 
She refuses any attempt by the prison to individualise her or to interpellate her as a 
confessional subject: even the psychiatrist arranged by Helen Suzman is angrily 
rejected. Makhoere links the psychiatrist's attempts to make her talk to colonial 
attempts to create special "cultural" spheres unconnected to the "political": 
This psychiatrist started by asking me questions such as who I was, where I was 
from, why I was in prison and what tribe I belonged to. Yerrah rna, I hit the 
rooil How could she come and ask me about what tribe I belonged to, what 
language I spoke at home? Did she think I didn't know why I was in prison? 
Besides, whoever told her I wasn't normal? I was angry because first these 
people had put me into segregation for a long period and then they brought this 
character here to ask me stupid questions, implying I must be insane. (105) 
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Throughout the memoir, Makhoere traverses the fantasy ofthe prison as a reformative 
space: there is nothing of the carefully deliberated rejection of guilt found in, for 
instance, Middleton's memoir, or the sense of private contemplation and personal 
growth found even in Mashinini's autobiography. Makhoere is uncompromising in her 
focus on the prison as a place where bodies are tortured, contorted and controlled: 
whenever an attempt is made to draw her into a confessional, contemplative 
conversation, she rejects it immediately. The chaplains who preach the virtues of 
obedience and contrition are dismissed with the same contempt as the psychologist 
(Makhoere 48-49). Attempts by the Red Cross to make the prison space more humane 
are represented as a camivalesque "nice break" and the Red Cross's "neutrality" is read 
as a form of collusion with the logic of the apartheid state and the prison (25). Unlike a 
great many writers, including Nelson Mandela, Makhoere refuses to distinguish 
between a potentially benign, reformative prison and the prison as a place of torture and 
injustice. For Makhoere, attempts by the prison to engage with her humanity are 
underpinned by the obscene obverse of torture and humiliation: her constant activity in 
the narrative revolves around forcing the penal system to betray the nonsensical, 
malicious truth behind its ostensibly reasonable actions. Indeed, there is something 
exceptional about Makhoere's unapologetic refusal to enter into any civil discourse 
with the prison officials, or to treat them with any humanity. Her description of 
stabbing one of the prison guards, Mbomvana, is a case in point: there is not even the 
older, more experienced voice - almost de rigeur in prison memoirs - that interposes to 
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mediate or explain the experience. The hatred is allowed a shocking immediacy in the 
text, heightened by the present tense of "let us kill her": 
190 
And we went for Mbombvana. We stabbed her several times with those 
mathematical instruments. We had made up our minds that this person was not 
going to treat us like this; we wanted to kill her, there and then. Let us kill her 
and they can hang us. Because we have had enough of her. We assaulted her for 
a long time, stabbing her in the face, on the head, on the body, all over. She was 
bleeding on the passage floor. After we had satisfied ourselves we went back to 
our cells. (64) 
The roles that she occupies are rarely even clandestinely permitted by the prison 
(although they are agonistic ally produced by it). Like First and Middleton, Makhoere 
insists on "dressing like a lady". However, while First and Middleton are at some level 
permitted to occupy this position in prison, Makhoere maintains this subject position in 
the face of the prison's overwhelming negation of her normality and femininity. Her 
insistence on dressing "normally" manifestly defies the way the prison interpellates her, 
and causes a crisis in the symbolic functioning of the apartheid prison, where black 
prisoners are simply not expected to make these kinds of demands. If First and 
Middleton identify femininity with their inner core, Makhoere insists on her femininity 
in relation to social equality and reciprocity. 
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While Makhoere's capacity to resist in this assertive way is predicated on a coherent 
notion of a collective will, there is also a degree of fluidity in the notions of the 
collective that she advances. The following excerpt illustrates something of the 
negotiated nature of communal agency in the memoir: 
191 
And all the other sisters resisting inside the prisons, who were my strength when 
times were hard - here I'm talking about aus Joyce, aus Esther and Thandisa-
deserve special mention together with Mama Dorothy. They fought an 
inimitable war in the dungeons of the hellish racists. We fought inside the cold, 
damp walls that kept us locked in, away from our fathers and mothers, 
husbands, sisters, brothers and children who are on the streets taking and giving 
hell to the military monster that is waging war to preserve its ugly past. We, the 
people, fighting for a glorious future for the beauty of all. But now I'm talking 
about the sisters who threw away the kitchen apron for cold steel in their hands 
- the hands which are capable of caressing and loving, oh so well. (Makhoere 
18) 
Here the most immediate communal "we" refers to women in prison, and more broadly 
to women who become resistance fighters. Elsewhere, she speaks with admiration of 
Thandi, an MK soldier who had broken away "from the traditional role of the female in 














as in a sense a separate struggle (against patriarchy and traditional, subservient roles) 
and as a part of the larger struggle against apartheid. However, the "we" transmutes to 
"we, the people" (echoing the opening line of the Freedom Charter), and is potentially 
extended to include even the oppressor in the phrase "for the beauty of all", and then 
returned to women resistance fighters with "but now I'm talking about ... " Something 
of the duality ofthis role is suggested by the hands that carry the "cold steel" of 
weapons but are also capable of "caressing and loving": the mutability of the "we" is 
strategic and contingent. The point is not that these roles are necessarily in conflict with 
one another, but that Makhoere's appeal to a collective identity is strategic and 
performative. It is perhaps only in the figure of her father that a kind oftension emerges 
in Makhoere's notion of membership to a group. Thus her father belongs to "the 
people" - "he was one of those people who got along well with others - a simple man, 
respected by most people in our neighbourhood" (1), but he is nonetheless a policeman, 
and the person who betrayed Makhoere. She clearly loves him, and is devastated by his 
death, but also recounts how he tore the family apart, and how her mother blamed him 
"for forcing his will on us to decide our future" (2). In her ambivalent feelings towards 
her father, and in his guilty stammer and his pathos, Makhoere confronts the aporic 
limits of her attempt to fashion a collective identity: her father belongs both to "the 
people" and to the enemy, he is a part ofthe family but a threatens to tear it apart, he is 
both oppressed and a patriarchal oppressor. 
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If one feels a sense of disquiet at Makhoere's lack of self-doubt and the absence of an 
"interrogative" self-reflexivity, as Driver does in her review article ofthe book, one 
should also be careful not to fall into the trap of demanding a conventional self-
evaluating confessional memoir in the service ofthe subject's "knowledge of self-in-the 
world" (Driver, "Review" 353). Such an appeal to knowledge of self fails to take into 
account the ways in which a carceral space such as the prison works to produce a form 
of "knowledge of self', and the very conscious ways in which Makhoere refuses to 
occupy such a position. 
Ultimately, while it is true, as Driver notes, that Makhoere "systematically reverses the 
Manichean self-other dichotomies formerly controlled by white authorities" ("Review" 
351), it seems injudicious to suggest that this means she remains subjected to the values 
and structures of apartheid society. The space of the prison, so closely identified by 
Makhoere with apartheid society in general, by definition does not allow such a 
reversal. When Makhoere refu es point blank to parade in prison, she states: 
I couldn't stand some ofthe rules and regulations the wardresses kept preaching 
about, and this was one of them. When these so-called rules and regulations 
were made, I wasn't invited to help set them up, anyway. (34) 
Such an insistence on agency obviates the fundamental asymmetrical distribution of 
















that these positions are exchangeable that negates the symbolic contract that underpins 
the culture of the prison. In other words, while Makhoere in a sense derives her 
language from the language of the prison, it is precisely her relentless insistence on 
repeating its dichotomies and procedures, with herself in the ascendant position, that 
augurs an ontological crisis in the nature of the prison. 
Finally, it is clear that none ofthe writers discussed in this chapter manages to speak 
from some neutral space outside the prison. The prison's terms and procedures are 
duplicated in the language that is used to remember, understand and defy the prison: 
even (and perhaps especially) the most inward-turning reflection relies on notions that 
are derived and contested in complex ways. What is perhaps most striking about these 
prison autobiographies by women is that they reveal the close collaboration between 
the language of "mental health", the space ofthe prison, the idea of race and the social 
rituals of femininity. In autobiographical prison writing by women, the structures that 
define the "I" which speaks as feminine, and therefore as disempowered in a patriarchal 
society, encounter the analogous discursive and material structures of the prison. The 
sUbjectivities constructed in these prison autobiographies are mediated by, but also 
strive to supersede, three interlocked systems of control: the apartheid language of race, 














broader 18th century intellectual project: it promised economic efficiency, the reform 
and principled education of its inmates, and the inculcation of an individual-centred 
ethos in sites where unruly crowd behaviour traditionally rendered control difficult. In 
Bentham's plan, inmates are arranged in separate cells around a tower, where they are 
visible to a centrally located authority that they themselves cannot see. In this way, 
control is dissociated from the actual bodies of the functionaries of power, and becomes 
associated with the intangible possibility ofthe gaze. Moreover, the gaze inevitably 
becomes internalised for the simple reason that it emanates from an invisible point: the 
inmate has to imagine the gaze, or the agency behind the gaze, since it can never be 
located in the outside world with any certainty. For Bentham, "the persons to be 
inspected should always feel themselves as ifunder inspection" (Bentham 44): in fact, 
the inspector, for Bentham, becomes not so much a human being as an omnipresent 
"inspective force" (Bentham 44). 
The panopticon also provides one of the clearest illustrations of Lacan's proposition that 
the gaze is an objet petit a, a "left-over" object-cause of subject formation in the 
symbolic: for the inmate to accept the call of the Law, an incorporeal gaze has to detach 
itself from the field of the visible. Moreover, this gaze is intimately associated with a 
fantasy of punishment: properly speaking, it is the sadistic and perverse support of the 
entire "reasonable" edifice that it supports. For the subject to be seized by the symbolic 
of the panopticon prison, for it to matter to him or her, the gaze first has to intercede. 
Contrary to the popular understanding, it is not so much the morality promoted by the 
institution that stands in the place of the conscience or the super-ego: it is the perverse 
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agency of the part-object, simultaneously interior and exterior to the subject, that 
exercises a superegoic role. At the risk of over-simplifying, an inmate of the panoptic on 
is more likely to behave according to the "neutral", "reasonable" rules of the institution 
if the imagined agency behind the gaze is a brutal madman who takes pleasure in the act 
of punishment. In such a Lacanian understanding, the more carefully the rules are 
followed, the more troubling the persistence ofthe dark peephole becomes to the 
inmate, the more obscene its desiring presence and the more unreasonable its 
requirements: the fact of its existence itself is read as a continued demand. For 
psychoanalysis, the panopticon functions as a material manifestation of the process of 
subject-formation: to become an individual subject, the subject has to encounter such an 
anxiety-provoking, derealising stain of the Real. The fact that the panopticon is so 
clearly a product of a particular historical moment in the West of course poses a number 
of questions to the universalising tendencies of Lacanian theory. Nonetheless, such a 
psychoanalytic understanding of Bentham's architectural innovation is useful in alerting 
us to the role of an invisible, anxiety-provoking excess in the process of sUbjectivation 
facilitated by the panoptic on. 
The structure of the panoptic on also reveals a number of assumptions that underpin the 
more general drive towards individualisation in the Enlightenment period. Bentham's 
enthusiastic description of his own project is quite instructive in this regard: 
Morals reformed - health preserved - industry invigorated - instruction diffused 
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gordian knot ofthe Poor-Laws are not cut, but untied - all by a simple idea in 
Architecture! -Thus much I ventured to say on laying down the pen - and thus 
much I should perhaps have said on taking it up, if at that early period I had seen 
the whole of the way before me. A new mode of obtaining power of mind over 
mind, in a quantity hitherto without example: and that, to a degree equally 
without example, secured by whoever chooses to have it so, against abuse. -
Such is the engine: such the work that may be done with it. How far the 
expectations thus held out have been fulfilled, the reader will decide. (40) 
The first and most obvious point is of course that the individualising process is linked 
here to economic requirements, to a certain ideal of fiscal efficiency or thrift. Not only 
does a panoptic on require fewer personnel than a more traditional institution, but it is 
also a site of production: prison labour serves the twin function of disciplining the 
inmates and of producing wealth. The second point is that the subject is constructed; a 
properly rational, self-regulating individual does not arise ex nihi!o, but through the 
intervention of an agency that is in some ways purely mechanical and in other ways 
entirely social. To individualise a person requires "power of mind over mind" - in other 
words, at least two people are necessary to produce one self-regulating subject. lfthe 
great Enlightenment project of attaining full knowledge of the self can be expressed as a 
desire "to see oneself seeing oneself', then the panopticon introduces a qualification 
that has troubled this undertaking from the outset: in its architectural economy, one sees 
oneself only because someone else is looking; the self-distance or self-objectification 
required to become available to one's own gaze requires an intrusive other. 
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While the law did not impose racial segregation in prisons during the 19th century, the 
treatment meted out to black prisoners was certainly very different from the treatment 
received by white prisoners. As Florence Bernault points out in A History of Prison and 
Confinement in Africa, the principal purpose of the prison encountered by black 
subjects in South Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, was to "promote the 
reproduction of the dominant power" (26), and not the reform and reintegration of 
prisoners. Corporal punishment remained one of the cornerstones of the colonial 
prison's control of its black subjects (Pete and Devenish 24). The apartheid prison 
inherited this practice, and used it extensively and enthusiastically until it was outlawed 
in 1996. The widespread use of corporal punishment on black offenders in South Africa 
often came into conflict with colonial authorities' ideas about prison reform. In their 
Natal case study, Pete and Devenish characterise this discrepancy between penal 
practice in South Africa and the imported reformative ideal as one symptom of larger 
frictions between white settlers and the colonial government in the 19th century: 
the colonial authorities saw the excessive whipping of black offenders in Natal as 
barbaric and out of step with the humane reform-oriented system of punishment applied 
in the mother country. The settlers, however, insisted that flogging was the only suitable 
means to punish black offenders, and stubbornly defended their right to impose this 
form of punishment freely. Their insistence that they be allowed to continue flogging 
black offenders was part of an attempt to assert Natal's independence from Britain, and 
affirm what the settlers regarded as their right to control African subjects and labour 
(Pete and Devenish 5). 
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The tendency to flog rather than to incarcerate black offenders reflects the development 
of a disciplinary technology in South Africa that saw black and white subjects as 
belonging to entirely different moral, social and legal spheres. As Pete and Devenish 
point out, "African subjects in the colonies were separated from the realms of law, 
civilisation and social contract ... which governed the development of 'modem' penal 
ideas in Britain. Under indirect rule, black criminals, unlike their white counterparts, did 
not belong to a 'shared moral universe'" (12). Notions of "reform" were simply not 
applied to black prisoners, but remained an important rationale for the imprisonment of 
white subjects. In fact, the social stigma of being incarcerated with black prisoners was 
seen as a serious obstacle to the prison's rehabilitative function (Pete and Devenish 17). 
The birth ofthe "modem" prison in South Africa, then, applied primarily to white 
subjects. The treatment of black prisoners rested on an overriding tendency to regard 
black subjectivity as somehow outside the compass of reason, contrition and reform, 
and the appeal to a developed interior life that these categories depend upon. Black 
prisoners were more likely to be physically assaulted, their diets were poorer, and they 
were kept in crowded communal cells!. By the tum of the nineteenth century, as 
Bernault points out, "Montagu's rehabilitation ideals had degenerated into a racialized, 
differential treatment that split amendment procedures into hard labor for blacks, and 
reformative treatment for whites" (9). Attempts to reform this situation, most notably by 
lOne of the recommendations of the 1943 Ballinger and Simons report is that the communal cells in which 
black prisoners are housed should be abolished and replaced with single cells. This was never implemented 
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the Lansdown Commission in 1945, were scuppered once and for all by the 
Nationalists' ascension to power in 1948, and the fonnalisation of racial segregation 
under apartheid. Many safeguards that protected prisoners' rights were removed with 
the passing of the 1959 Prisons Act, including the provision for regular visits to prisons 
by magistrates and boards of visitors and the right to report freely on prison conditions, 
including the taking of photographs (Smit 31). Conditions in South African prisons 
became generally more militarised and sheltered from public scrutiny after 1959, and 
the racial segregation of prisoners was both continued and consolidated. 
When South Africa inherited the idea of a prison as a refonnatory institution during the 
colonial period, it also inherited its philosophy of individualisation, and something of its 
Benthamite structure - perhaps more so than elsewhere in Africa (Bemault 7-8). The 
South African prison countered the fonnation of group identities and punished 
infractions of its rules with the deployment of reward-based classificatory systems and 
with the use of solitary confinement. It attempted, in a rather haphazard way, to apply a 
system that atomised its inmates, used their labour, and combined punishment and 
refonn. Pretoria Central, where Hennan Charles Bosman and Hugh Lewin served their 
sentences, was one of the first "total" penitentiary institutions. Stephen Gray points out 
that the blueprint allocated single cells to longtimers, and provided for workshops 
where prisoners could also receive skills training (16). However, as the preceding 
discussion makes clear, the Benthamite "refonnatory" model was also radically 
transfigured by the realities of the South African political and economic landscape, and 
specifically by its racial policies. The idea of the prison as a potentially benign site 












working to individualise and reform its inmates in the service of the public good never 
really took root, and was all but abandoned by the apartheid government, who used 
prisons largely as a means to enforce a dictatorial form of social control. 
Prisoners for black inmates, in particular, could not be described as modem 
penitentiaries by any stretch of the imagination. In fact, they were more closely 
modeled on mining work compounds, which were in tum simply prisons under a 
different name. As Worger points out, "free" black workers were compelled to live in 
the compound "for the duration oftheir six-month contracts, fenced and guarded and 
not permitted to leave the company premises at any time except to enter the mines" 
(76). This blurring ofthe distinction between prison and ordinary labour 
accommodation also points towards the more general penalisation of black subjects' 
everyday lives under colonial and apartheid rule. 
One consequence of these differences is that it becomes difficult to generalise about the 
technologies of isolation employed by the apartheid prison. At one end of a spectrum of 
penal practice, isolation was employed in ways that gestured towards Bentham's ideals: 
the function was to remove prisoners from "bad influences", to facilitate supervision 
and control, and to create conditions supposedly conducive to reflection, contrition and 
rehabilitation. At the other end of the spectrum, prisoners were isolated as simply 
another form of physical torture. The apartheid state used some of the technologies of 
the modem penitentiary in ways often radically uncoupled from their original aims, and 
applied them in uneven and improvisatory ways. 
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It would therefore be misguided to look at South African prisons as reflections of some 
Benthamite ideal: in fact, in a way analogous to the structure of apartheid ideology in 
general, the South African penal system consisted of a distorted pastiche of some of the 
themes of modernity, often divested from their original context and aim, and unevenly 
applied. This applies particularly to solitary confinement, which was widely used, but to 
remarkably different ends, and in entirely different contexts. Moreover, the way in 
which solitary confinement was imposed - its delimitations, its role and its day-to-day 
implementation - relied heavily on apartheid understandings of race. White prisoners 
were more likely to encounter a "modem", reformative prison than black prisoners; 
isolated white inmates were often regarded as more "reformable" than black inmates, 
and women more than men. Where for black prisoners isolation often served a function 
identical to torture, the isolation of white prisoners frequently became entangled with 
other considerations: poorly defined ideas of reform, a desire for their repentance, some 
notion of their "protection", a fascination with the spectacle of their imprisonment, or 
simply as a way to keep them apart from one another and from the other prisoners. 
In other words, if the Benthamite idea of individualisation through solitary confinement 
originally worked in the service of an ideological and philosophical preoccupation with 
the production of an individual-centred society and ethics, its transplantation to South 
Africa also effected a transformation and a fracturing of this ideal. Solitary confinement 
~~----------------
in South Africa remained a form of interpellation - it produced certain forms of 
----------------~ 
SUbjectivity, of self-understanding - but it would be a mistake to recognise a 
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homogenous philosophical idea or cultural desire at play in the way South African 
prisons exercised this form of incarceration. Nonetheless, in the same way that solitary 
confinement in the Benthamite panopticon discloses something of the mechanism of 
18th century subject-formation, solitary confinement in South African prisons reveals 
something of the material processes and the different forms of sUbjectivation in South 
Africa under apartheid. To put it simply, when we read "I" in a prison autobiography, 
we need to read it in relation to the experience of solitude in prison. An "I", by its very 
nature, circumscribes and confines its referent. When this "I" emerges through the 
memory of imprisonment, we are inevitably confronted by its material counterpart in 
the prison space: the confined, isolated body ofthe prisone~. 
Because solitary confinement plays such an important role in the apartheid prison, the 
problematic ofthe relationship between self and other, the individual and the group, -------------------_ .. -- -- -- - -- ----
emerges as one of the most important distinguishing features of the prison memoir 
------------------
during this time. The way in which the apartheid prison reforms prisoner identities 
- -------------------------- -'-'-"--"_._-' . 
through its deployment of space, and specifically by enforcing solitude, provokes an 
understanding of identity, a form of self-relation, that exercises a kind of gravitational 
force even on broader post-apartheid understandings of personal identity and 
obligations. 
2 As Benveniste points out, the pronouns "I" and "you" belong to an exceptional discursive instance in their 
appeal to a "reality of discourse" (218). The pronoun "I" is properly speaking an "indicator", because it derives 
meaning from its context of production: it describes the "the person who is uttering the present instance of the 
discourse containing f' (218). Its meaning is therefore entirely contingent on the situation in which it is uttered. 
To say that the sign "I" has as counterpart the isolated body of the prisoner is therefore not really a statement of 
analogy, but literally true: the use of the fIrst person pronoun in the prison autobiography immediately invokes 
the material context in which it is produced. It is the umbilical cord that links language to discourse, the 



















One signal theme that runs through all South African memoirs is the. desire foL~.,,~ .. _~.~ ... 
community that is inculcated by the prison's rejection of ordinary forms of human 
com;:~arY confinement, this desire be~~rnes especially acute: almost 
universally, prisoners refer to it as one of the worst forms torture, often resulting in 
profoundly depressive states and mental disintegration. Thus Herman Charles Bosman 
-------~. 
becomes tormented by paranoid fantasies while he is in isolation. Albie Sachs suffers 
~ --_._-----_. 
from a deepening depression and hallucinatory experie.[lc.es. Emma Mashinini suffers 
-------------~ .. ~'--~--.-"."-.~-. ~.'".-"'~~,-.,....- ... ~.~"~. 
from a terrible, vertiginous panic when she forgets her own daughter's name. 
MiiilitIanyrureMOgOOa-finds~the solitary experience of grief at his daughter's death 
almost unbearable, and wishes for death. Even Nelson Mandela, normally careful to 
present an image of patient, rational forbearance, notes that solitary confinement was 
"the most forbidding aspect of prison life", and suggests, using a somewhat self-
distancing conditional, that "one's own mind ... can begin to play tricks" (494). Sachs 
provides a vivid and informative description of his mental state after prolonged solitude: 
My limbs, my trunk and my head lie in an inert vegetable mass on the mattress, 
while my soul floats gently to the ceiling, where it coalesces and embodies itself 
into a shape which lodges in the comer and looks down at my body. Usually the 
shape is that of an owl that stares at me, calmly, patiently, and without emotion. It 
is my own owl, my own I. It is I staring at myself. What is more, I am aware of 
















at myself. I am a mirror bent in on itself, a unity and yet an infinite multiplicity of 
reflections. (252) 
It is difficult, in this description, to avoid noticing the metaphoric presence of the 
panoptic on. If the modern prison uses solitary confinement to obtain power over the 
----~------~-- ----------
mind, it needs to separate the mind from the body: what Sachs describes here is a -
hallucinatory literalisation ofthe Cartesian project, a disembodied, rational mind that 
looks down at the "inert vegetable mass" of the body. The philosophical ideal of seeing 
the self seeing the self is realised here in a macabre way: a third eye watches the soul 
watching the body, each ofthe actors caught in an abyssal and infinite play of 
reflection. Sachs's description also underscores precisely the obstacle to the dream of 
rational self-presence that the panopticon is predicated upon: such self-presence is 
possible only against the background of self-fragmentation. In other words, the moment 
in which the self encounters itself does not result in synthesis and unity, but is instead a 
profoundly fragmenting, derealising moment. In solitary confinement, the obscene 
converse side of this logic of individualised, rational self-reflection becomes visible: it 
/ 
is experienced as self-alienation and fragmentation, the most agonising psychological ------ ---- ~ torture. 
Under such conditions, it becomes almost impossible to hold onto a coherent inner 
world. Chapter Four, "Women in Prison", discusses_theJapiddi§iI1t~gration of a stable - ~~---- -.. ~ .. -~ ~.~ "'-.' .. --------.~ 
interiority in solitary confinement. In solitude, memories disappear, cherished beliefs 
"-----------------------,._.--._--
and ideals become meaningless, and the mind loses its capacity for invention and play. 
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In Long Walk to Freedom, Nelson Mandela notes that in prison, "you must find 
consolation in being true to your ideals, even if no one else knows of it" (464). In 
practice, such a solitary adherence to a coherent belief system is a gargantuan and 
sometimes impossible task, since a principled world-view is at some level inevitably 
communally constructed and maintained. Sachs notes that "ideas alone would be 
worthless without the will to utilise them", and that prison directs its destructive 
energies precisely at the will (168). 
At the same time, one should take care not read the deprivations imposed by solitary 
confinement in terms ofa simplistic binary, where those who are in positions of power 
consolidate their authority by divesting their captives of even the small potential for 
resistance afforded by a coherent interior life. While this is undoubtedly very often 
precisely the intention and the effect of solitary confinement, we would do well to 
remember that power is ultimately a name for the way relationships are structured in a ------
social space, that it refers to a system of differences that remains open to various -
appropriations. In his book The Number (2004), which the concluding chapter of this 
~------------------------------, -------
thesis refers to in some more detail, Jonny..§~!>_erg describes the experiences of 
. ----------- .~-- .. "-~-.--~.'-~-'---.-",--...-----... --
Magadien Wentzel when he is first imprisoned for political activism in the early 198OS-:-
The vast numbers of young people imprisoned during the post-1976 waves of protest 
made it impossible for prison authorities to separate the political activists from the 
general prison population, leading to much closer interaction between prison gang 
members and political prisoners. Through his contact with the 26s and 28s - the 
notorious "numbers" gangs still found throughout South African prisons - Wentzel is 















won over to their culture and aspirations. In order to join one ofthe gangs, he has to 
undergo an induction ceremony which consists of stabbing a warder, surviving the 
ensuing beating administered by the prison guards, and then spending time in solitary 
confinement (Steinberg 142-153). Solitary confinement, in other words, becomes 
employed by the prison gangs as an integral part of their initiation ceremony: in 
ad~til'fiP'iS·'a-symf)oTic-fiteoTpassage-;'tne'illSorrentati()n and vulnerability that 
atferurOii11ils·wiTIi"of'cnnfmemeffi-bec'omEllarnessed to the rec~itmeirt psyclior~ 
_", __ ~ __ .~., .. __ •• _.M • __ ~.~" -.. ~ .-.~-,-----
the g2RgS • ..:r.ll0Jesson4hatMagatiien,leams,during thistime: "feel all the pain on the 
~.---"-"..- .. ,.". 
inside, and show nothing on the outside" (145) has obvious utility in gang culture. It 
would be myopic to suppose that political prisoners did not sometimes attach an 
equivalent ritual value to the deprivations of prison life, or use the prison's organisation 
of space to construct meanings that had nothing in common with the purpose intended 
by the prison authorities. 
Nonetheless, solitary confinement renders prisoners exceptionally defenseless against 
their captors, both physically and psychologically. In South African prison memoirs, 
this vulnerability is often felt most acutely during interrogation sessions. The intense 
desire for companionship, coupled with the sense of meaninglessness and the 
disintegration of a stable interiority inculcated by solitary confinement, means that the 
process of interrogation can be both feared and desired. A few days after his 















At times I have felt an urge to call for the interrogators simply for the sake of 
relieving the tension. In the seven years of my practice as an advocate I never 
could understand why even hardened criminals made full and detailed 
confessions to the police, thus providing the information needed for their 
conviction. Now I realise that isolation produces an almost irresistible urge to 
communicate. Any fate is better than continued uncertainty. (28) 
Hugh Lewin describes a similar overpowering compulsion to confess to his 
interrogators: 
I wanted to talk. They were the only people I knew now in the world and I 
wanted to talk to them. I wanted to ease off the load and tell them what they 
wanted to hear. It wouldn't matter because they knew most things already, but 
they said they wanted to hear it all from me myself. That didn't matter. Nothing 
mattered anymore. It was all over now, all over, with everybody gone (the others 
must have had time by now to get across) and those that weren't gone they knew 
about now anyway. Nothing mattered any more except that it would be so nice to 
stop, to sit and talk. So nice not to feel so tired. So nice not to care, not to have to 
care about anything at all. (20) 
Solitary confinement, in other words, creates conditions that on the one hand nurture a 
kind of Utopian ideal of community, and on the other hand invite a confessional 
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narrative.3 It exposes, in an immediate and compelling way, the impossibility of 
sUbjective autonomy, ofliving a life without others. As Mandela notes in Long Walk to 
Freedom, "nothing is more dehumanizing than the absence of human companionship" 
(397). 
As this thesis demonstrates, South African prison memoirs describe, and in some ways 
enact, the incessant labour that characterises the fabrication of community against the 
prison's drive to individualise, to impose a solitary identity. At the same time, the desire 
for community, born out of the unbearable destitution of isolation, is undercut by the 
sometimes unpleasant realities of communal life in prison, the sense in which the 
visceral reality of others can be as aggravating as it is inspiring and strengthening. 
In his Jail Diary, Albie Sachs describes how he escapes from his sense of complete 
isolation by whistling a duet with a mysterious prisoner. He speculates that the whistler 
might be a young woman who belongs to the Alexander Group, a movement he 
characterises as "rather theoretical, paperbome and cut off from the mainstream of 
African politics" (21). Reflecting on the difference between solidarity inside and outside 
prison, Sachs notes: 
If, oh dark girl, you belong to the Alexander Group, and if you are the whistler, 
well, so much the more valuable our present bonds. Outside prison our 
3 It is perhaps no accident that the rise of the confessional autobiography in the West coincides with the rise of 
the Enlightenment penitentiary: as John Bender points out, the consciousness-centred novel per se is rooted in 
the same cultural and philosophical conditions that gave rise to the modem prison (Bender 11). 
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differences are sharp, but we stand for the same things; inside, let us meet and 
hold fast to each other. How marvellous it is to be able to speak to someone 
again, even if we are compelled to use this indistinct tenuous language of 
whistling. (21) 
Solitude, in other words, demands a closer appreciation of community: differences 
between people become almost immaterial in solitary confinement. Sachs's relief at 
finding companionship, even in such a tenuous way, is soon undermined by the way 
camaraderie is transformed into a demand: 
I find, however, that I am subjecting myself to the uncertainties of another's will. 
The routine which I am carefully trying to build up is being undermined. 
Sometimes, I am trying to sleep when the whistler calls me. Sometimes I am in 
the middle of activities with which I attempt to sustain myself. (25) 
The problem is solved when Sachs manages to impose a schedule to the whistling by 
responding only at night. In these opening pages of his Jail Diary, Sachs touches on a 
central dilemma of life in prison: the desperate manufacturing of a communal bond, the 
desire for company, brings one face to face with the "uncertainties of another's will". 
This irresolute suspension between two extremes is perhaps typical of the SUbjectivity 
produced by the prison: the contrary desire for the presence of others and the recoil from 
their presence in the interests of sustaining the self is an irresolvable dilemma that 
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prison discloses the absolute necessity of human companionship, "communal life may be 
a different form of tyranny, itself a prison from which there seems to be no escape" 
("Hamlet's Dreams" 12). In Memoirs of a Saboteur, Natoo Babenia foregrounds a 
somewhat different but related problem with community in the apartheid prison: one 
never knew whether one was sharing a cell with police informers: 
We were all in it together but I only knew David, Mdalose, Simelane and 
Phungula by face. No one really knows who the others are, what you have said 
and whether you are already an impimpi. It was terrible. You could talk as much 
as you wanted. There were no cops to stop you. But no one spoke because we did 
not trust each other. When David Ndawonde came in he would not answer any of 
us. (96) 
In this case, the companionship of a communal cell becomes the very foundation of 
solitude, a telling example ofthe sense in which solitary confinement is not merely a 
description ofthe body in space, but relates to a more abstract severing of the bonds of 
intersubjectivity. Life with others can be the most powerful catalyst for paranoid 
withdrawal into the self. 
One of the prison memoirs to engage in the most sustained and self-reflexive ways with 
the experience of solitary confinement in a South African prison is probably Breyten 














this chapter relies heavily on this text to pursue some of the general points raised above 
in closer detail. 
Breytenbach, one of South Africa's best known Afrikaans poets, was arrested at the 
airport as he was about to flee the country, and sentenced to nine years in 1975 for 
activities relating to a somewhat obscure (and short-lived) political group called Okhela. 
His imprisonment was particularly significant since Breytenbach was at this point a 
feted and anthologised poet, and also the brother of Jan Breytenbach, the most 
decorated soldier in the South African Defence Force and a close friend of several 
apartheid government ministers. Breytenbach's harsh sentence suggests that his political 
activities were seen as a form of betrayal of the Afrikaner establishment by one of its 
sons. While in prison, he penned a number of almost impenetrably idiosyncratic semi-
fictional autobiographical sketches that were later published under the title Mouroir 
(1983), and wrote The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist (1994), a baroque and 
---.--..,._-
experimental autobiographical account of his experiences in prison, soon after his 
~.------.--
release and exile. Of his nine years in prison, he spent two in solitary confinement, and 
~-- ---'' _____ ~~ ____ M __ ., __ .~ ____ ~"._.~ ..... __ •• _._ ........ _._ •• ,._ ........ " __ ~~ • • _'_.~_'H ~_~.'~_._._. _ 
these are also the years that are described in the most fractured, convoluted and self---------------_.- ~~ .. -.-.-.. -
reflexive prose. The later part of the memoir, which chronicles his life at Pollsmoor 
, _. _____ -- - ,. __ •. ~ ~,,~" " ••.•• --_."..--. "M'_~_ - .. _-. "" -. .,~. -"~~-'" --.. ~~-..,..,.-'~ ................ ~".I<,>.~ .... ..... '""-~--".~~>-.. '-.,-.w_.~...,,_ 
Prison, seems more willing to empl()y the mimetic conventions of realist narration. 
True Confessions stands out jtQn:LQther SQll~thAfri.£~.!l p'r!son memoirs for its refusal to 
""""---~--~-"-----.-.. -"",,,,.---














i~the outset, it challenges the reliability and constanc), of t narrator by 
(~titious rmture <?f1he-.1ext and Qfthe "I" wbicl!~ 
You know that we're always inventing our lives. You know that what I'm 
confessing now is also the instantaneous invention of what might have happened. 
(Breytenbach 17) 
The self-questioning opening pages of True Confessions reads almost like a methodical 
negation of Rousseau's famous declaration in his Confessions: "I propose to set before 
my fellow-mortals a man in all the truth of nature; and this man shall be myself' (1). As 
Jolly notes, " ... the Confessions is, ultimately, not a conventional autobiography; if 
anything, it is a parody of that convention" (92). For Breytenbach, the self is -i~mufiiDTe;lrls"iiot'oigaiiisedaround some s!!:lble kerrieCBy'~·~ension, the 
---_. --- ---- " --., .... -- ....... --_. ..... .-.-~.-""'=-.. --............ .. ... . 
memoir seems formally, philosophically and ideologically protean. At one moment, it 
invokes the space of the prison in order to interrogate the nature of language and 
identity; at another, it looks like a political manifesto; at another, it seems to be a factual 
account of life in prison. 
When the memoir first appeared in South Africa, it was most often criticised precisely 
for this fractured, ambiguous quality. It was dismissed by some for not being 
"literature", for having a "diffuse focus", for being too "deconstructive" and for trying 
to have "a foot in two camps" (Galloway 295-306). In particular, it did not seem to fit 
the mould of "struggle literature": Breytenbach's voice was simply too self-conscious 
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and individual to act as a cohesive narrative focal point for the aspirations of the 
oppressed masses of South Africa. While it speaks eloquently about the dehumanising 
effects of prison, it does not speak on behalf of any particular ideology or group of 
people, nor does it extend a reliable account of specific historical conditions. As 
literature, it was too documentary, and as documentary, it was too literary. 
Breytenbach never speaks comfortably on behalf of a collective. In fact, True 
Confessions stands out from most ofthe other memoirs that this thesis deals with for its 
resolute refusal to indulge in even the most provisional romanticisation of solidarity. 
Breytenbach regards the self as essentially isolated, and the voice that emerges in the 
me~~~~i;~'llci-;~inststr-6frits -dIfference fro~-~thers.'One 
--- --------
of the most potent images of the narrator's isolation occurs at the beginning of the 
memoir, where he describes giving testimony at his trial: 
And then, this same process is an open-ended one; I can hear the echoes. As it 
continues - this jumbletalk, this trial, I can go on searching, and I can hear the 
reverberation of my own voice. I'm sitting here - I have this little instrument in 
my hand; I have the earphones on my head and I speak to you and I listen to the 
voice coming back. And I learn from these words the reality as it is being 
presented at the moment of emitting the sounds. That is perhaps as close as I can 
come to what identity is considered to be. That is as close as I come to the truth. 
Here I am. Here is the truth also. (13) 
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Two things are striking about this passage. First, the voice that addresses us is a coerced 
voice, immediately calling into question the spontaneity and reliability of the confession 
in court and, by extension, the confessional project of the memoir itself. Second, 
Breytenbach's real audience is himself: his speaks and hears his own voice through the 
earphones. The second person "you" merely relays the voice back to its origin: the 
speaking "I" encounters its own alienated voice, always a split second behind itself. 
It is telling to contrast this passage to various instances where Mandela describes court 
proceedings in Long Walk to Freedom, where he constantly speculates on the effect of 
words on the judges and the prosecutors. For instance: 
As I listened to Conco and Luthuli, I thought that here, probably for the first time 
in their lives, the judges were listening not to domestic servants who said only 
what they knew their masters would like to hear, but to independent and 
articulate Africans spelling out their political beliefs and how they hoped to 
realize them. (277) 
Here Mandela listens to and feels solidarity with Conco and Luthuli (who in turn, if we 
follow Mandela's logic, represent all Africans), and reflects on the transformative 
power of the words of the addresser on the perceptions and consciousness of the 
addressee. For Mandela, the fact that a court is by its very nature public, and compelled 
to record testimony, can be used in the service of a revolutionary agenda. The subject 
who speaks under such conditions fulfills a representative function: the single voice is 
217 
... ",.-u ... ".-...
""uU'F,
,,7"'"1r.o   a ]n ~m












also the voice of the masses, reflecting communal desires. Mandela habitually provides 
transcripts of court proceedings and long excerpts from public speeches in Long Walk to 
Freedom, so that the autobiography becomes a kind of extension of the court-room, a 
public space where statements can be made for the record, where collective identity is 
forged, and where communication becomes possible across sharp cultural and historical 
divides. 
In contrast, in the courtroom scene cited above, Breytenbach appears to be his own 
~-------------~~~~--addressee. For him, communication is a claustrophobic self-addressing circle: the self, 
-'" -.-.--~~--.- ... -.. -.. --'.-~.~.," ... --- .. ---- "-------------------------
and by association the truth, reside in a moment of repetition, when the self encounters 
~-------------------~ ------"'--, .. -~--~ ... -<, ...• ~~--., ,"~.-- -.~'.~ • .,---'.------.-.. ------.--~.--~ •. - .• -~--,---
its own utterance after a detour through the other of the courtroom<!l!t:Lth.e.J.TI.~chine. In 
~ --.. --.--.~.~-... -.. .. .. ". . . .. ..' -'- ... 
some ways, Breytenbach offers us a bleak parody of rational r~.l1ection: the s~lf ~rriv~~~ 
.,..---. __ ._--- _. __ .... _ ........ -.-~-.------.... -.-
at a moment of self-presence, encountering its own voice through the act of confession. 
_~~______________ __~-l?" ------.--.-------.-.~~-"<.--'~.-'-.~~-~'_M~~, 
By focusing on the specific material technologies and the social context that underpin -------_._---_ .. _----_ .. __ .. __ .. _---_ ..... -....... _--_.-.. -.. - .•. _. -'" .. .. __ ....... _ ............ _. 
this endeavour, Breytenbach portrays such "self-presence" as a frightening form of 
.. - ~ ... ~"--~ .. ~ ..• ~---, "'. ~ ~----- ... --.,--- .- ........ -.. ~--.,-..... -.~-,.-".-'~.-.. 
alienation.-N()t only is the "I" who speaks in the memoir trapped in a solitary self-
addressing circuit, it does not recognise itself in its own addr~~~:.t.~e very act of making ----_ ...... _-.................... - ... ' 
the voice audible in a public space, of demanding recognition, robs the speaker of self-----_ ... ----_ ... _ ....... . 
--rf¢QWJiQ.n. For Breytenbach, the court-room is a machine designed to enforce the 
worst kind of solitude and alienation, and the voice that speaks in the court-room has no 
detenninate coordinates, no stable point of reference. While Breytenbach's self-
consciously philosophical style tends to lend his descriptions a universalising 
existentialist gravity - sometimes it seems he is talking not so much about his own 
"","'T'.,. 
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experience as about the human condition - it is worth remembering that his solitude in 
the courtroom is also predicated on his own very particular social and historical 
position. As an Afrikaner, his loneliness in the courtroom is underscored by the fact that 
the system sitting in judgement of him is doing so in defense of Afrikaner domination. 
For Breytenbach, there is no unambiguous solidarity with a revolutionary group, 
because his very cultural and familial proximity to the same Afrikaner power that 
imprisons him for his beliefs also drives a wedge between him and his revolutionary 
compatriots. As Lewis points out, "while Afrikaner nationalists might have wanted to 
claim him as torchbearer for the language and its expressive capabilities, the 
intemationalliterary community ... expected him to fulfill the role ofthe dissident, 
disowning the politics associated with Afrikanerdom" (441). In a sense, he is not merely 
deprived of a literal community in the courtroom, but also of an imaginary community: 
from the outset, his solitary confinement refers as much to his psychological isolation as 
to his physical seclusion. 
Breytenbach experiences the self as a fundamentally negative category, available only 
~ .. ----""----.><--.-.. ,,.--.-... ,~.,,-- '-.,. .-. 
through absence and isolation. His perception of freedom after his incarceration reflects 
'--------------_......-'-
some of this: 
Ah, Mr Investigator, don't y<?u think I'm guilty? Yes, I have the guilt ofthe 
survivor. All my friends are dead because they are still alive, locked in the 
cleanliness of asexual and dehumanised space. And I, I'm outside alive in the 
deadness of my surroundings. (27) 











In this description, being alive and being dead become interchangeable: the subject 
appears as such only against a contextual backdrop, and then only as an effect of 
contrast or difference, expressed here as a form of guilt. To be a "survivor", in other 
words, is not simply to be, but to be not-dead; to exist, by definition, because of the 
production of a relative term. 
A version of this abyssal expanse which separates self and other recurs throughout the 
memoir. Breytenbach's desire for communication and community is constantly 
undercut by his sense of physical, emotional or ideological distance from others. He is 
trapped in a kind of limbo, catching glimpses of solidarity in adj oining rooms, but 
unable to participate in it: 
The trial of the SASO student leaders (South Mrican Student Organization) was 
going forward at the same time as mine, in an adjoining courtroom. Sometimes, 
during recesses, I passed by them in the stairwell or corridor. They were all 
dressed in complementary African shirts - very flashy. I envied them their warm 
and rumbustious camaraderie. (67) 
Unlike many other political prisoners, Breytenbach does not focus on the courtroom as 
a place of contact, but rather as C!: place that produces distance. "From time to time," he 















moving in another world altogether" (68). In contrast, during Hugh Lewin's court case, 
he cannot help finding common ground even with the comrades who betrayed him: 
Diane, in the box, diminished the roles of others and increased her own. As she 
walked back from the box, on her way out, she looked across at me, as if 
pleadingly - and I couldn't help but nod slightly at her, and wink. (Lewin 53). 
For Lewin, the courtroom is situated in the domain of the social- contact is made, 
messages conveyed, alliances shift, friends are rejected or forgiven. For Breytenbach, 
the social aspect of the courtroom simply serves to foreground his absolute isolation 
from his family and friends: it is a place where he encounters nothing other than a 
distorted version of his own voice. 
Like other prisoners in solitary confinement, Breytenbach is driven by a desperate need 
for contact with the outside world and with other prisoners. However, his descriptions 
of contact with others often terminate in a painful re-emphasis of his solitude. For 
instance, he describes how, in Pretoria Central, one ofthe Black cleaners would wriggle 
the wire loop that led to the toilet in his cell: 
I would bend and squint down the wire through the conduit and just barely 
perceive, pressed to the other end, a friendly black eye. I would jiggle it and he 
would respond likewise. It was like touching a finger. We communicated. It was 



















What Breytenbach forecloses in this description is precisely the domain of community, 
of solidarity forged through a joint desire to communicate. The isolated "I" 
communicates with an inaccessible "eye". The pronoun "we" appears only once in the 
,,-------
entire description - "we communicated" - but any effect of commonality is 
immediately erased with the suggestion that the reality of the other is a kind of illusion, 
that the self merely encounters itself in a mirror. The mirror, in other words, provides an 
appearance of something beyond the enclosed limits of the self while it in fact instates 
the very limit that separates the self from the world. 
Remarkably, once Breytenbach is moved to Pollsmoor and integrated into a prison 
community, he takes as much care to re-invoke the distinction between self and others 
as he does to subvert it. Breytenbach endeavours, through his actions and his narrative 
strategies, to ensure that he remains essentially separate from the other prisoners. For 
instance, he describes being asked by other prisoners to help them write their letters: 
At the outset it was strange that people should approach me and ask me to answer 
their letters for them - it impinged on my sense of privacy. I soon learned that a 
letter in prison is public property. Those who do not get any mail, even the poor 
'social cases', can thus also vicariously have an outside dimension to their lives. 
No major decisions concerning love or family problems are made without being 
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In this instance, the relationship that Breytenbach establishes with the other inmates is 
described as a form of uncomfortable literary forgery, an incursion on his "sense of 
privacy". The prisoners' request obviously blurs the distinction between self and other 
in a way that is alien to his sensibilities. Breytenbach rejects this troubling collapse of 
the boundary between self and other by affecting the voice of the social sciences: 
If! had to typify the genus 'prisoner', I'd say that it is someone who is socially 
weak, who has no control over his own desires and impulses, who has real1y no 
means of making a separation between the real world and the imaginary ones. 
(167) 
What is missing in this description is any acknowledgement that he himself is also a 
prisoner, that despite the gulf of learning and ideological commitment, he shares a 
common predicament with the other inmates. Even Herman Charles Bosman, who is 
careful to maintain the satirist's distance from his subjects, acknowledges that the 
shared reality of the penitentiary compels him to satirise not just others, but also himself 
- in fact, much of the dark humour of Cold Stone Jug derives from the moments where 
Bosman remembers to count himself under the genus "prisoner". Despite Breytenbach's 
.----------_._------------
insistence on the split and fragmentary nature of narrative SUbjectivity, he is remarkably 
----------------'-'--' "'" -'" '''''"''''''''''''-'''''''''''''' '" - -,"'-, - '" -"',,'---- " 
consistent in maintaining an equivalence between the selfwho narrates and the selfwho 
is the subject of narration. The highly individualised narrator of True Confessions 
---.-'--.-----~.---
autobiography in a foreign country, with a sense of distance from the world of the 














prison, seems no different at all from Breytenb~he-prison'Scrfue;-illway~~~ady 
.-.. -----.- ----._._------- - . --....... --------. -.. -~ 
separated from the world he inhabits. 
--------------.----~.---
If he does not feel that he belongs to the community of prisoners, he feels a similar 
distance from the prison guards (the boere): 
I had to write love letters for the boere too, or applications for promotion ... 
Sometimes I was asked to write essays for their kids ... I absolutely lapped it up, 
sir; I loved it because I could use their need to obtain, illegitimately, material on 
the subject they wanted me to write about. Sometimes I would be asked to do 
their homework for them. Quite a few were attempting to finish matric or obtain 
their junior certificates by correspondence courses, and I would complete their 
tasks. I became involved to the point of holding thumbs when it became 
examination time, and analyzing afterwards why 'we' did not succeed ... (169) 
In this instance, he hardly distinguishes between the guards and the prisoners.4 If 
inmates have no concept of plagiarism, nor do the guards. As prison scribe, 
Breytenbach belongs to neither camp, yet both seek to include him in an uncomfortable 
"we", using his words in order to forge their own identities and achieve their own ends. 
When he describes the guards, he employs a normalising clinical voice very similar to 
the one he affects when he characterises his fellow inmates as "socially weak": " 
4 The sense of affinity with the guards (Breytenbach "holds thumbs" when it becomes examination time) is 

















some warders ... should definitely have been in an institution for the mentally retarded" 
(224). 
Any camaraderie is laden, for Breytenbach, with tension and contradiction. On the one 
hand he desires escape from the confined isolation of the self, but on the other he 
deliberately reinstates the distinction between self and other, inside and outside, 
insisting on a difference that sets him apart from those that surround him in the prison 
space. 
This sense of unease with the incursion of the other into the "private" space of the self 
~--'-"----"-"-" 
is felt most acutely in his relationship-i;;langua:ge;-whiGhjssimultl!!!~~QuslY the ground 
.. - ... ~ __ c..; .. _".::-_'.:.... "_"" '"",-,~ ___ • 
of individuality in a confessional autobiography and the foundation of inter SUbjectivity. 
- --~-.'. -~.--"-~-~"'-""" - ' .",,"- "-._- .. -._ .... ". 
--------""""----- - ---" 
Language individualises, but it also connects: in this way, the narrative medium of the 
---"-""-""---""-"-"""--- "---"--""-" , 
autobiography reflects something of the tension that Breytenbach identifies with the 
,.-_ ... -. --... --------
social space of the prison. Explaining his reasons for writing the memoir, Breytenbach 
comments: 
Which is why I turn back to you, Mr Investigator, Mr I, and I talk because you 
must give me sounds. You must allow me to regurgitate all the words, like the 
arabesques of a blind mind. I am the man on the comer, with dark glasses, 
waiting for your coin. I am the lift attendant in Security Headquarters. Don't ask 
me any questions. You don't have to. You will not be able to stop the answers in 















Language is equated with "black vomit", an abject interiority. In this sense, 
Breytenbach's confessional project is conventional- speaking becomes a form of 
purging, a way to extemalise a secret private burden. However, the addressee "must 
give him sounds" and "must allow" him to speak: in a fundamental way, the words do 
not really belong to the narrator, but are always already the words of another, contained 
by and invoked by his imaginary interrogator. Moreover, the words are "regurgitated", 
suggesting that they have been used before and are not unique to this occasion. In this 
sense, Breytenbach's confessional project is constantly thwarted. The desire to construct 
an authentic record of personal experience is frustrated by the realisation that his words 
are never entirely his own; that the very act of speaking in order to delineate a self 
inscribes the speaking subject in a symbolic order which is inexorably intersubjective. 
Undoubtedly, this experience is intensified and consolidated by Breytenbach's specific 
predicament: he is a writer writing about being forced to write. He associates writing 
with privacy and inner freedom: 
In the dark I am not in the way. There is nobody to look over my shoulder. I am 
relieved! Then, like an irrepressible urge, there would be the need to write. In the 
dark I can just perceive the faintly pale outline of a sheet of paper. And I would 


















Here writing is enabled by privacy and simultaneously confers an at least minimally 
stable symbolic identity: the act of writing makes him into a writer, functioning as a 
kind of autochtonous, autotelic act of self-creation which militates against the prison 
environment's incessant desire to dehumanise prisoners through pejorative labels and 
systems of classification. Writing is "irrepressible", a spontaneous, liberating act of the 
body enabled by the absence of others. However, he is also forced to write his 
confession: in this sense, the "irrepressible urge" becomes an injunction from outside, 
and writing becomes associated with the prison's absolute humiliating negation of 
privacy: 
They can wait for you to start contradicting yourself, and they can relay 
themselves; you, you have to stay awake because you have to write, scribbling, 
filling page after page, repeating, altering, having it tom up, starting anew. They 
leave, they are replaced by two fresh interrogators and you sit there. 'May I go to 
the toilet, sir?' They do not answer, they wait. You write. You become desperate. 
'May I go to the toilet, please?' And you're accompanied to the toilet where you 
are stripped of the last vestiges of privacy or the dignity you may have thought 
you had, because you are not allowed to close the door ofthe closet and you have 
to do whatever nature calls you to do in full view of the cynical man standing 
there, observing you, picking his teeth. (30) 
Breytenbach claims that his life is "eaten up by words" (28); that "[i]t is all surface" 
(28). In the context of interrogation, language forces an intolerable intimacy, bringing 
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self and other in unbearably close proximity. For Breytenbach, writing is 
simultaneously the instrument that enables an inner life, a private self, and the very tool 
that his interrogators use to destroy every last vestige of privacy. By forcing one ofthe 
doyens of Afrikaner literature, a figure who is essentially defined through his writing, to 
write as part of the interrogation process designed to incriminate and imprison him, 
Breytenbach is placed in an intolerably contradictory position: the very foundation of 
his self is also the instrument that the state uses against him. As Schalkwyk points out, 
"the very compulsion to write, which underpins the most secure ofBreytenbach's ---------------- -----_._----_._---------_ .. _--_._ .. -... _-- -_ .. _--_._--... _- .. _---
identities, that of the writer or 'scribe', ... also underlies his abiding sense of self-
should be made that this anxiety-provoking split relation to language, while perhaps 
characteristic of the confessional genre in general, is based in this case on particular 
material circumstances. In fact, Breytenbach's interrogators were using a standard 
interrogation technique, used also on Emma Mashinini - confessions are written and 
rewritten in order to check for inconsistencies. In Breytenbach's case, his interrogators 
were certainly sophisticated enough to understand that his status as an important 
Afrikaans writer would force him into a particularly difficult psychological 
predicament. 
The memoir's anxiety about plagiarism is a corollary of its more general anxiety about 
language. Plagiarism is precisely the point where the language of the self becomes 
confused with the language of another. One ofBreytenbach's quarrels with the other 
prisoners revolves around their tendency to plagiarise, their inability to fix an "owner" 
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to language (or even experience). Discussing one prisoner's manuscript, Breytenbach 
claims: 
It was clear at that stage, judging only from the handwritings, it had already been 
written by five different people - all giving free reign to their diverse fantasies. 
(166) 
Despite (or perhaps because of) his condemnation of prisoners' use of the "extremely 
predictable and second-hand" (167), Breytenbach is persistently preoccupied with the 
originality and authenticity of his own thought and writing. In "plagiarism", one of the 
poems appended to the memoir, Breytenbach invokes the figure of a man who writes 
himself a poem for his birthday: 
he scraped and scrounged, aped what he found, 
and tried to turn the leftovers 
into something with his breath - (365) 
The desire here is almost for an alchemical transformation of the second-hand into 
something original. The poem is both a birthday gift and a form of giving birth, an 
attempt to create something new from the old. However, the poem is destroyed by the 
wrappmg paper: 
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having used up everything to hand 
he wrapped it circumspectly in fresh paper 
meaning to write it out neatly later that evening 
but when around nightfall he unfolded the present 
the damned paper had already gobbled up the poem ... (366) 
It appears that it is impossible, in prison, to produce and sustain particularised, authentic 
language. What belongs most characteristically to the self - the very language it 
couches itself in - is always already compromised by its involvement in the speech of 
another. The act of putting pen to paper extends the promise of a cohesive identity while 
simultaneously repudiating the possibility of a unified self by reproducing the radical 
dependence ofthe self on the other. 
How do we account for this fragmented, insistently individualised narrative voice of 
True Confessions, which anxiously rejects solidarity even as it appears to long for it, -
.-dec"raies its independence even as its autonomy is questioned at every tum? To what 
~teni-does the t~nsion between individual identity and the claims ofconiinunity'i~ 
True Confessions reflect Breytenbach's cultural, philosophical, literary, or 
psychological predilections, and to what extent is this tension inherent to performance 
of subjectivity demanded by the prison? 
On the one hand, Breytenbach' s experience of prison is clearly mediated by his literary 
and philosophical disposition. His early works, including Katastrofes (1964) and Die 
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huis van die dowe (1964) associated Breytenbach with a group of writers working in 
Afrikaans in the 1960s referred to as the "Sestigers" (Writers of Sixty). Brink goes so 
far as to identify Breytenbach as the principal figure of the "Sestigers" (Brink 5). This 
movement, spearheaded by writers such as Etienne Leroux, Andre Brink, Chris 
Barnard, Bartho Smit, Ingrid Jonker and Jan Rabie, was characterised by its departure 
from the localised realism that typified a great deal of previous literature in Afrikaans. 
Drawing heavily on French existentialist thought, the Sestigers rejected the notion of a 
rational, comprehensible world that makes itself available to mimetic representation in 
art. In the sixties, Afrikaans writing became increasingly modernist, interested in 
. 
subjective interiority at the expense of realist description. It was distinguished by 
/~-~-.-.---.--- ""------_. __ .••. 
< 
... self-conscious experimentation with time and chronology, referentiality, a 
variable point of view, the monologue interieur, myth as organizing authority, 
typographical effects. We find elements ofthe anti-novel with its anti-hero, its 
anonymous, faceless figures, its 'outsiders' ... while the language itself is affected 
in more than one way in an attempt to invoke a fragmented world, or to follow 
the illogical course ofthe monologue interieur. (Grove 5. My translation.) 
While Breytenbach originally aligned himself with this movement, his growing 
commitment to the liberation struggle in South Africa made him increasingly cautious 
ofthe New Critical fonnalism ofa number of the Sestigers. In this, he is joined by some 














criticises his predecessors for their lack of political engagement and questions the 
morality of a purely "aesthetic struggle" in a country beset by the violence of apartheid 
rule (Brink 43-45). Nonetheless, Breytenbach's writing retains a strong reliance on a 
strong subjective voice, a rejection of the conventional registers of documentary realism 
and a preoccupation with a "deeper reality" underlying - or adjoining - the ordinary and 
the everyday. The self-reflexivity, philosophical digressions, fonnal experimentation 
and the insistence on the deeply personal nature of experience that characterise True 
Confessions are all evident in his earlier work in Afrikaans. To a certain extent, in other 
words, his experience of incarceration is inflected through the literary sensibility that he 
brings to prison. 
However, in many significant ways, True Confessions also marks a departure from 
Breytenbach's earlier oeuvre. This departure is signaled first of all by the fact that True 
Confessions was the first book that Breytenbach wrote in English.5 It is in many ways 
clearer and more descriptive than his other work. The experience of alienation and 
disintegration ofthe narrating "I" is intense and o~-e-cl"'·fi'--c-m~at:-e-'ri;-a'-l 
---- ---------------
circumstances. The transactions between the inner and the outer world, between self and 
~
other, have a kind of immediacy and urgency that are lacking in Breytenbach's pre-
prison writing. 
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Moreover, from the outset, Breytenbach explicitly links his narrative strategies to the 
specific material realities of courtrooms and interrogation sessions. In fact, one of the 
most interesting aspects of the memoir is its self-reflexive insistence on a link between 
~ ------------------------------
the rituals of the prison and the production of an autobioSEaphical voice. Beyond the -- - - --- ----. 
question of Breytenbach's pre-existing philosophical and aesthetic inclinations, the 
~iearly-sliapesBreYteiiliach'sl1aI'fafi6n:an(n)rings a particular form to his 
. ______ • _______ •• ~, __ .,~_ •• _ ••• "_. ___ .. _." ____ •• __ ".~ ___ 0'- --_______ ~ ___ _ 
--~-~-----.--. 
experience. There is a sense in which Breytenbach's highly developed literary 
~
sensibility becomes invaded by the prison, and particularly by the technology of solitary 
confinement. True Confessions incessantly attempts to read the prison as a kind of 
metaphor, where the incarcerated "I" represents a universal truth about human identity. 
How;:-er, the inescapable material force ofthe apartheid prison, the weight of history 
behind it, insists in turn that the "I" is the metaphor, a fantasmatic reflection of the 
reality of the penal institution. Jameson's development of the idea of the "relative 
, autonomy" of litera~-~d-~~~~~:ultural production, discussed at some length in the 
introductory chapter, is germane here. In one sense, Breytenbach self-consciously 
assembles the "I" as a representative of a particular philosophical and literary -.-----_._--_.. _ ... _- -. __ .... -. .... .---- .. ---~--- •... "-.-.. --- - '-'._-_. 
constellation of ideas, and gains a form of distance from the traumatic reality of life in 
233 
------~----------------------"------------"-~--------------
prison through this endeavour. In another sense, the prison relentlessly organises and 
r--------- --------.----------------- - -- ---------------"" -- -
circumscribes the ideas that are used to describe it, constantly eroding the distance that 
- -_. --- ---
the...llaffating "I" attempts t~_£re-ateJi:omthe-WIltexLthat_l2!:9_voked the narration in the 
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Confessions, and the foundation of its strange shapelessness and its anxious self-
reflexivity. 
One way to begin addressing the question of the relationship between the narrating ---------~ect and the condition of incarceration is to look at the memoir's frequent allusions 
~-Wh~~~~~;~~b;~h'i;'fi;~td~~~i~~d,h;i'~'a-skedto~i;~ up by~ne of his--------_ ....... - . 
interrogators: 
There was no mirror; just a metal sheet screwed into the wall. In this surface one 
could see a vague reflection of yourself. Just enough to shave by. Like looking at 
a memory of yourself through an opaque sheet of glass. (32) 
Later, he describes cleaning his cell in Pretoria Central Prison: 
The floors ... were covered with plastic tiles ... and these had to be polished and 
kept shiny ... You had to be able to mirror your face in it. That was my Sisyphus 
task: making of my floor a mirror which could capture and return my real face -
which would be immediately walked over and sink back into greyness ... (142) 
What is striking about these passages is not just the opacity of the mirror image, but the 
sense in which the image is the result of prison labour: it is an image constructed in 
answer to an order. Becoming visible to oneself is, in both these instances, a kind of by-















Breytenbach's account of himself in True Confessions is ineradicably linked to his 
security police interrogators' practice of forcing him to write confessions for days on 
end. They constantly destroy his efforts and demand that he start over: 
'Write', they say, and you write. Two sheets. 'What must I write about, 
sir?' 'You know: just write.' And they come and they read the two pages, 
and they smile and they tear it up. 'Write', they say, and you write. You 
write the same two pages. You want to please them: you don't want to 
annoy them. (28-29) 
Rather like the mirror image in the polished floor, a self-representation is repeatedly 
----~-' ... -•.. 
produced and erased in answer to an unyielding demand. What Breyt~llbach . 
,.-.,0' ., ..... "., .. _."._ 
~-
foregrounds here is the way in~1!ich the act of rendering a s~lf..i~..rJpt some effortless, 
.-' .,,~ .. -- -'--"-.---"'--'---_.,- -.~-.--"-~-.,,--., .. -... ~' . --.. -.~~~--,--.¢' .. -,,--~-----
-------~---"'-.--,,---~""'."~.~.~-. 
spontaneous effect of subjectivity, 1mtarises in response to .the relentless and terrifying 
~ .. -------~.-... ---~-~---.-.. -.~~.---.-- -~ .. --~~.-~~"'- -~-... -" ,- -. " - ' .. '.~--~'"-.. , ... "'''' .. .".~,.,-~.---."...--
demands of police interrogation. There can be no moment of self-recognition or se~ 
'"":'.... '.' _~~-"'-'""'~""'~4~~~"'''''_~~ -"--.,.,..."""""_"~_,,,,>.. ... ,,,,,,.,,~, ..• , 
presence in the construction of such an autobiography because th~desrre6f1lle'"pi1Soll--' 
int~rcedes:-whatihesubject encounters in the metal sheet, the polished floor or the 
written confession is not self-presence, but a profoundly alienating and futile attempt to 
1mwide..JlIU:1g(;)Qll:rte r.esponse t() a demand that is never fully formulated. As Chapter 
Four, "Women in Prison", points out, Emma Mashinini describes a similar sense of 
abjection and self-loss during her interrogation sessions: 












Always they wanted the truth, when 1 had no more truth to tell. 1 don't think they 
ever understood that in fact there was nothing to give away. But they always tried 
to find it, this nothing. (Mashinini 75) 
For Mashinini, the impossibility of providing a version of her life that would satisfy her 
interrogators gains an almost material reality: what her interrogators demand under the 
rubric "truth" is actually an impossible concretisation of absence. The kind of 
confessional identity that is produced under such circumstances clearly intersects with 
the demands of a more "literary" confession - the production of a truthful account of an 
individual life - but at the same time it removes the belief in the possibility of self-
presence, spontaneity, agency and authenticity that has traditionally animated the 
construction of a confessional autobiography. 
While critics like Jolly would like to read Breytenbach's unstable "1" as a form of 
resistance to the prison's attempts to name and fix (Jolly 90), it is indisputable that the 
"de-stabilised" self in True Confessions attends at least in part on the way in which the 
narrator is addressed by the structures ofthe prison. The "destabilising" effects of 
solitary confinement aside6, the autobiographical "1" is persistently fragmented by its 
6 Breytenbach describes solitary confmement as " ... having all objectivity taken away from you": 
You watch yourself changing, giving in to certain things, becoming paranoiac, staring at the wall, 
living with an ear at the door and yet cringing at the slightest noise, talking to the ants, starting to have 
hallucinations - without ever being able to ascertain the extent of these deviations or this damage 
precisely because you have nothing against which to measure it. (130) 
It is difficult to square this terrifying sense of a loss of constancy with Jolly's claim that" ... the autonomy of 
the subject - its power to resist violation - lies in the de-stabilization, not the assertion, of the concept of the 


















genesis in a coerced confession. In his autobiography, Breytenbach invents a self which 
arises in a complex dialogic response to the structures of the prison - structures which 
simultaneously demand visibility and erode the self. The modem penitentiary requires 
the production of "life narratives": prisoner confessions, the biographising of prisoners' 
lives by the courts, by criminologists, by priests, by social workers, by psychologists, by 
parole boards, and so on. At the same time, and perhaps particularly in the apartheid 
prison, the prisoner is an anonymous nobody, severed from meaningful social and 
familial links, eroded by the brutality of life in prison, or psychologically fragmented by 
the deprivations of solitude. Like so many other prisoners' accounts, Breytenbach's text 
is suspended between these two polarities - on the one hand the prison's demand for a 
truthful portrait of an individual's personality and life, and on the other its inexorable 
assault on the very cornerstones of a stable identity. 
If the processes of interrogation and confession constitute the material underpinnings of 
r------- -------
interrogation are similarly implicated in the text's disquieting production of difference 
between self and other, its concomitant craving for a connection with others and its 











The memoir is addresse<;l to an ima~I1ClITjnterlQQ..uJQrxeferre<!~ in tum, as "Mr 
._____--- -------__ r' 




Now I must get rid ofthe unreality. I must vomit. I must eject this darkness. I 
must plead with you, Mr Investigator, to not stop asking me questions. Do not 
desist, do not tum away from me. (27) 
Here the interlocutor is ambiguously positioned between being a police interrogator, a 
priest, a psychoanalyst, and the reader of the text. The compulsion to write is both 
internal (as a writer, he writes to overcome the trauma) and external (the act of writing 
itself attends on a traumatic injunction), blurring the distinction between inner and outer 
pressure, between compulsion and compunction. The Ubiquitous "eye" which surveys 
and-cootrels becoIlies assocIated WIth the "I" whiclI~. What we find here is in fact 
C 
the structure of the panopticon outlined at the beginning of this chapter: the external eye 
that functions as an invisible centre to life in the Benthamite penitentiary derives its 
authority through a process ofprojection and internaliation. At some level, the imagined 
desires behind the gaze need to become internalised by the inmates ofthe panopticon. 
The shift from behaving as if the eye is always looking to identifying with the eye 
requires a minimal modification of consciousness, and is in fact central to the avowed 
refonnative goal of Bentham's architectural discovery. In solitary confinement, the 
surveillance of the eye is experienced as a particularly anxiety-provoking intrusion, 
















its focus. The authority of the gaze rests on the fact that it makes a demand of 
consciousness rather than (merely) ofthe body: it engages and reorganises the interior 
life ofthe subject. During interrogation, the desire ofthe interrogator and the existence 
of such a ubiquitous gaze become interchangeable. 
For Breytenbach, the confusion between the narrating "I" and the other, the 
incorporation of an alien desire to the self, attends first of all on the logic of 
interrogation, on the interrogator's claim to intimacy in a modern penitentiary. 
However, it also extends to addressee of True Confessions in the most general sense. 
every reader inevitably becomes an interrogator. The very act of scrutinising the 
memoir implicates the reader in the panopticon's mode of control and surveillance-
and in the case of this memoir, it implicates the reader specifically in a mode of control 
exploited by apartheid. For the Breytenbach who speaks as an "I" in True Confessions, 
there is simply no real difference between, on the one hand, the "literary" confession 
with its general, abstract audience, and, on the other, the process of self-scrutiny and 
confession, coupled with the demand for repentance, that is demanded by the 
penitentiary. The general, abstract form of the reader of confessional autobiography is 
simply the universalising fa9ade of authority in the prison. Any confession produces an 
anxiety-provoking confusion between an inner world and an external demand, between 
self and other. Even where Breytenbach addresses an activist community, he tends to 
locate them as interrogators: 
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I must tell you that I cannot hold my criticism, my disaffection, in abeyance; that 
I cannot condone your (our) agreements and compromises - not even tactically. I 
love you too bitterly for that. I hear you chuckling, you who are Black .. , (260) 
Here the "your" of the addressee is followed by an uncertain parenthesised "our", 




the demands of the prison than of a rhetoric of struggle and solidarity. The fact that 
~ --- ---..-----_,,~.-....._~ __ ... _ _ __ .•. ~._'" •. v,-.. ··--""·-···-··'-~--... -~ ____ _ 
Breytenbach self-consciously finds literary forms to represent these moments of 
.,~ -,,~ .~-~-.,-.-.' .. _----",_._-_. "-.~ --, - ----."'~-'-~,---~~--'~---". '''~-.-~.-.----"_.-" _. 
uncertainty"anQspliiTd;~tificailOn~f course alerts us to the difference between the "I" 
/'----
'-in the texf and the figure of the author: eveh as the prison imposes one-[oiin cjf 
consciousness, the act of writing an autobiography, which implies a form of self-
- .. " "." 
reflection and self-doubling, always already opens that consciousness to scrutiny and 
interrogation. , 
"'-
One way of apprehending Breytenbach's itinerant addressee (is he speaking to himself, 
to us, to his interrogators, to a general abstract audience?) is to read True Confessions as 
a staged encounter between the legal confession and the religious or psychoanalytic 
confession.7 Peter Brooks points out that these two confessional models in fact "emerge 
simultaneously, in a reciprocal influence" in Western thought (3). In many ways, the 
panoptic on, with its focus on reform, its deployment of solitary confinement and its 
belief in the power of reason and self-reflection, functions as one of the material sites 
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are, at least potentially, uncoupled from judgement and punishment. They are more typically aligned to self-
knowledge and the alleviation of a private burden. 
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where these two confessional fonns are both produced and connected to one another. 
Seen in this light, Breytenbach' s confusion of addressee simply surfaces something of 
the ideological and material grounds ofthe confessional fonn in literature. On the one 
hand, True Confessions paridocally reproduces a coerced police confession, and on the 
other it participates in a different tradition of confessional writing that is essentially 
self-examining and is associated with the authentication of inner truth - in J.M. 
Coetzee's fonnulation, this tradition begins more or less with Rousseau and is defined 
by "an underlying motive to tell an essential truth about the self' (J.M. Coetzee, 
"Confession" 194). For Breytenbach, the act of confession, whether it is in a literary 
autobiography or in a prison cell, is inescapably entangled with a particular mode of 
interrogation. 
Thr...Q~~~ the constant confusion of the interrogator and the self::- "image and mirror-
image", in Breytenbach's words (56) - the confession of a "crime" to another becomes 
the confession of guilt to the self. In the chapter titled "I Found Myself Confronted 
By", Breytenbach speaks in the first person aSfflei;rt~;;og;t-~;~ 
I am the rock, the flatfoot. I am stupid, not so? But you know of me. Here we are, 
today, still today, still this intenninable dark day, days and days for ever. I am 
with you. I never let go of you again. You are programmed. I cleanse you. I break 
you in. I break you down to the pure outcome of spontaneous confession and 
give-away and self-oblivion. Since I love you so. (57) 
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In the "pure outcome of spontaneous confession", the legal confession turns into the 
religious confession, and becomes fully internalised: in other words, the act of 
confession seems freely chosen, and arises from an inner compulsion to be absolved of 
sin. The more Breytenbach confesses, the more guilty he becomes of playing into the 
hands of the enemy, and the more he needs to confess in order to be absolved of the 
guilt. 
If Breytenbach is catapulted into this imaginary relationship between "I" and "you", self 
/~--"--.-...• .,.-.- .•••..... "" ... -"- ........ -.. 
" - -. ,-,._~_.~-,-~.- "'-~--"-.",,--
and mirror image, interrogated and interrogator, it is to a certain extent because th~ 
.,"~." .. ~,. ,~' ,.~--.--~~.-~ 
apart11eiQ~aifdltsAfri1«ilierTiii1aionanes addiesshim as an individual, and 
,..---. 
concede that he has subjective interiority. In the case of most black activists during 
apartheid rule, the prison had little interest in functioning as a "fuachtneforalterin,S. 
--minds" (Foucault 125). For them, the prison system remained radically other, treated 
:h~111as radically other, and was far more interested in torturing bodies than in 
reforming minds. For Breytenbach, the idea of physical torture is entirely fantasmatic, a 
--..'~.~- -
terrifying potential that emerges in speculative digressions, footnotes and an addendum 
on "Torture in South African Cells and Interrogation Rooms" (349-352). The function 
oftorture here is properly superegoic. Breytenbach tortures himself with fantasies of 
torture, even though torture is never raised in an overt way as a possibility by the police 
















way" (21). Torture functions to produce a particular fonn of psychological interiority, 
characterised by fear and dependency, rather than to punish.8 
In contrast, during Molefe Pheto's interrogation sessions, he is viciously assaulted and 
belittled. While they are torturing him, his interrogators lose any vestige of humanity: 
'My kaffertjie, you will call me baas!' ('My' here was pronounced in Afrikaans 
which in English would be like 'May'). The new one had gone berserk. He was a 
complete beast. Wild. 'You will fly like a kite with a motor karr without wheels!' 
as he wheeled around with his hands and body simulating the motor car he was 
talking about. He had looked really funny, more ugly and beastly than he had 
been. (Pheto 101) 
Pheto's reproduction of his interrogators' strange pronunciation, his focus on their 
absurdity, his insistence that they are beasts rather than people, simply reflect the regard 
in which they hold him. They are represented as people who are essentially incapable of 
coherent action or speech, beyond the pale of humanity. He points out that his attempts 
to confess are in fact impeded rather than facilitated by the torture: "But just as I was 
about to tell them I was ready to talk, they started again" (101). In this way, both 
torturer and victim are divested of language and incapable of dialogue. In The Body in 
Pain, Elaine Scarry observes: 
8 This was certainly not the case for all white political detainees and prisoners. For instance, Hugh Lewin 
describes his beating at the hands of his interrogators in graphic detail in his memoir Bandiet: Out of Jail (23-
27). 















Physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing 
about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and 
cries a human being makes before language is learned. (4) 
For Pheto, there is no possibility of confusing self and other. In fact, the brutal, single-
minded attack on his body allows him to retain a kind of independence of mind: there is 
no demand, in his description, that can be internalised, no possible confusion of voices 
and desires, because the exchange takes place beyond the parameters of reason and of 
ordinary speech. 
For the prison's individualisation process to work, at least a minimal level of 
recognition of sameness is necessary - a point implicit in Foucault's Discipline and 
Punish, but never explicitly spelt out. In Breytenbach's case, the apparatus ofthe state 
recognised him as a subject, and to a certain extent Breytenbach recognised the 
sUbjectivity of his interrogators. Throughout True Confessions, he is haunted by the 
familiarity of the houses the prison warders take him to, the familiarity of the language 
they use, the nostalgia they feel towards the South African landscape. His interrogators 

















An uncomfortable reciprocity and mutual recognition characterise many of his 
exchanges with prison and police officials. He observes about his security police 
interrogators: 
They are dangerous also because, despite the fact that they are conditioned to 
their work and believe blindly that they are justified in doing their thing, and 
questioning authority or the validity of an order has never been part ofthe 
Calvinist tradition, they are nevertheless very human with the same brittleness 
and the same doubts that you or I may have. The danger then comes from the 
internal conflicts they have to struggle with. The dichotomy is between doing 
what they have been conditioned to do unquestioningly and the leftover feelings 
of humane compassion, and - as they are not mentally or culturally equipped to 
resolve these contradictions or even to recognize them - they tend to become 
very violent in an unconscious effort to blot out and perhaps to surpass the 
uneasiness. However strange it may sound, Mr Eye, I am convinced that some of 
the people they have killed in detention probably died when the interrogator was 
in a paroxysm of unresolved frustrations, even that the interrogator killed in an 
awkward expression oflove and sympathy for a fellow human being. (49-50) 
Breytenbach's insight that people might have been murdered in detention as an 
expression of "love and sympathy for a fellow human being" relies, I would suggest, on 

















such as Molefe Pheto and Caesarina Makhoere, apartheid functionaries never present 
themselves in ways that invite understanding or identification: there is, on the whole, no 
ideological or cultural common ground between prisoner and interrogator, essentially 
because the interrogators do not allow or even conceive of such a possibility. 
Breytenbach's recognition of the humanity of his interrogators is carried through to his 
relationship with the reader, who is posited as someone both deeply familiar and 
intolerable. Throughout True Confessions, Breytenbach attempts to maintain alterity 
against the relentless inner and outer demand for the recognition of sameness, for 
identification with his interrogators. Ifhe finds the security police "entirely 
unreasonable", they can nonetheless "smile at one another and joke", sometimes over a 
cup oftea (46), human gestures that Breytenbach cannot help but identify with. 
Unlike writers like Nelson Mandela, Indres Naidoo or Moses Dlamini, Breytenbach 
finds it difficult to evoke a discourse outside the discourse ofthe prison, which seems to 
invade even his most private spaces. He finds it difficult to fix a purpose to his 
incarceration, or to find a cohesive ideological standpoint from which to comprehend 
and contain the experience of prison. His relationship to the African National Congress 
and the armed struggle is at best contradictory. The memoir takes care to deconstruct 
what he calls a "romantic view of underground work" (84): 
Have we veritably thought through all the negative connotations and results of 
armed struggle, and the dangers to the political ideas, which we cherish, of 
underground work itself? Isn't it very often just a Boy Scout Game? (85) 
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It is notable that one ofthe few sections ofthe book which uses the plural "we" is 
riddled with questions, qualifications and doubts. In contrast, when Mandela affects this 
pronoun in Long Walk, it often serves to obviate and negate doubts and uncertainties 
that attend on speaking as an individual. In addition, for Breytenbach, there does not 
seem to be a notion of an alternative future that might legitimise his experience in 
prison. If anything, the future presents itself in images of disaster or as are-emergence 
of the present moment: 
The African national Congress - or some organization still called the ANC for I 
am now projecting my mind into the distant future - will eventually rule the 
country. What's left of it. Judging from its practices in exile, inside the 
organization and towards other South African political groupings, its alliances 
and its ideological examples and commitments - it is conceivable that the present 
totalitarian State will be replaced by one which may be totalitarian in a different 
way, and intolerant of alternative revolutionary schools of thought, more 
hegemonic but minus the racism. (359) 
Either the future will hold nothing, or it will be substantially the same: apocalypse or 
repetition. 
For Breytenbach, the world of the present and the prison are all-encompassing. His 
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engaged and colonised by the prison. Language, time and space are endlessly 
reduplicated: 
Excuse me for taking refuge in my own language: there's always another 
language behind the present one; there's always another world living in the 
shadow ofthe one we share; there's for ever another room behind this one and in 
this other room there's another man sitting with a little tape recorder Whispering 
in his own ears, saying, 'There is another world living parallel to this one, there is 
another language on the other side of the wall being spoken by another man 
holding a little instrument, etc. etc.' (40) 
One could say that Breytenbach's physical solitary confinement becomes extended to a 
more abstract solitary confinement in a world of continual replication. Breytenbach 
\\ 
occupies a kind of narrative deadlock at the furthest extreme of the discourse of the 1\ 
prison itself: there is no "alternative story" or a "we" beyond the individualised "I" that \) \ 
might allow him the illusion of breaking through to the "other side". I: \ 
The question is whether a voice which is located in a place of endless repetition is 

















Turning the gaze from the window to the mirror has never been a way out or a 
way past: it has always proved to be what Breytenbach in Mouroir discovers it to 
be: a diversion. ("Breytenbach" 84) 
Indeed, the individualising logic of the penitentiary is designed to be self-enclosing and 
total. In Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela notes that in solitary confinement, "the mind 
begins to tum in on itself, and one desperately wants something outside oneself on 
which to fix one's attention" (397). Such an inward tum erodes the conditions that 
allow a sense of autonomy and collapses the difference between subject and ground. In 
effect, in the absence of any external points of reference, the mind itself becomes a 
projection ofthe prison. 
The question ofBreytenbach's ability to resist the power of the prison gains a broader 
importance when it is seen as a more general question about the ability ofthe subject to 
resist the individualising power of the modem penitentiary, which is designed 
specifically to suppress resistance at the level of consciousness itself? In other words, 
what are the modes of resistance available to prisoners such as Ruth First, Albie Sachs 
and Hugh Lewin, who encounter the more "modem" face of the apartheid prison? In the 
sense that white prisoners were far more likely to be interpellated by a recognisably 
Benthamite institution, the question in fact extends to an even more general level, where 
it relates to the subjectivation of white identities under apartheid: one should remember 
that the panopticon is ultimately a coercive, material realisation of a much broader 
social form of interpellation .. 
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In Breytenbach's case, I would suggest that there is in fact no immediate, significant 
moment of resistance present in the autobiographical text. The fluidity of narrative 
identity and the anxious self-questioning simply realise, in a fairly direct way, a subject 
position that is manufactured by the penal institution. The philosophical digressions and 
flights into poetry mask a kind of sUbjective destitution, a terrifying self-loss or 
aphanisis. They emerge as an aesthetic ising screen against the Real, a hole that is ripped 
into the subject's symbolic universe by the prison. 
At an ontological level, however, one could claim that Breytenbach's existence, both as 
the cause of his writing and as its retroactive effect, poses a challenge to the structure of 
the prison. If Breytenbach is trapped in a kind of traumatic aporetic impasse which 
attends on the prison's mode of interpellation, it is interesting that the prison seems to 
reach a similar limit in the figure of Breytenbach. His sense of self is thrown into crisis 
by his confinement, but his confinement also poses an ideological crisis for the 
apartheid system. This is evidenced by the constant clumsy attempts on behalf of 
security police agents and prison officials to "convert" him, which often collapse into 
nervous attempts at self-justification. Breytenbach's description of a Security Agent's 
attempts to convince him of the validity of apartheid is a case in point: 
There was Hendrik Goy, tortured, chain-smoking, again ambivalent; capable of 
fierce hatred, a chip on his shoulder, aware somehow of being a pariah in society, 
















able to terrorize others. I still hear him in his crude way trying to bring me to 
other insights, trying to argue into the silence that what they're doing is right. 
(43-44) 
If Goy is arguing "into the silence", then Breytenbach becomes the embodiment of that 
anxiety-provoking silence, a traumatic void in the self-construction of a particular kind 
of Afrikaner identity. The panopticon rests on the idea of rehabilitation, but 
rehabilitation is also one of its points of structural weakness. In order to effect the 
"reintegration" of its subjects, it needs to acknowledge the existence of the other, and 
enter into a conversation with him or her. 
In a South African context, where the idea of anti-social behaviour is simply not 
consonant with the principled actions of political activists, the rehabilitative drive of the 
prison inevitably reaches a moment where it has to justify itself in the face of the 
profound skepticism of both the national resistance movement and the international 
community. For this reason, the prison in apartheid South Africa was inevitably only 
ever a distorted part-version of a Benthamite reformatory institution: at the most crucial 
moment of its ideological interpellation it is compelled to render an account of itself, 
essentially to eXCUlpate itself, and in the process to lose its veneer of dispassionate 
universality. In the face to face encounter with the political prisoner, the "reformative" 
prison has to disclose both its deployment of power and its particularity, threatening the 















Again, Breytenbach serves as focus of anxiety not because of his otherness, but because 
of his sameness. His brother, Jan Breytenbach, serves as a kind of shadowy alter-ego in 
the memoir, linking Breytenbach by blood to the very centre of Afrikaner power. One 
of the memoir's deepest ironies is that Breytenbach, imprisoned for his rejection of 
Afrikaner hegemony, is allowed to write in prison in the interests of Afrikaans 
literature: 
Soon after my sentencing I applied in writing, as always in prison, in duplicate, to 
the authorities for the permission to paint and to write. Without me knowing 
about it similar requests were being made from outside, emanating from the 
South African milieu of writers and academics. People who absolutely rejected 
me and my ideas and what my life stood for but who, perhaps from an obscure 
sense of uncomfortable ness, ifnot guilt, and also, surely, because of a true 
concern for my work, applied to the minister to allow me to continue writing. 
'For the sake of Afrikaans literature.' Was it a way for some of them to establish 
in their own minds their evenhandedness? (159) 
In a way analogous to Breytenbach's inability to forge a stable self because of the over-
proximity between self and other, the Afrikaner establishment struggles to maintain a 
coherent,justifiable sense of its own identity precisely because Breytenbach is too 
closely identified with it. Breytenbach both belongs and does not belong; he writes in 
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threatens to destroy that identity. To identify with Breytenbach as an Afrikaner 
introduces a disquieting supernumerary element to Afrikaner identity. 
In a sense, then, Breytenbach's critique ofthe prison is most interesting precisely where 
he struggles to distance himself from its modes of operation, where he identifies most 
closely and uncomfortably with his own interrogators, and they with him. It is in fact 
where the process of interpellation - with its sustaining mechanisms of isolation, mutual 
identification and projection - proceeds in an unimpeded way that the apartheid prison 
is forced to confront the structural limitations of its modus operandi, where the 
panopticon becomes most clearly inadequate to the task it is required to perform in 
South African society. To put it differently, resistance in True Confessions resides in the 
production of an author rather than in the narrative itself. 
Solitary confinement, and particularl  its use in South African prisons under apartheid, 
is one of the most total and unremitting forms of imprisonment. It leaves little room for 
resistance because its object is explicitly the mind ofthe inmate; it appropriates the 
interiority of the subject. Especially where it is employed under the guise of "reform", it 
invades and permeates any attempt at self-narration, since its efficiency is in fact based 
on the production of narratives of self. 
However, for an institution based on Bentham's panoptic on to work, its operation must 
proceed in a way that is at least in theory invisible. To return to the model outlined at 
the beginning of the chapter, the gaze ofthe central authority must ultimately be 
253 
UU"e teILS t  r1"",1-.. ",u tsn~V1,emJa n
,ntrn,"ill1'''''' a el ll1
IS
IS
D ltlOI>uc:o  
 ......... 'u.










apprehended as the freely chosen exercise of reason; its literal presence must remain in 
the shadows. One of the gestures of resistance available to writers who recount their 
experience of solitary confinement is precisely to traverse the pacifying fantasy of a 
neutral, ubiquitous power, and to insist on including the anxiety-provoking, self-
distorting presence of the gaze as objet petit a in their narrative reconstructions. In some 
ways, this remains possible because the panopticon exists in a fraught and difficult 
relationship to apartheid, an ideology that was incessantly forced to justify itself by 
internal and external pressures. 
As this thesis tries to illustrate, white prisoners were much more likely to encounter the 
traditional Benthamite prison because the prison recognised their subjectivity and saw 
them as participants in the proj ect of modernity. The problematics of a confessional 
autobiography, so closely associated with the emergence of a modern individualising 
penitentiary, becomes in the field of the prison memoir predominantly a form of "white 
writing". However, solitary confinement was at the same time widely applied in all 
South African prisons. The experience of being deprived of community and of the 
sustaining stability of a freely assumed shared symbolic marks the "I" of every voice 
that describes imprisonment. At the heart of every South African prison autobiography 
is an awareness of the individual subject as a vanishing point. The prison memoir, and 
by extension the subjectivities that it gave rise to, is compelled to establish a 
relationship with the echo of abjection and disintegration that is invited by every use of 
the word "I". Without acknowledging the role of solitary confinement in the apartheid 
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SIX: CONCLUSION: THE PRISON AFTER APARTHEID 
In "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", Louis AIthusser points out that 
Repressive State Apparatuses - which would include the police, the courts and the 
prisons - are determined by a double functioning. While they function primarily by 
repression, a secondary ideological function guarantees their cohesion and 
reproduction (19). One ofthe main aims of this thesis has been to focus on the 
ideological performance, rather than the repressive agency, of the prison in South 
Africa before 1994. My primary interest has been in the connection between the 
material practices and rituals of the apartheid prison and the (ideological) construction 
of subjectivity, or, to use a more properly Althusserian phrasing, the construction of an 
imaginary relation between the subject and the real relations of production. 
The massive influence of the prison on every sphere of existence in South African 
society has meant in effect that the prison defied narrow delimitation as a repressive 
institution, and started functioning as an influential instrument in the production of 
ideology. It produced ways of thinking about the self, it presented influential ways of 
apprehending collective agency, it demarcated the boundaries and the rules of the 
struggle against apartheid, and it generated more general ideas around ethics and 
citizenship. Nowhere is this more clear than in autobiographical writing about the 













experience of incarceration; the imagining of a self is inexorably entangled with the 
experience of the penal institution. 
As the introductory chapter emphasises, the apartheid prison's forms of subjectivation 
have retained currency after the democratisation of South African society: to 
understand ideas of "self' in the post-apartheid moment, we need to understand 
something of the ideological demands of the apartheid state's repressive apparatuses. 
The prison autobiography serves to provide an image ofthe national subject as 
ontologically undecidable - in other words, still engaged in the process of becoming -
and also, after apartheid, to consolidate a new hegemonic national SUbjectivity. 
Specifically, the utopian concept of community as a site where differences are 
overcome, reconciliation becomes possible and individual talent is fostered and valued 
is galvanised by the apartheid prison's drive towards individualisation and segregation. 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the regenerative potential of communal life emerges as 
a powerful theme across a broad spectrum of prison autobiographies, where the value 
of a solidarity emerges in an agonistic relationship to the penal system's forms of 
control: community is, in a very real sense, defined through reference to the 
segregation and alienation that characterised life in South African prisons and in the 
broader social arrangements that the prison reflected and sustained. 
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When the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) released its final report in 
1999, the concept of "Ubuntu" featured prominently in its description of its 
philosophical and ethical grounds in both the first and the fifth volumes. The report 
explains this concept through reference to the proverb "umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu", 
which it translates as "one only is a person through other persons" (1.5: 39). In effect, 
the TRC instated this term at the very centre of national self-relation: it has, in fact, 
become difficult to follow any discussion of communal responsibility in a South 
African context without encountering this term. l Its use in actuality links post-
apartheid emphases on communalism and nation-building to a kind of organic 
traditional African wisdom, despite the fact that, as Christoph Marx observes, "no 
historical evidence has been produced to substantiate this alleged community culture" 
(52). In fact, the contours of a communal ideology, and specifically the association of 
community with nation, were forged at the height of the struggle against apartheid, and 
apartheid prisons were important laboratories for the production of ideas about 
collective agency and responsibility. The reliance on the vague concept of "Ubuntu" 
masks some of the specific material- and relatively modem - foundations of post-
apartheid communalism. 
If the prison helped to supply a model for community, prison memoirs also reveal the 
experiences that had to be excluded in order to forge powerful national tropes such as 
I See, for instance, Sharlene Swartz's "A Long Walk to Citizenship: Morality, Justice and Faith in the 
Aftermath of Apartheid", Desmond Tutu's The Rainbow People of God: A Spiritual Journey from Apartheid to 
Freedom, Dirk Louw's Ubuntu and the Challenges of Multiculturalism in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 
Augustine Shutte's Ubuntu: An Ethicfor a New South Africa, Mfuniselwa Bhengu's Ubuntu: The Essence of 














Ubuntu. Chapter Three, "On Robben Island", examines in some detail the forms of 
violence, and the processes of exclusion, that attended on the construction of 
communal identities in prison. The prison memoir reminds us of both the origin and 
the spectre of conflict and prohibition that haunts the utopian idea of community. In 
addition, prison autobiographies show us how a collective identity is ultimately a 
refuge from the deprivations of enforced solitude: the desperate desire to perform an 
intersubjective identity stems, in the first place, from a form of torture that produces 
alienation and madness. If the prison memoir incessantly extols the virtues of a 
collective life, it is also marked by a recoil from a terrifying loss of self that is bound 
up with Enlightenment technologies of individual is at ion. Solitary confinement remains 
simultaneously a kind of supernumerary excess to and an important foundation of 
contemporary forms of national identity. 
At present, the experience ofthe apartheid prison is progressively harnessed to serve 
and to legitimise the emergent hegemonic ideologies ofthe democratic state. Recently 
published texts such as Mac Maharaj's Reflections in Prison (2001) and Ahmed 
Kathrada's A Free Mind (2005) indicate the sense in which the apartheid prison 
memoir has become almost seamlessly connected to the language of mainstream 
politics: these texts are not so much autobiographies as policy statements, a collection 
of philosophical and political essays that serve to disclose the continuity between the 
principles and opinions of apartheid prisoners and government policy in the present 
post-apartheid moment. While the apartheid prison is mythologised as a space of 
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struggle, transformation and reflection, conditions in real prisons in South Africa 
remain dismal. The 2005 Jali report on corruption and violence in South African 
prisons outlines a calamitous situation in the Department of Correctional Services, with 
widespread corruption, maladministration and routine infractions of prisoners' 
constitutional rights. Prisons are overcrowded and inmates are "subjected to torture and 
other treatment that would be deplorable in any democratic or civilised society" 
(Republic of South Africa 333). Solitary confinement remains widespread as a form of 
punishment (336). The C-Max Prison in Pretoria, constructed under the new 
democratic government, is characterised by the report as an institution designed to 
"punish and even torture" its inmates (365). Prison rapes are common and warders 
either turn a blind eye to sexual assault or actively participate in the sexual exploitation 
and rape of prisoners (390-462). In effect, the promotion of the apartheid prison as the 
birthplace of a democratic nation is paralleled by a scandalous neglect of deteriorating 
conditions in existing prisons - a situation that is exacerbated by a public outcry about 
spiraling crime rates in South Af ica and the consequent demonisation of criminal 
offenders. A series of public promises made by the Department of Correctional 
Services in 1997 to ensure even harsher conditions for prison inmates met with little 
resistance from the public or from political parties (Oppler 46). 
Against this background, life stories that have been emerging from post-apartheid 
prisons are marketed as survival stories or as anthropological studies: with the demise 
of apartheid, the prison autobiography rapidly lost its significant status in South 
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African letters. Texts such as Heather Parker Lewis's The Prison Speaks (2003) and 
Julia Landau's Journey to Myself: Writings by Womenfrom Prison in South Africa 
(2004) are typical of the new prison autobiographies. They straddle the line between 
biography and autobiography, and represent the experience of prison in a frame loosely 
defined by the Social Sciences: located somewhere between a confessional narrative 
and a biographical investigation, they use prisoners' stories in the service of therapy, to 
disclose something about the hardship of life in prison, and to reflect on the social 
conditions that have governed the lives of prisoners. For all their reformative zeal, they 
sometimes come perilously close to fulfilling a function identified with the penitentiary 
apparatus: the production of biographical, individualising knowledge about prisoners. 
As Foucault notes: 
The introduction of 'biographical' is important in the history ofpenality. Because 
it establishes the 'criminal' as existing before the crime and even outside it. And, 
for this reason, a psychological causality, duplicating the juridicial attribution of 
responsibility, confuses its effects. At this point one enters the 'criminological' 
labyrinth from which we have certainly not emerged: any determining cause, 
because it reduces responsibility, marks the author ofthe offence with a 
criminality all the more formidable and demands penitentiary measures that are 














These kinds of autolbiographies effectively mark the depoliticisation of imprisonment 
after apartheid, or at least the strategic relegation of the political to the globally 
marketable realm of personal suffering and survival. 
One ofthe most interesting and self-reflexive texts to emerge from and in fact to 
critique the genre of post-apartheid prison narratives is Jonny Steinberg's The Number 
(2004). Steinberg's book chronicles the life story of Magadi en Wentzel, whom he 
meets in Pollsmoor prison in 2002 and follows after his release in 2003. Wentzel is 
introduced to Steinberg by Johnny Jansen, the prison head, who clearly sees Wentzel 
as an advertisement for the post-apartheid prison's ability to reform its inmates. In 
other words, Wentzel is presented by the highest authority figure in the prison as a 
representative subject, the product of a new national and institutional culture. As a 
complex intimacy is established between interviewer and interviewee, Wentzel starts to 
exceed the frame provided by the prison. On the one hand, the idiosyncrasies of his life 
militate against such a representative role, and on the other the "new" culture of the 
prison seems inextricably bound up with traditions and rituals that extend to at least the 
end ofthe nineteenth century. 
In some ways, Steinberg's book participates in a more general post-apartheid shift 
away from political prison autobiographies towards a more collaborative, interview-
driven memoir. (Another example is Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela's A Human Being 
Died that Night (2003), an account of Gobodo-Madikizela's interviews with Eugene de 
261 1 
IS
avel m; na ll1
ID(:X JrIC,lb  










Kock, the commanding officer ofthe apartheid death squads.) One material catalyst for 
the prevalence of this kind of autolbiography is perhaps the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), where the testimony ofthe victims and perpetrators of apartheid 
were assembled in a social and legal space that foregrounded the idea of personal 
testimony as collective endeavour. Autobiographical narratives were produced under 
court-like circumstances, with interlocutors posing specific questions working towards 
a clearly defined goal. Moreover, the TRC reached the bulk of the South African public 
through the media, so that journalists essentially became the editors of and 
commentators on the life stories that they were recording. Steinberg, in other words, 
draws on a dominant post-apartheid understanding of narratives of personal suffering 
and transformation as a form of public dialogue. In the process, as with Gobodo-
Madikizela's account, it becomes difficult to locate the subject ofthe narrative: as 
much as Steinberg recounts Magadien's life story, he is of course also producing an 
autobiographical narrative about his own encounter with Magadien and his world. 
One consequence of such a collaborative approach to the construction of a life story is 
that the interviewer appropriates and potentially misrepresents the subject's narrative. 
As Steinberg notes: 
I have used the words 'I' and 'me'. 'I say to Magadien ... ' 'Magadien tells me ... ' 
As if we are equals. We are not. The relationship between ajoumalist and his 
subject is never a relationship between equals. The 'I' in the pages ofthe book the 
262 
: un ll L"J"'- UU"U 
o C:Olll  













journalist pens is not a flesh-and-blood being with a soul to be bared and a heart 
to be scorched. He is a cipher, an abstraction; he is a pair of eyes that sees all. The 
subject, on the other hand, the 'Magadien', he is the one with the bared soul and 
scorched heart. The 'I' is capable of doing him violence. (240) 
In the same way that the prison head attempts to use Magadien to make a point about 
~ '"-. ..,.-~<.~----------...---
his prison, ~uses Magadien in the service of his own narrative about South 
~, .. ,.-,-.~.~-.... 
,------
The point is not, of course, that this erodes the spontaneity 
and authenticity of the narrative: as this thesis has argued, even the most confessional 
autobiographies are shaped by the public roles that they play. Rather, the point is that 
different uses of the same life narrative become entangled with one another. Magadien 
is interested in a kind of therapeutic retrieval of memory, while Steinberg is interested 
in writing a popular analysis of South African society at a particular historical juncture. 
One could say that post-apartheid autolbiographies are marked by a kind of fracturing 
of purpose, an uncertainty about the frame and utility of self-narration. Steinberg is 
perhaps unusual in foregrounding this anxiety, but the interweaving of voices in any 
collaborative autobiography necessarily highlights the fact that self-construction is 
------. 
governed by socially located relations of power and undermines some of the traditional 
autobiography's claim to artless transparency. 
Where Steinberg departs from some ofthe conventions that are emerging around post-




















between political imprisonment and other forms of incarceration. In this sense, 
Steinberg rejects the idea of a clear line that marks off post-apartheid criminal 
"confessions" from the valorised autobiographical narrative space of political prisoners 
under apartheid - a line that is absolutely essential to emerging myths about South 
African nationhood. 
First of all, he notes that Wentzel is initially imprisoned in the late 1970s for his 
involvement in anti-apartheid politics. During his spell in Victor Verster prison, he is 
recruited into the 28s, one of the three Numbers gangs (the others are the 26es and the 
27s). The movement from fighting against apartheid to becoming a criminal gangster 
seems almost seamless in Wentzel's account: in his reconstruction of events, the 
struggle against the white government and his embrace of gang culture are nearly 
synonymous. As Steinberg points out, a material contributory factor to this slide from 
political to criminal activity had to do with prison conditions. Unlike activist leaders, 
rank-and-file demonstrators were thrown into overcrowded open cells with the Number 
gangs (Steinberg 141). For someone like Wentzel, who had grown up on the periphery 
of gang culture, the shift from political activism to gangsterism was not really 
extraordinary: 
The truth is that, culturally and socially, Magadien was far closer to the prisoners 

















from neighbourhoods like his; they had broken into the homes and factories of the 
Cape Flats,just as he had. (Steinberg 142) 
In other words, Steinberg insists on recognising the complex interstitial, itinerant 
nature of the identities of people disenfranchised by apartheid, and resists Magadien's 
attempts to glamorise himself as either a gangster or a political activist by pointing out 
the moments of dissonance and fissure in his self-construction. After Steinberg records 
Magadien's version of crowd violence during the post-1976 protest marches, he 
comments: 
When Magadien describes the scenes, you can make out the complex strands of 
his identity; the activist, celebrating the memory of white retreat, the haunted soul 
remembering the fallen figures who were once merged into a crowd, and the 
gangster who watches with glee as the world was turned upside down. (140-141) 
In this way, Steinberg's book constructs a subjectivity that is increasingly fractured 
c ~~---------------.~--.---, •• - .•• ---.---•• ----.• ----•• ---~.-.--'.--~ ... ---•• -~-----. 
precisely in its subject's attempts to create a coherent, integrated identity: the dialogic 
~;hi~hWentzel's story is presented interweaves the activity ofself~-'--"----
~-------.-----.-... --.. -.--.- .. _. __ c __ .. _._._._ ..... _.-·.· ...... ---.c 
representation with deconstruc!jye_~!'itical !~f.1ection~_o.l!t!?:eI1atur~ and uses of 













One of Steinberg's most penetrating insights relates to the way Wentzel appeals to the 
language of myth in his bildung. Thus he points out that Wentzel's claim that he was 
imprisoned for the first time in 1976 is unlikely, but remarks: 
That he fiddled with his own formative moment, placing it in June 1976, one of 
the most formative moments in recent South African history, is poignant and 
telling. For he is doing with his personal history exactly what a nation does with 
its own; it freezes a moment in time, paints it in bold and gaudy brush strokes, 
and uses it as a device to explain where it has come from and why it has turned 
out the way it has. (137) 
Steinberg picks up here on an entanglement between personal history and the 
e_._________ _ __ ~-------
construction ofa national identity that is in fact typical of many oft~J~2Jiti~~~ 
.. _r ----'---_~._. __ r_.c._~~~_H __ ~_ ~. ___ -.--... , .. ____ ... _. .... . _ . ___ .. "' _ -
~e:tnt5'Gs discussed in previous chapters of the thesIs. However, instead of enlarging his 
~"""-... -.----".",,,----.-. ,..-._----_._- ..-
own life story in order to produce a kind of national history, in the way Nelson 
Mandela does in Long Walk to Freedom, Wentzel uses South African history as a way 
to provide coordinates and significance to his personal memories. To put it differently, 
the political is used in service of the personal, rather than the personal in service of the 
political. The significance of 1976 as an important turning point in South African 
history becomes articulated with Wentzel's recollection of a private crossroads. This is 
perhaps indicative of a larger shift in the prison memoir, and in South African 













and myths of national history start to function as indices in the construction of 
individual lives. Concomitantly, communal history becomes reduced to a somewhat 
discoherent collection of mythologised events. 
In addition to the orthodox public history that informs Wentzel's story, he also draws 
on the parabolic history of the Numbers gangs, which can be traced back to the story of 
Nongoloza and his lieutenant Kilikijan, two bandits in Johannesburg in the early 20th 
century. Steinberg takes care to distinguish between the "real" history of Nongoloza 
and the fable-like history, "an odd hybrid of Homeric and Talmudic tales" (Steinberg 
43) that Numbers gang members are forced to memorise as part of their induction into 
the gangs: 
The first is a real-historical figure who walked the actual streets of early 
Johannesburg. The second is the mythical Nongoloza, whose story was invented 
and transmitted by thousands of South African prisoners. (Steinberg 35) 
As much as Wentzel's self-construction is framed by the real events of the South 
African transition to democracy;irisalS(}infonned_byakindofparane1~-~ythol~gised 
andOiiiiy-tra~smitted prison history. By commenting on the collusions and frictions 
that are generated between these two different understandings of history, Steinberg 
both resists the homogenisation of history that is typical of many apartheid-era 














identity that is eminently political. On the one hand, the secret mythical history of 
Nongoloza is understood as a story about black resistance to colonial law: Nongoloza's 
banditry is seen as a rejection of migrant labour on the mines and as an attempt to 
wrest power and wealth from white exploiters. On the other hand, the Numbers gangs 
offer a kind of "official" account ofthemselves that translates gang activity into a form 
of communal activism. Steinberg transcribes a speech that Wentzel plans to deliver to 
the Minister of Correctional Services when he visits Pollsmoor prison: 
'I salute the 26,27 and 28 groups for showing courage. They stood up and fought 
for our rights under the apartheid regime, for us to be treated in a humane way. 
But when democracy came to South Africa everyone forgot the blood that we 
shed in prison for the sake of democracy. Instead we were labelled as gangsters. 
Let me put the record straight: we were never gangsters. With our souls and our 
minds we were freedom fighters. We put our bodies and lives on the line for 
democracy, and we are doing it yet again for change.' (18) 
The echoes between Wentzel's self-construction and the forms of self-presentation 
employed by many anti-apartheid campaigners is disturbing on a number of levels. 
First, it suggests that the language of political activism and communitarianism is 
eminently appropriable. If a gang member can construct his or her subjectivity using 
the language of self-sacrifice and the struggle for political freedom, it implies that the 
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discursive, rhetorical element that this form of language in fact needs to conceal in 
order to work effectively. Second, it intimates that the rigid border between political 
prisoners and criminal prisoners might not be as self-evident as many anti-apartheid 
activist autobiographies suggest. By offering even a tenuous link between gang activity 
and the struggle against apartheid, the self-justificatory public rhetoric of the gangs 
threatens to dispel the idea of a criminal other against which the new democratic order 
has to define itself. As Chapter Three ("On Robben Island") points out, the "two 
prisons" model is absolutely essential to the construction of a hegemonic model of 
citizenship through sacrifice and struggle: the idea that gangsters might be animated by 
notions of the public good removes the ontological premise of normative post-
apartheid concepts of "self' that emerge in memoirs of political imprisonment. The 
idea of a subject who is both a criminal and an activist is properly speaking grotesque, 
as this thesis discusses in relation to Moses Dlamini's "Poqo-criminals" in his Hell 
Hole, Robben Island (1984). 
Through his careful recording and scrutiny of Magadi en Wentzel's life story, Steinberg 
creates a post-apartheid collaborative autolbiography that manages to deconstruct some 
of the premises of canonised anti-apartheid political memoirs. Specifically, he returns 
to ideas surrounding the unity of self, the construction of a homogenous public history, -------------- .. ---'.-.----.---.--.--.• --~.----.----- ... -...... -... -.- ..•...... _.-................... -- •... , 
the unassailable dignity and integrity of struggle, and the link between the story of a 
self and the story of a community, in order to ask penetrating and unsettling questions 
~--'.-~ -. ---"~,-.... ~.-----.-.,.-.-~ 















Simultaneously, he offers new possibilities for the prison memoir in the post-apartheid 
moment precisely by retaining many of the strengths of the apartheid prison 
autobiography. Instead of producing a semi-voyeuristic victim narrative, Steinberg 
manages to perpetuate the tradition of radical social analysis and criticism forged under 
apartheid. For Steinberg, the prison remains a privileged explanatory space in a society 
that remains deeply marked by the mass criminalisation and imprisonment of its 
citizens. The Number insists that the construction of identity in prison discloses the 
'~---.. ~.~.~.,,~ 
play of power in society in general. Nonetheless, it is attained at the expense of 
-.--.-----.--.~ 
wresting ownership of the story that the book recounts away from its original teller. 
Considering the book's erosion of Wentzel's autonomy and transparent self-presence, 
the reader remains haunted by the possibility that the text ultimately serves to 
represent not Wentzel's narrative, but the more privileged voice and values of the 
journalist. Even at its best, the post-apartheid prison life story seems caught between 
subreption and radical critique. 
Steinberg's insistence on the prison's central role in understanding post-apartheid 
~---- ---------
SUbjectivity and social arrangements, however, stands out in a social context where the 
---------------existence and role of the prison is generally disregarded. After decades of living under 
a police state, South Africans seem anxious to return the prison and its apparatuses to 
the margins of visibility. 










The only dominant social institution that has insisted on sustaining the language of the 
prison and its jUdiciary apparatus in a clearly visible, public way has been the TRC. In 
some ways, the logic behind the TRC has been precisely to invoke the spectre of 
imprisonment, the logic of interrogation, the drive towards refonnation and the 
processes of public trials in order to escape from a history defined by imprisonment. 
As such, its wager is that a kind of iteration of the defining processes of a police state, 
but inflected through the desire for reconciliation and public accountability, will 
constitute an event that will untie the nation's bonds to its oppressive past. The TRC is 
really a machine for producing autobiographical accounts that serve a communal or 
national interest. In this way, it fulfils a function remarkably similar to the function that 
the apartheid prison inadvertently served. If, in other words, the prison autobiography 
has become a diminished and marginalised fonn in the post-apartheid moment, the 
TRC has until recently retained specific penal technologies in a role that is central to 
and productive of post-apartheid national identity. 
I mention the TRC because it is so clearly a post-apartheid continuation and a radical 
reevaluation of a certain penal logic - and, moreover, its orientation is towards the 
manufacture of narratives about the self. However, it falls beyond the scope of this 
thesis to engage in a sustained and thorough way with the work and role of TRC. I will 
remark briefly on a few aspects of the TRC in order to return to one of the central 















other words, does the TRC simply reproduce the material agency of the prison in a new 
context, or does it unsettle the power ofthe prison and its institutions? 
One of the most important ways in which the TRC revises the juridicial and penal logic 
that it appropriates is by transforming what were essentially private rituals into public 
displays. In this way, the element of secrecy that governed the apartheid prison and its 
institutions is eroded. Thus, for instance, the idea of confession is moved by the TRC 
from an essentially clandestine, classified domain to the public arena, where the 
confessional narratives of both victims and perpetrators become social acts that escape 
juridical and penal circumscription. Consequently, they can be used, disseminated and 
translated across a range of social institutions. 
A remarkable example of this repetition and publicisation of one ofthe most concealed 
elements of detention under apartheid - police interrogation and torture - can be found 
in the TRC's questioning of a former Security Policeman, Captain Jeffrey Benzien, on 
July 14, 1997 during his amnesty hearing. A South African Press Association release 
describes how Benzien is asked by ANC MP Tony Yengeni to simulate his technique 
on a colleague, Mncebisi Sikhwatsha: 
A hush fell over the amnesty hearing venue in Cape Town and the audience 
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Benzien, his voice breaking, returned to the witness stand and under persistent 
questioning from Yengeni admitted there was always the possibility that people 
might lose consciousness. (SAP A, "Former Policeman") 
In this instance, it seems the tables are turned between the former interrogator and his 
victim: Benzien is the one who is interrogated and potentially humiliated, largely 
because of the public nature of the hearings. As Antjie Krog points out in Country of 
my Skull, however, Benzien uses the occasion to expose Yengeni's betrayal of his 
comrades while he was under torture: 
'Do you remember, Mr Yengeni, that within thirty minutes you betrayed Jennifer 
Schreiner? Do you remember pointing out Bongani Jonas to us on the highway?' 
And Yengeni sits there - as if begging this man to say it all; as if betrayal or 
cowardice can only make sense to him in the presence of this man. (73) 
This public repetition of the act of interrogation both repeats and explodes the logic of 
a legal confession. On the one hand, the intimacy of the relationship between torturer 
and victim is reinvoked in order to produce a narrative that relates to factual evidence, 
motivation and culpability in ways that are consonant with a security police 
interrogation. On the other hand, the unrestricted civic nature of the hearing ensures 
that the roles of witness, interrogator, jurist and judge become entirely communal, 













are never conclusively decided or resolved. Thejouissance of torture, a sinister, veiled 
support for the ostensibly neutral and dispassionate operation of justice, erupts in full 
public view during one of the most publicised hearings in South African history. As 
Slavoj Zizek points out, the moment the foreclosed dimension of perverse enjoyment 
becomes visible in the symbolic field, the symbolic itself loses its coherence and 
credibility (Totalitarianism 160-165). By instating the act of torture as a spectacle in a 
juridical context, the entire symbolic edifice of law and punishment is denaturalised: 
something "goes wrong" with the rituals of justice. In "Renegotiating Responsibility 
after Apartheid", Mark Sanders points out: 
To a certain extent, we, as interdisciplinary scholars oflaw, want things to go 
awry, to "go wrong". When operating boundaries are transgressed and quasi-
juridical conventions are renegotiated, other dimensions of responsibility may be 
broached. Once that takes place, however, one cannot anticipate what will unfold. 
(592) 
In other words, the sense of the uncanny that arises during the Benzien trial, of an 
unraveling of the appropriate procedures, catapults the questions of accountability and 
guilt into the domain of the undecidable. In Alain Badiou's terms, the Benzien hearing 
participates in the logic of an event. Elements of the apartheid penal system-
interrogation, confession, standing trial - are removed from their original context and 













ambivalence. In this way, the apartheid penal and juridical system confronts itself in 
the TRC, which is essentially a mirroring device, an apparatus for effecting 
transference. As Mark Sanders points out, "[t]ransference is a way of staging in the 
present a past set of experiences, and is an alternative to direct confrontation with 
figures who are linked to traumatic events" (591). Thus even though Benzien is still the 
same man who tortured Yengeni, the TRC also forces him to play the role of the man 
who tortured Yengeni: transference is achieved because Benzien is and is not himself, 
he effectively stands in for himself in the juridical space provided by the TRC. 
Through this process of redoubling, mediation and symbolic substitution, the TRC's 
"staging in the present" of the penal logic of apartheid becomes a way of returning to 
the past while maintaining a form of temporal and spatial distance. The same actors, 
the same material spaces, are irrevocably fractured through the act of re-presenting the 
past. 
One of the TRC's most important instruments for escaping from the retributive 
apartheid logic of surveillance and punishment was the process of amnesty. In some 
ways, the need for amnesty was a practical necessity rather than an abstract desire for 
restorative justice. As Charles Villa-Vicencio points out, an important consideration 
for the new regime 
... was the need for amnesty to ensure a peaceful transition from the old to the 
new. Not least was the need to ensure the support ofthe security forces in 
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safeguarding the elections and the emerging democracy against those intent on 
destroying it. (2) 
In other words, amnesty was introduced in order to conserve order, specifically by 
maintaining the loyalty of the security forces. In this sense, it is possible to consider 
amnesty not so much as a process designed to break from the materially based 
procedures and structures of the past as to ensure, at least at a minimal level, their 
continuation. 
While amnesty plays a conservative role, it also promises a kind of interruption of 
history, a new beginning. Erik Doxtader points out that the Western use ofthe idea of 
amnesty, as it was developed in antiquity, had less to do with forgetting than with a 
form of acting: 
Amnesty ... is less an outright forgetting than aforeclosing on the ability of 
individuals to use a past event as grounds for a certain behaviour. It requires that 
we act as if that which we remember - and which is delineated explicitly in some 
kinds of amnesty decrees - is no longer available as a justification or reasonable 
cause for action. (127) 
Following this definition, amnesty is equivocally situated between forgetting, or acting 
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recorded in the very act of granting amnesty. Amnesty therefore allows a "new 
beginning" by carefully blocking off - and, in the process, preserving - the past. 
In the case of the TRC, one of its conditions for granting amnesty was full disclosure 
by the perpetrators of human rights abuses. These disclosures became a matter of 
public record, an attempt to provide, in broad strokes, an accurate picture of recent 
South African history. The TRC therefore generated and recorded public memory even 
as it attempted to produce forgetting. While the confessions of perpetrators were 
produced and chronicled, they were placed under erasure: the nation, in some ways 
performatively constituted through the very act of witnessing these confessions, was 
tasked with acting as if the acts referred to in the testimonies had never occurred. 
In the practice of amnesty, we find another example of an ambiguous return to past 
events. It would be a mistake to think of amnesty as an element that is utterly foreign 
to apartheid penal logic. In fact, apartheid police interrogations often relied precisely 
on a provisional, individualised form of amnesty: once the detainee confessed, and 
implicated his or her colleagues, there was always the tantalising possibility of being 
set free, of the police acting "as if' what they know is no longer reasonable grounds for 
the prosecution ofthe individual. As with other elements ofthe TRC, amnesty gains a 
restorative function because it is the public expression and application of a term that 
the apartheid penal system applied in a private and idiosyncratic way. 
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Amnesty therefore does not figure a radical break with the past, but is instead an 
appropriation and translation of an extant juridical and penal concept. Its function is 
inherently conservative: the texts that are produced in the service of amnesty cannot rip 
apart the social fabric precisely because they are under erasure, serving both as records 
of memory and as instruments that serve forgetting. 
Where amnesty does escape from the logic of the past is in its refusal of agonistic 
identities, probably one of the most characteristic features of identities generated in 
prison. As this thesis has argued, it is precisely through the fact that prisoners recoil 
from the prison and its procedures that they remain in some sense bound to it: amnesty 
promises to excise the prison from South African life both materially and 
psychologically, particularly by refusing the logic of antagonism and othering that is so 
central to the oppressive agency ofthe apartheid prison. 
The TRC, in other words, retained the juridical and penal structures of apartheid in the 
service of escaping from its penal logic. Its efficacy remains in doubt: partly because it 
simply never managed to become public enough, and partly because its success 
depends on a form of ambiguous duplication, a break with the oppressive past through 
a replication of some of its rituals. 
We are left, then, at the present moment, at a moment of uncertainty. Real prisons are 
increasingly forgotten as the material space of the prison loses its power to shape 
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notions of self and nation. At the same time, the TRC has ensured that a certain judicial 
and penal structure remains at the kernel of political life in South Africa, where it has 
become entangled with concepts of forgiveness, national duty, responsibility towards 
others and with the construction of a communal history. As South African notions of 
accountability, the contours of communal existence, of duty towards others and the 
nature of self and citizenship become increasingly abstract, it is worth remembering 
that such abstractions are forged through material institutions and share a specific, 
local history. The prison memoir is a reminder of the material forces that have 
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